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Abstract
This study explored several predictors of posttraumatic growth (PTG) in a sample
of 169 breast, prostate and colorectal cancer survivors. The first aim was to determine the
influence of Anxiety, Depression and Perceived Threat (defined as the combination of
Life Outlook Threat, i.e., the degree a cancer diagnosis challenged a survivor’s
assumptive world, and Physical Threat, i.e., threat to mortality and physical well-being)
in the prediction of Positive and Negative Cognitive Processing. The second aim was to
examine the effect of Anxiety, Depression, Perceived Threat, and Positive and Negative
Cognitive Processing in the predication of PTG.
Cancer survivors who were treated at one of the Denver Division clinics of the
Rocky Mountain Cancer Center participated in the study. Since little empirical research
has been conducted utilizing the variable of cognitive processing in the psychological
literature, the study sought to investigate how Anxiety, Depression, and Perceived Threat
were related to Positive and Negative Cognitive Processing. Hierarchical regression
analyses were used to explore four primary hypotheses.
The results of the study revealed several important findings. Physical Threat,
Depression, and Permanent After-Effects of Cancer Treatment significantly predicted
Positive Cognitive Processing, with lower levels of Physical Threat and Depression and
no After-Effects of Treatment predicting higher Positive Cognitive Processing. Life
Outlook Threat, Positive Cognitive Processing, and Type of Cancer Treatment Received
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also significantly predicted PTG. The findings indicated that greater life outlook threat
and positive cognitive processing as well as receiving more than one form of cancer
treatment predicted greater growth. None of the variables reached significance in
predicting Negative Cognitive Processing and Negative Cognitive Processing failed to
significantly predict PTG.
While perceived threat and cognitive processing have a strong theoretical basis in
the emergence of growth, the constructs have received little empirical attention. This is
the first study that has assessed how being diagnosed with cancer challenges, rather than
alters, a survivor’s assumptive world. The results of the study provide evidence that
increases in life outlook threat and positive cognitive processing are related to PTG.
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CHAPTER ONE
STUDY OVERVIEW
Introduction
Background of the Problem
Cancer is a potentially terminal illness that impacts many people. In 2008, nearly
one and a half million men and women were predicted to be diagnosed with cancer, and
over a half million individuals died of cancer in the United States (National Cancer
Institute, 2009). Receiving a cancer diagnosis is typically a frightening and unexpected
event that challenges an individual’s fundamental beliefs about him/herself and the
predictability of the world. Cancer is known to be a stressful and often traumatic
experience affecting many aspects of a person’s life. Tedeschi and Calhoun (1995)
described characteristics of a traumatic event as being sudden, unexpected,
uncontrollable, and producing ongoing effects. Cancer leads to confrontation of one’s
mortality, and the inevitability of death (Tallman, Altmaier, & Garcia, 2007). Although
medical advances have been made, cancer remains a life-threatening illness, often
provoking fear and uncertainty about the future. Survivors typically deal with numerous
negative experiences, including medical treatments and their side effects, such as pain,
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fatigue, nausea, and hair loss; temporary and permanent changes in physical appearance;
alterations in future life plans; the threat of future disease recurrence, and changes in
social roles and relationships (Manne, Ostroff, Winkel, Goldstein, Fox & Grana, 2004;
Stanton, Bower, & Low, 2006).
Research in the psycho-oncology field has historically focused on the negative
psychological consequences of cancer. Individuals with cancer often exhibit symptoms of
psychological distress, including depression, anxiety, and manifestations of posttraumatic
stress disorder (Tallman et al., 2007). Yet, researchers suggest that severe affective
disturbance is relatively rare, and on the whole, not enduring, as most survivors resume
normal mood and functioning within the year after medical treatment completion
(Andersen, Anderson, & deProsse, 1989). Thus, research focused only on documenting
distress and dysfunction may lead to a potentially misleading conclusion about
adjustment following cancer.
The notion that suffering and distress can be potential sources of positive change
dates back to writings by the ancient Hebrews, Greeks, early Christians, and Buddhists,
all of whom noted the potentially transformative power of suffering (Tedeschi &
Calhoun, 1995). The past decade has seen increased empirical focus on the potential for
positive change and growth in the aftermath of trauma. Cancer is one area where growth
is possible. A growing body of research supports the idea that cancer diagnosis and
treatment might result in positive psychological outcomes as some cancer survivors
report profound positive changes in themselves, their relationships with others, and other
life areas following cancer.
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Many terms have been applied to the idea of positive change after trauma,
including benefit finding, stress-related growth, found meaning, adversarial growth,
perceived benefits, thriving, and posttraumatic growth, each with slightly different
definitions. The lack of uniformity of terminology has caused confusion and a
fragmented understanding of the phenomenon of posttraumatic growth. This study
focused on the concept of posttraumatic growth (PTG), defined by Tedeschi and Calhoun
(2004) as “positive psychological change experienced as a result of the struggle with
highly challenging life circumstances” (p. 1).
PTG encompasses the experiences of individuals whose development, at least in
some areas, has surpassed what was present before the struggle with a crisis. The
individual has not only survived, but has experienced changes that are perceived as
significant, and go beyond a return to normal functioning. PTG is not a return to baseline;
rather, it is an experience of positive change that, for some, is profound. Unlike similar
concepts of resilience, sense of coherence, or hardiness, PTG has a quality of
transformation. It involves a movement beyond pre-trauma levels of functioning
(Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004).
Tedeschi and Calhoun (2004) proposed that growth is not a direct result of a
trauma, but rather an individual’s struggle with the new reality in the aftermath of the
trauma, which is critical in determining the extent to which PTG occurs. Researchers
have suggested that people develop and rely on a general set of assumptions and beliefs
about the world that guide their actions, and lend understanding and meaning to events.
Major life crises challenge a person’s understanding of the world, and psychological
crisis can be defined as the degree to which the event challenges a person’s assumptive
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world, including assumptions about benevolence, predictability, controllability of the
world, one’s safety, and one’s identity and future (Janoff-Bulman, 1992).
The theory of PTG suggests that the traumatic event that occurs must be
challenging enough to the assumptive world of the individual in order to be a catalyst for
the cognitive processing necessary for growth. In other words, there must be a sufficient
amount of perceived threat to one’s beliefs and well-being for PTG to develop. Thus, a
prerequisite for PTG is threat to one’s life outlook (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). In the
current study, Life Outlook Threat is defined as the degree to which being diagnosed with
cancer challenged the survivor’s assumptive beliefs and worldview. If a person’s
preexisting beliefs are not disrupted by the event, there is no need for adjustment and reevaluation, and therefore, no opportunity for change. Once an individual’s worldview is
altered, or perhaps even shattered by a traumatic event, cognitive processing and
restructuring are among the processes necessary to “rebuild” one’s beliefs (JanoffBulman, 1992).
Cognitive processing is defined by Bower, Kemeny, Taylor, and Fahey (1998, p.
979) as “the process of actively thinking about a stressor, the thoughts and feelings it
evokes, and its implications for one’s life and future.” Williams-Avery (1999) created the
Cognitive Processing of Trauma Scale, which describes cognitive processing using five
factors: Positive Cognitive Restructuring, Resolution, Downward Comparison, Denial,
and Regret. It is proposed that Positive Cognitive Restructuring, Resolution, and
Downward Comparison represent Positive Cognitive Processing, while Denial and Regret
indicate Negative Cognitive Processing. Williams-Avery (1999) explained that improved
cognitive processing may signify “reduced signs of repression, such as avoidant/numbing
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behavior and intrusive thoughts, greater organization of thoughts, higher degrees of
assimilation or meaning-making, greater ability to see the experience from alternative and
often more positive perspectives, and greater acceptance and resolution” (p. 119).
This study focused on how cognitive processing influences PTG. Tedeschi and
Calhoun (2004) asserted that the degree to which the person is engaged cognitively by the
trauma is a central element in the process of PTG. It is suggested that people who report
growth in the aftermath of trauma must alter certain goals and basic assumptions that they
held prior to the trauma, while at the same time persisting in an attempt to build new
beliefs, goals, and meanings. Tedeschi and Calhoun (2004) argued that persistence in
cognitive processing should be associated with PTG.
Calhoun and Tedeschi (2006) differentiated between different types of cognitive
processing that occur at different points in time as individuals cope with trauma. They
explained that immediately following a crisis an individual engages in a ruminative
process that is typically automatic and intrusive. As the person works to manage
emotional distress, processing becomes more deliberate and effortful, which is the type of
cognitive processing believed to produce PTG. PTG is more likely when a person
ruminates in a deliberate, reflective way, trying to make sense out of the trauma.
Deliberate and reflective rumination tends to assist in repairing, restructuring, and
rebuilding the individual’s general way of understanding the world, and is proposed to be
qualitatively different from the nonproductive and often intrusive rumination that is
characteristic of depression and anxiety.
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Statement of the Problem
Based on published rates between 2004-2006, 40.58% of men and women born
today will be diagnosed with cancer of all types sometime during their lifetime. This
number can also be expressed as almost one in two men and women will be diagnosed
with cancer of all types sometime during their lifetime (National Cancer Institute, 2009).
It is commonly thought that a cancer diagnosis and subsequent treatment are often
associated with negative psychological responses, at least initially. However, a growing
literature also testifies to the prevalence of PTG resulting from the struggle with cancer.
It is important to recognize and acknowledge that positive life changes and personal
growth can occur following cancer, and that changes suggest the possibility of the
transformative power of illness and human resilience, which can be enhanced through
psychological intervention. At present, researchers lack a comprehensive understanding
of the process of PTG, specifically in regard to cognitive processing. It is possible that
research on PTG may yield a more complete and balanced understanding of cancer
survivors’ psychosocial experience and health. Cognitive engagement following trauma
is a key factor in Tedeschi and Calhoun’s (2004) model of PTG; however, few studies
have examined how cognitive factors are connected to growth. Specifically, how are
Positive and Negative Cognitive Processing reflected in the Cognitive Processing of
Trauma Scale each related to PTG? A better understanding of the types of cognitive
processing, following a cancer diagnosis, that lead to growth might direct psychological
interventions targeting cognitions that have the potential to facilitate PTG.
When studying cognitive processing, it is imperative to consider factors that
influence a person’s cognitions and ability to process information. Individuals with
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cancer often exhibit symptoms of depression and anxiety (Roy-Byrne, Davidson, Kessler,
Asmundson, Goodwin, Kubzansky, et al., 2008; Smith, Gomm, Dickens, 2003), which in
many instances are prompted by the degree of perceived threat that persons experience.
Research has indicated that these symptoms influence how an individual thinks and the
content and valence of thoughts (Watkins, 2008). Typically, both depression and anxiety
increase negative affect, which often hinders effective cognitive processing. Mineka and
Sutton (1992) reported that anxiety and depression have substantial effects on the
processing of emotionally relevant information. For instance, anxiety seems to be related
to attentional bias for threatening stimuli, and depression appears to be associated with
memory bias for negative self-referential material (Mineka & Sutton, 1992).
Depressed individuals tend to engage in more negative and self-critical
rumination that can be maladaptive; they may also experience impaired concentration and
problem solving. Furthermore, anxiety symptoms often lead to an overestimation of
threat, underestimation of coping resources, and overuse of compensatory self-protective
strategies, such as cognitive and behavioral avoidance (Riskind, Williams & Joiner,
2006). As stated previously, PTG requires deliberate and effortful cognitive processing,
and since anxiety and depression often lead to rigid and unconstructive ruminative
thinking, high levels of anxiety and depression will likely impede PTG.
Thus, it would be remiss to examine ways in which cognitive processing is related
to PTG without also examining how a cancer survivor’s level of perceived threat, anxiety
and depression influence cognitive processing. For instance, if it is the case that higher
levels of anxiety and depression hinder positive cognitive processing, anxious and
depressive symptoms may be decreased through psychological intervention, creating a
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greater capacity for a cancer survivor to engage in cognitive processing that might aid
growth.
Purpose of Studying the Problem
Research supports the notion that many individuals perceive that they have grown
or benefited in some way from their experiences with cancer (Stanton, Bower, & Low,
2006). While PTG is transformative in nature and represents a change beyond recognition
of benefit, its emphasis on positive change and the transformative power of trauma, has
similarities with the framework of positive psychology, which focuses on positive
features of the human experience, such as happiness, hope, and wisdom (Seligman &
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). The traditional pathology model of psychology neglects the
strengths of individuals, focuses solely on problems (which yields a limited view of the
person) and does not work to build adaptive qualities and skills. It has been proposed that
there is a current paradigm shift in psychology from a field primarily concerned with
pathology and what is “wrong” with the person, to a new model of psychological health,
thriving, wellness enhancement, and human strengths and growth (Lechner, Zakowski,
Antoni, Greenhawt, Block & Block, 2003; Tedeschi & Kilmer, 2005). However, in order
for this approach to be put into clinical practice, more research is needed that speaks to its
efficacy.
It is important for medical doctors, health care providers, therapists, and
psychologists to understand the possibility and process of PTG in cancer survivors. In
particular, it is important to determine how anxiety, depression, perceived threat, and
cognitive processing are associated with growth. This knowledge will allow a more
whole and balanced view of responses to cancer. It will also aid in the development of
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clinical interventions that draw upon and enhance individuals’ strengths and skills, which
can be utilized in the adjustment to illness.
Yet, health providers must be cautious not to prescribe growth to a survivor,
minimize the psychological distress that usually accompanies cancer, or suggest that
those who do not experience PTG are somehow deficient. Until researchers understand
more about the psychological origins of growth, the conditions under which growth
occurs, and the best ways to assess growth, designing clinical interventions aimed at
enhancing growth may be premature (Park & Helgeson, 2006). The presence of PTG may
not necessarily be accompanied by greater well-being and less distress. Nonetheless,
research suggests that the occurrence of PTG is an indication that persons who
experience it perceive that they are living life in a fuller and more meaningful way than
they had before the traumatic event (Calhoun & Tedeschi, 2006).
The overall purpose of this study was to examine how cognitive processing is
related to PTG in breast, prostate, and colorectal cancer survivors. Second, in order to
understand factors that influence cognitive processing, this study examined how
symptoms of anxiety and depression, as well as perceived threat, are associated with
cognitive processing.
Importance of Studying the Problem
The possibility of growth following a struggle with highly stressful events fits
well with emerging models of therapy that emphasize strength and resilience. This
growing body of research has produced many interesting findings, but also has raised
unanswered questions about the specific mechanisms related to the emergence of PTG.
As mentioned previously, one model of the etiology of PTG proposes that cognitive
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processing rebuilds beliefs after trauma has violated an individual’s basic beliefs about
the self and the world. Thus, growth is thought to emerge from a period of inquiry in
which one attempts to make sense of a traumatic event, including its causes and
implications (Park & Helgeson, 2006). Yet, much is still unknown about the relationship
between cognitive factors and PTG. For instance, more research is needed on how the
valence and content of cognitions relate to growth. Additionally, more research is needed
to clarify some of the mechanisms by which growth experiences occur.
This research is important for several reasons. First, it will increase understanding
of cancer survivors' capacity to not only withstand the hardships and obstacles that come
with illness, but to actually transform and grow as a result of cancer. Such an
understanding may enlarge the traditional focus of psychology on “problems” and
contribute to the development of effective interventions that seek to facilitate growth and
thriving among those who deal with challenging illnesses.
Second, the processes through which PTG occurs remain vague. The current
study will attempt to clarify the relationship between symptoms of anxiety, depression,
perceived threat, and cognitive processing in predicting PTG. The results of this study
may have important implications for cancer survivors in terms of life purpose and
meaning.
Third, research has suggested that PTG may be associated with improved physical
health. For example, PTG has been associated with decreases in pain in a mixed sample
of cancer and lupus patients (Katz, Flasher, Cacciapaglia, & Nelson, 2001). While the
relationship between these variables is presently unclear, if health care providers
understand the factors that may lead to growth efforts to increase PTG can be
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implemented. These interventions might have the potential to buffer against poor physical
health.
Fourth, this study may have implications for psychologists, as well as other
healthcare professionals. By gaining a greater understanding of the potential for PTG in
the aftermath of cancer, psychologists may gain a broader awareness of the possible
psychological responses following major medical illness. Greater awareness of PTG may,
in turn, lead psychologists to adopt a more nuanced approach with survivors, which
includes listening for the growth survivors may be experiencing and focusing on aspects
of PTG as they emerge in sessions.
Overview of Hypotheses
1.

Anxiety, Depression, and Perceived Threat will predict Positive Cognitive

Processing over and beyond the contribution of the demographic control variables. It is
hypothesized that Anxiety and Depression will negatively predict Positive Cognitive
Processing, while Perceived Threat will positively predict Positive Cognitive Processing.
2. Positive Cognitive Processing will significantly predict PTG over and beyond the
demographic control variables, Anxiety, Depression, and Perceived Threat. In other
words, Positive Cognitive Processing will account for a significant amount of the
variance of PTG beyond the demographic control variables (i.e., Age, Gender, Stage of
Diagnosis, Time Since Treatment Completion), Anxiety, Depression, and Perceived
Threat. It is hypothesized that Positive Cognitive Processing and Perceived Threat will
positively predict PTG, while Anxiety and Depression will negatively predict PTG.
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3. Anxiety, Depression, and Perceived Threat will predict Negative Cognitive
Processing over and beyond the contribution of the demographic control variables. It is
hypothesized that Anxiety, Depression, and Perceived Threat will all positively predict
Negative Cognitive Processing.
4. Negative Cognitive Processing will significantly predict PTG over and beyond the
demographic control variables, Anxiety, Depression, and Perceived Threat. In other
words, Negative Cognitive Processing will account for a significant amount of the
variance of PTG beyond the demographic control variables (i.e., Age, Gender, Stage of
Diagnosis, Time Since Treatment Completion), Anxiety, Depression, and Perceived
Threat. It is hypothesized that Negative Cognitive Processing, Anxiety, and Depression
will negatively predict PTG, while Perceived Threat will positively predict PTG.
Overview of Variables and Measures
Several demographic factors were included in the analyses as control variables
(Age, Gender, Disease Stage at Diagnosis, Time Since Treatment Completion), which
helped lessen potential confounds as described in the literature. The independent
variables in the first and third hypotheses were Anxiety, Depression, and Perceived
Threat of cancer. Positive and Negative Cognitive Processing were the dependent
variables, respectively. In the second and fourth hypotheses, the independent variables
were Anxiety, Depression, Perceived Threat, Positive Cognitive Processing (Hypothesis
2), and Negative Cognitive Processing (Hypothesis 4). PTG was the dependent variable.
A demographic questionnaire was used to collect background information as well
as cancer diagnosis and treatment information, which were used in statistical analyses.
No identifying information was collected. Perceived Threat was broken into three
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components: Life Outlook (i.e., the extent to which cancer challenged the way the
survivor sees him/herself, others, and the world), Physical Threat (i.e., mortality
salience), and Reaction to Cancer (i.e., reacting with feelings of fear, helplessness, or
horror), and was measured by asking participants several questions. Examples of
questions are: “To what extent did being diagnosed with cancer challenge the way you
see the world in general?” and “At that time [time first diagnosed], how likely did you
think it was that you would die of cancer?” These questions were answered on a Likert
scale ranging from 1 = not at all to 6 = extremely. The Hospital Anxiety and Depression
Scale, developed by Zigmond and Snaith (1983), was used to measure symptoms of
anxiety and depression. The Cognitive Processing of Trauma Scale (Williams, Davis &
Millsap, 2002) was used to measure cognitive processing of cancer. Finally, the
Posttraumatic Growth Inventory, developed by Tedeschi and Calhoun (1996), was used
to measure PTG following cancer. Each measure mentioned above is a self-report
instrument, and based upon piloting the entire questionnaire with five cancer survivors, it
was estimated that completion of all measures would take approximately 20-30 minutes.
Limitations
Several limitations of this study should be noted. First, the study tested the above
hypotheses in a sample of breast, prostate and colorectal cancer survivors, thereby
limiting the generalizability of the results to other cancer survivors, or trauma survivors,
as a whole.
Second, the scores on the self-report measures used in this study are based upon
participants’ perceptions. Scores on self-report perceptual measures are often biased and
vulnerable to socially desirable responding (response bias). Yet, using a survey with self-
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report measures was the most efficacious way to collect the data for the current study.
Effort was made to select measures that use non-leading questions, have established
validity and reliability, and have been used for previous research in the PTG and/or
cancer literature. However, the Cognitive Processing of Trauma Scale (2002), while it
met the needs of this study, was developed fairly recently, and thus has not been widely
used. Moreover, the variable of perceived threat is theoretically based upon the model of
PTG, and therefore was measured by response items created specifically for this study,
rather than on an empirically tested assessment measure - the reliability and validity of
these items is not yet established.
Third, another potential limitation is the sample size due to a lack of participant
interest, motivation, fatigue, or other side effects due to illness. Effort was made to make
the data collection portion of this study brief for participants (20 - 30 minutes) in order to
lessen response burden and time demands.
Fourth, using a cross-sectional, retrospective research design prevents the drawing
of conclusions about a causal and temporal relationship between the independent and
dependent variables, and is susceptible to recall biases. Experimental and longitudinal
research designs that assess variables pre and post cancer diagnosis are needed to address
this limitation; however, these designs are difficult to implement as participants are
typically identified after a cancer diagnosis has already occurred. Despite these
limitations, this study represents an important step in clarifying the relationship between
cognitive processing and PTG, and how perceived threat, anxiety, and depression
contribute to these factors.
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Summary
Cancer survival has increased due to advances in medicine; yet, large numbers of
people are still diagnosed with cancer. The diagnosis of cancer is potentially life
threatening, and initial diagnosis, along with subsequent treatment, is often a shocking
and traumatic event. Having cancer has the potential to evoke a wide range of
psychological reactions. Literature shows that many of these reactions are negative,
including, for some, evoking clinically significant levels of depressive and anxiety
symptoms. However, over the past decade research has also suggested that the struggle to
deal with traumatic events, such as cancer, may result in positive changes. Examples of
such changes are positive views about oneself and one’s relationships. Tedeschi and
Calhoun (1995) coined the widely used term posttraumatic growth, to refer to the
spectrum of positive changes an individual may experience after a traumatic event
(Manne et al., 2004).
Distress in the aftermath of a cancer diagnosis is likely to be a common
experience for many, and an individual’s perception of PTG does not necessarily
decrease or buffer against distress. Nonetheless, research has shown that the struggle with
cancer often leads to changes, which some individuals regard as highly positive. PTG
may lead a person to believe he/she is living a richer and more purpose-filled life, and has
the ability to create possibilities and potentials that might not have been imaginable
before cancer. The empirical research on PTG is growing and offers promising findings.
A better understanding of the process of PTG will help to clarify and further research.
This study will specifically focus on the role of cognitive processing, and how factors
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often related to the cancer experience (perceived threat, anxiety, depression) influence
this process.
Chapter One provided the background of the concept of PTG following cancer.
This chapter also included a statement of the problem, purpose of studying the problem,
importance of studying the problem, hypotheses, overview of the variables and measures
associated with the study, and limitations of the study. Please refer to Appendix A for a
glossary of terms used in the study. Chapter Two will present a review of the literature
relevant to this study as well as the theoretical basis of the hypotheses outlined above.
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE
Introduction
Throughout time, across many different religious and philosophical traditions,
there has been an understanding that suffering and hardship have the ability to produce
positive outcomes (Calhoun & Tedeschi, 2006). There is often a perception among those
who have endured tragedy that they have been strengthened in some form or fashion by
their struggle with it. An event that is initially extremely aversive may lead to
psychological transformation and growth. People may not feel pleased that trauma has
occurred, but research has discovered that many people view the aftermath of trauma as
something that has benefited them (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1995).
Individuals’ reactions to trauma are very important to study as they offer insights
into human nature, and the capability humans hold to not only survive, but grow in the
face of suffering. In classic literature, heroes are often portrayed as “tragic figures” who,
after struggling with whatever tragedy befalls them, emerge as their “best selves”
(Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1995). This notion is not just reserved for literature, but rather,
seems to hold true for many “ordinary” people who achieve “extraordinary” outcomes
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when faced with trauma. The experience of trauma can be very terrible and upsetting, yet
it can also lead to what may come to be regarded, in the extreme, as “the best thing that
ever happened to me.” Trauma can also be regarded simply as a beneficial experience, by
providing the opportunity for psychological growth that would not be possible without
the challenge of the traumatic event. It is the very act of struggling with the consequences
of trauma that makes possible varied forms of PTG (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1995).
Over the past decade, researchers have moved beyond an exclusive focus on the
negative consequences following traumatic events (Linley & Joseph, 2004; Park &
Helgeson, 2006; Wortman, 2004; Zoellner & Maercker, 2006). There is now a growing
body of research that documents positive ways that people’s lives have changed
following trauma. Studies on PTG are important for several reasons. Most notably,
focusing only on the negative outcomes of trauma can lead to a biased understanding of
posttraumatic reactions. Traditionally, little effort has been made to understand how the
worldviews and identities of survivors have been altered in the aftermath of trauma.
Instead, concentration has rested on fairly routine procedures of symptom reduction
(Ballou & Brown, 2002).
An understanding of posttraumatic reactions needs to take into account the
potential for positive, as well as negative changes, if it is to be comprehensively studied
(Linley & Joseph, 2004). When considering the implications and consequences of PTG, it
is important to realize that the phenomenon is not limited to a particular type of trauma.
Positive changes have been empirically reported following circumstances such as chronic
illness, heart attacks, cancer, bone marrow transplants, HIV and AIDS, rape and sexual
assault, military combat, bereavement, and natural disasters (Linley & Joseph, 2004;
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Milam, 2006; Park & Helgeson, 2006; Paton, 2006; Rosner & Powell, 2006; Wortman,
2004; Znoj, 2006). Therefore, PTG is potentially the result of numerous factors, and there
is a present need to establish more clearly through research the variables that are
associated with growth in the aftermath of trauma.
In order to effectively address the potential for PTG, it is important to explore,
and subsequently more fully understand, the factors contributing to responses after
trauma. This literature review will provide a rationale for the relationships suggested in
the proposed model in this study. The theoretical framework for the study comes from
previous studies conducted with people who have experienced a variety of traumatic
events. This study will focus specifically on individuals who have survived breast,
prostate, and colorectal cancer.
Why Cancer as a Model of PTG
According to Geffen (2006), “Cancer is a growing presence in our society” (p.
20). The author explained that, “If heart disease was the affliction of the World War II
generation, cancer is the disease of the baby boomers and more and more people…ready
or not, are suddenly being forced to confront it” (p. 20). Breast, prostate and colorectal
cancer, along with lung cancer, comprise the leading anatomical sites for new cancer
cases, as well as cancer deaths, in the United States (American Cancer Society, 2008).
The overall number of new cancer diagnoses continues to increase each year (Geffen,
2006) and the cumulative impact of these cancers on society is enormous.
Cancer is a disease that has the ability to strike fear in many individuals and often
creates a great deal of uncertainty, suffering and loss (Lechner & Weaver, 2009). On
being told that one has cancer, a sense of panic often sets in. Lechner and Weaver (2009)
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explained that many survivors report that they do not recall much of the conversation
with their physician after hearing the news. In the researchers’ work, they found that
receiving a diagnosis of cancer is a “seismic event” (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004), and this
“earth-shattering news” often causes a rush of emotions and cognitions. In the following
days, weeks, and months survivors confront hardships and struggles that result from both
the illness and its treatment. Yet, paradoxically, Lechner and Weaver (2009) found that
many survivors experience positive life changes.
Park (2009) explained that medical illnesses, including cancer, “set the stage for
the kind of existential confrontations and global violations of beliefs and goals that are
thought to lead to meaning making and ultimately to growth, thus leading researchers to
look in this direction” (p. 21). The impact of cancer is widespread, and as Park (2009)
described, a better understanding of growth in the context of medical illness may have
implications for clinical interventions, even at the broad level of public health, where
knowledge gained from research could have a substantial impact. However, a major
limitation in the existing PTG literature is a lack of understanding of the process of, and a
clearly defined set of variables related to, growth. The current study aimed to fill in gaps
in the research by examining the effect of cognitive processing on PTG in breast, prostate
and colorectal cancer survivors. In addition, this study determined how symptoms of
anxiety and depression, as well as perceived threat, affected cognitive processing, which
in turn, predicts PTG.
This chapter includes an examination of PTG, providing an overview of common
challenges related to the topic, and the relationship between cancer and growth. This
chapter also explores how cognitive processing relates to PTG and reviews the most
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relevant literature regarding theoretically derived predictors of PTG, including perceived
threat, anxiety, and depression.
Trauma
In order to understand and appreciate the concept of PTG, one first must have a
general understanding of what constitutes trauma, and the negative consequences of such
an event. According to the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th Edition, Text Revision, an “extreme traumatic stressor”
involves
direct personal experience of an event that involves actual or threatened death or
serious injury, or other threat to one’s physical integrity; or witnessing an event that
involves death, injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of another person; or
learning about unexpected or violent death, serious harm, or threat of death or injury
experienced by a family member or other close associate. (DSM-IV-TR, American
Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 463)
Moreover, the person’s response to the event must involve “intense fear, helplessness, or
horror.” Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a possible psychological outcome after
trauma. The characteristic symptoms resulting from exposure to trauma include persistent
re-experiencing of the event, persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma,
“numbing of general responsiveness,” and persistent symptoms of increased arousal
(APA, 2000).
The word “trauma” indicates that an event was a shock. Researchers have
proposed that certain characteristics make events traumatic. These include: an event
occurs suddenly and unexpectedly; there is a perceived lack of control over it; the event
is out of the ordinary; and the degree to which it creates long-lasting problems (JanoffBulman, 1992; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1995). Negative events often have highly negative
psychological consequences. Individuals who have experienced a traumatic event might
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endure effects on their thoughts, emotions, behaviors and physical health. For many,
thoughts, images, and recollections of the event regularly intrude into conscious
awareness, and are most likely unwanted and uninvited (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1995).
Trauma-related thoughts also impact how individuals think about themselves, and their
self-esteem. Being exposed to highly negative events may decrease self-esteem, at least
in the first days or weeks after the trauma. Perhaps the most significant way thoughts are
affected is the struggle to achieve an understanding of what has occurred. Trauma
survivors might ask themselves: “Why did this happen?” and “What was the reason for,
or purpose, of this tragedy?” Researchers have suggested that whether or not trauma
represents a negative psychological event depends in part on the survivor’s satisfaction
with how he/she addresses and answers these questions. The process to understand why a
crisis has happened, what some researchers have termed the process of “meaning
making” (Neimeyer, 2001), is thought to be a common occurrence after trauma. In a 2010
review of the literature on meaning-making, Park (2010) summarized,
It is clear that meaning-making attempts and meanings made are reported by most
individuals facing highly stressful events. In fact, it seems logical that some sort of
cognitive readjustment or meaning-making process must occur following experiences
of events that are greatly discrepant with one’s larger beliefs, plans, and desires. (p.
290)
Drawing on clinical experience in working with the bereaved, and research related
to bereavement, Schwartzberg and Halgin (1991) reported that after a death, individuals
often strive to make sense of the loss and ask questions regarding why the event
happened. They suggested that questions such as these pose a severe cognitive threat
because they trigger how a person’s implicit beliefs about justice and control have failed
to explain the profound event. Echoing other grief researchers, the authors explained that
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some people never find meaning while others may develop a way to make meaning out of
the loss. Schwartzberg and Halgin (1991) proposed that those who find an answer to
“why” questions are attempting to preserve the assumptions that guided their beliefs
before the loss, and therefore, in turn, minimize the impact of the trauma. Furthermore,
the authors suggested that most grieving individuals experience changes in beliefs about
themselves and the world. These include: “reprioritizing values, gaining wisdom,
shedding the illusion of immortality, developing a less optimistic view of the world, and
questioning spiritual beliefs” (p. 242). Some of these changes are what some researchers
term growth.
Tedeschi and Calhoun (1995) suggested that initially ruminative processes
attempt to establish comprehensibility. This process occurs when a person tries to grasp
the reality of what has happened. The authors proposed that when fundamental
understandings of personal reality are violated, there seems to be a time lag between the
event and a full appreciation that circumstances are changed. With comprehensibility
comes a better ability to manage the trauma and figure out methods to cope. The more
reflective element of cognitive processing is what is termed “meaning making,” which is
thought to occur when an individual has had some success coping with the trauma and is
not preoccupied with mere survival. The person is able to move beyond survival to
recognition of other possibilities and changes that occurred in the aftermath of the
trauma.
It is important to note that searching for meaning in loss is not necessarily related
to better adjustment post-trauma. Davis, Wortman, Lehman and Silver (2000) explained
that some individuals may never initiate a search for meaning regarding the purpose of a
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trauma, and these individuals appear to adjust relatively well to the loss. Yet, greater
distress may occur for a long time after a loss for individuals who search for meaning and
never find it. Davis, et al. (2000) described examples of individuals who are at a higher
risk to initiate a search for meaning and not find any, and in turn, experience distress.
These include individuals who exhibit symptoms of intense anguish and struggle to find
meaning shortly after a loss, and people who experience a loss under traumatic
circumstances (e.g., sudden, untimely, violent).
The specific emotions people experience in the aftermath of trauma will vary
among individuals and across particular circumstances. One emotion that many survivors
experience is guilt, resulting from a feeling of remorse about what was done or what was
left undone. Feelings of guilt may reflect a belief among individuals that certain actions
may have prevented the event, or that certain actions would have made the loss more
manageable (Hodgkinson & Stewart, 1998; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1995). Other common
emotional reactions to trauma include: anger, irritability, fear, and anxiety; fear and
anxiety are frequent emotional responses. It has been suggested that when the
circumstances of trauma involve significant threat to life, health, or to important property,
it is likely that those individuals will feel apprehension, worry, and concern. Depression
is also quite common. While anxiety is more likely to occur when trauma involves major
threat, depression is more likely when the circumstances involve significant loss
(Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1995). In general, individuals exposed to highly stressful events
are very likely to experience a variety of distressing emotions.
Survivors who are struggling to cope with trauma may also exhibit negative
changes in their behavior including: increase in legal and illegal drug use, withdrawal

24

from others, sexual difficulties, and an increase in aggressive behavior. Physical
problems and complaints are also common in the aftermath of trauma. Individuals
exposed to highly traumatic events that occur unexpectedly will often experience an
increase in physical arousal. For many, this increase in activation will not quickly
subside, and is one of the most common complaints associated with highly stressful
events (Hodgkinson & Stewart, 1998). Because of this chronic arousal of bodily systems,
it is not surprising that people report fatigue as well as a long list of other physical
complaints, such as gastrointestinal difficulties, headaches, and loss of appetite, etc.
(Hodgkinson & Stewart, 1998). Finally, data also suggest that exposure to stressful
events puts a person at increased risk for developing psychiatric disorders (Rubonis &
Bickman, 1991).
However, it is necessary to keep in mind that most people who are exposed to
high levels of stress will not develop psychiatric disorders, and that there are many
factors that contribute to the development of such disorders, only one of which is
exposure to traumatic events. For those who do develop psychiatric disorders, the most
likely impairments are anxiety disorders or clinical depression (Goenjian, Steinberg,
Najarian, Fairbanks, Tashjian, & Pynoos, 2000). Many survivors will experience a
reduction of psychological distress over time (Lepore & Revenson, 2006). Yet, it is not
time itself that decreases distress, but certain experiences and coping mechanisms used
when dealing with the aftermath of trauma. For example, the traumatic event may be
reviewed in a person’s mind numerous times before the reality of the trauma is accepted
and distress is relieved (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1995). The available information points to
the reality of the negative consequences of trauma, and of the capability of these events to
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greatly test individuals’ ability to cope. Yet, the other side of this struggle is that it can
lead to the potential for psychological growth that would not be possible without the
challenge of trauma.
Trauma and Assumptive Beliefs
While varying in specifics, most models of growth (Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Taylor,
1983; & Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004) hypothesize that the experience of a traumatic event
violates an individual’s basic beliefs about the self and the world, and that some type of
cognitive processing to rebuild beliefs and goals occurs, resulting in perceptions of
growth (Park & Helgeson, 2006). Thus, there is a period of “psychological
reorganization” in the aftermath of trauma. An individual’s appraisal of the extent to
which events or situations violate his/her beliefs, expectations and goals determine the
stressfulness of an event (Park, 1998).
Cognitive processing models of post-trauma reactions propose that people enter
situations with preexisting mental schemas. These schemas contain information about
individuals’ past experiences as well as their beliefs, assumptions, and expectations
regarding future events (Creamer, Burgess & Pattison, 1992). Life is comprehensible
because individuals create order through their belief systems, which provide expectations
about themselves and the world, which, in turn, allow people to process information and
act and respond to events with confidence, or not.
Janoff-Bulman and Frieze (1983) explained that people typically operate on the
basis of assumptions and personal theories that allow them to set goals, plan activities,
and order their behavior. The authors proposed that there are three core assumptions that
form the basis for many individuals’ “assumptive worlds:” seeing ourselves as having
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control over events and being relatively invulnerable to harm; viewing the things that
happen to us as orderly, predictable, and meaningful; and regarding ourselves and others
in a positive light (Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, 1983). Without a set of fundamental beliefs
individuals would not be able to make sense of the world around them, and, therefore, a
person’s assumptive world is generally resistant to change. Yet, the occurrence of a
traumatic event often represents what is unknown and incomprehensible, and confronts
people with information that is inconsistent with that contained in existing schemas about
their safety and invulnerability (Creamer et al., 1992). Thus, a traumatic event has the
ability to shatter the understanding that people have of the world.
Janoff-Bulman (2004) suggested that as non-victims, individuals believe they are
prepared for misfortune. At a rational level, people know that car accidents are common,
cancer strikes large percentages of people, and crime is widespread, but at some deeper,
experiential level we do not seem to accept it. The author explained that while people
know bad things happen, they do not believe it will happen to them, and therefore they
are psychologically unprepared for trauma. When confronted with trauma, people face
threatening questions and prospects, such as death, which are a part of the human
experience, but usually hidden out of conscious awareness. The internal world of an
individual is thrown into upheaval because the assumptions that provided psychological
stability and coherence are now viewed as inadequate and inaccurate in describing the
posttraumatic world of the survivor (Janoff-Bulman, 2004).
Horowitz (1986) argued that for recovery from trauma to occur, new information
inherent in the traumatic experience must be processed until it can be brought in line with
personal schemas. Yet, attempts to assimilate threat-related information may be avoided
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by a survivor, as assimilation requires exposure to aversive stimuli, which often results in
increased arousal and desire to avoid thoughts and reminders of the trauma. Creamer et
al. (1992) asserted that until a traumatic event can be incorporated and integrated into
existing schemas, it is stored in active memory, and the psychological elements of the
event continue to produce intrusive and emotionally upsetting thoughts and/or
recollections. Yet, preexisting schemas often do not accurately reflect a survivor’s life
after trauma and, therefore, modification of pre-trauma schemas typically occurs to
accommodate new information. The questioning of basic assumptions is what prompts
personal change through the task of rebuilding an assumptive world that accommodates
the reality of the experienced trauma.
Janoff-Bulman (1992, p. 133) explained, “By engaging in interpretations and
evaluations that focus on the benefits and lessons learned, survivors emphasize
benevolence over malevolence, meaningfulness over randomness, and self-worth over
self-abasement.” By working to rebuild their fundamental assumptions, individuals
incorporate the data of their experience and new, and perhaps more negative, assumptions
are formed that acknowledge the survivor’s greater danger and increased vulnerability.
While negative views may pervade the inner world of survivors in the immediate
aftermath of the trauma, Janoff-Bulman (2004) proposed that over time survivors
reestablish generally positive, yet less absolutely positive, core assumptions.
For some the process of rebuilding assumptions and beliefs is more difficult, and
in some cases posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) might develop after a trauma. Foa
and Riggs (1993) and Foa and Rothbaum (1998) proposed that after exposure to trauma
two basic cognitive dysfunctions are associated with the development of PTSD: that the
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world is completely dangerous, and that one is totally incompetent. The authors
suggested that individuals who encounter a traumatic event with the notion that the world
is extremely safe, and they are extremely competent, have more difficulty in assimilating
the traumatic experience into their existing schemas. Further, for those who have
experienced various traumas throughout their lives, a traumatic event may trigger existing
beliefs about the dangerousness of the world and one’s abilities. Thus, rigid beliefs about
self and the world, positive or negative, may lead to more distress after trauma.
Conversely, the authors suggested that people who have less rigid beliefs, and are able to
view a trauma as a unique event that does not have broad implications about self and the
world, will likely experience less distress and would not develop PTSD (Foa & Riggs,
1993; Foa & Rothbaum, 1998).
Posttraumatic Growth
Overview
Taylor (1983, p. 1161) argued, “One of the most impressive qualities of the
human psyche is its ability to withstand severe personal tragedy successfully.” In addition
to the negative outcomes of trauma mentioned above, many trauma survivors also
experience positive psychological changes. Zoellner and Maercker (2006, p. 628) defined
PTG as “the subjective experience of positive psychological changes reported by an
individual as a result of the struggle with trauma.” Examples of positive psychological
change include: an increased appreciation of life, setting of new life priorities, a sense of
increased personal strength, identification of new possibilities, improved closeness of
intimate relationships, or positive spiritual change (Tedeschi, Park, & Calhoun, 1998).
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PTG describes the experience of individuals who not only recover from trauma,
i.e., return to pre-trauma level functioning after a period of emotional distress, but use the
trauma as an opportunity for further individual development. Individuals who have
experienced PTG overcome trauma with improved psychological functioning in specific
areas. For example, an individual who is confronted with cancer might experience a shift
in priorities that results in spending more time with loved ones (Zoellner & Maercker,
2006).
Many terms have been used in the literature to describe the phenomenon of
growth (finding benefits, stress-related growth, thriving, positive psychological changes,
adversarial growth). This study uses the term “posttraumatic growth” as defined by
Tedeschi and Calhoun (1995, 2004) as it best captures the meaning of the phenomenon.
The term “posttraumatic” implies that the growth happens in the aftermath of a highly
stressful/traumatic event, not as the result of any minor stress or as a part of a natural
developmental process. The term “growth” emphasizes that the person has developed
beyond his/her previous level of adaptation, psychological functioning, or life awareness
(Zoellner & Maercker, 2006). In other words, there is an additional benefit compared to
the pre-crisis level.
Posttraumatic growth refers to a change in people that goes beyond an ability to resist
and not be damaged by highly stressful events; it involves a movement beyond pretrauma levels of adaptation. Posttraumatic growth, then, has a quality of
transformation, or a qualitative change in functioning. (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004, p.
4)
PTG has been conceptualized as both an outcome of the struggle with a traumatic
event (Schaefer & Moos, 1992; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1995, 2004), and as a coping
strategy (Affleck & Tennen, 1996). This study conceptualized PTG as an outcome,
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utilizing the model proposed by Tedeschi and Calhoun (1995, 2004). One of the reasons
this model is useful is because it attempts to illustrate the mechanisms of PTG. In the
PTG as outcome model, coping influences PTG, but growth is the transformative result
of the struggle with trauma rather than a particular coping strategy used to deal with the
event.
Schaefer and Moos (1998) explained that environmental and personal factors,
such as social support and demographic characteristics, shape the traumatic experience
and its aftermath. The authors suggested these factors influence cognitive appraisal
processing and coping responses, which, subsequently affect the outcome of trauma and
the perception of growth. They emphasized the important role of approach coping, as
opposed to avoidance coping, for growth to occur. Approach coping involves attempting
to analyze trauma in a logical way, reappraising the crisis in a more positive light,
seeking support, and taking actions to solve the problem. Avoidance coping includes
trying to minimize the problem, deciding that nothing can be done to change it, seeking
alternative rewards, and venting emotions (Schaefer & Moos, 1998). Thus, they
suggested that the specific ways in which an individual copes has an influence on
whether or not growth is experienced.
Model of Posttraumatic Growth
Tedeschi and Calhoun (2004) conceptualized the growth process as follows: a
traumatic event, which they describe as an event of “seismic” proportions, shakes or
destroys some key elements of an individual’s important goals and worldview. It
represents a challenge to goals, beliefs, and the ability to manage emotional distress. The
resulting emotional distress initiates a process of recurrent rumination and attempts to
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engage in behavior that is intended to reduce distress. Initially, rumination is more
automatic than deliberate. It is characterized by frequent returns to thinking about the
trauma and related issues. After initial coping success (e.g., reduction of emotional
distress, disengagement from unreachable goals, etc.) rumination may evolve to more
purposeful thinking about the trauma and its impact on one’s life.
In the initial aftermath of a traumatic event, people often do not conceive of
positive outcomes, or growth, due to being overwhelmed by distressing emotions and
loss. Only through the reduction of some of this distress does growth become possible
(Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1995). Rumination, in the form of constructive cognitive
processing (analyzing the situation, re-appraisal, and finding meaning) is assumed to play
a critical role in the development of personal growth. PTG is conceptualized as a
multidimensional construct including changes in beliefs, goals, behaviors, and identity, as
well as the development of a life narrative and wisdom.
Tedeschi and Calhoun (1996) proposed five domains of growth (as measured by
the Posttraumatic Growth Inventory (PTGI)): greater appreciation of life and a changed
sense of priorities; warmer, more intimate relationships with others; a greater sense of
personal strength; recognition of new possibilities or paths for one’s life; and spiritual
development. Individual characteristics, styles of managing distressing emotions, the
degree to which individuals engage in self-disclosure about their emotions and
perspective on trauma, cognitive processing (specifically, the process of deliberate
ruminative thought), and some degree of enduring distress are all believed to influence
the emergence of PTG (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004; see Figure 1). This study focused on
one of these elements; the role of cognitive processing in the development of PTG.
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Figure 1: A model of posttraumatic growth.

Note. From Tedeschi, R.G. & Calhoun, L.G. (2004). Target Article: “Posttraumatic
Growth: Conceptual Foundations and Empirical Evidence.” Psychological Inquiry, 15(1), 1-18.
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Challenges to the Concept of PTG
There are arguably two main controversies in the current PTG literature: (1)
whether PTG and related constructs reflect genuine positive change, and (2) whether the
manner in which growth is typically measured is valid (Frazier, Tennen, Gavian, Park,
Tomich & Tashiro, 2009). Several researchers have wondered whether perceptions of
growth are real or illusory (Frazier, et al., 2009; Helgeson & Park, 2009; Sumalla, Ochoa
& Blanco, 2009; Wortman, 2004). Wortman (2004) suggested that statements of positive
change might represent defensive illusions, such that survivors want to convince
themselves that something good has come out of the loss they have endured.
Furthermore, the author proposed that individuals are often motivated to depict a more
positive view of their lives than is actually the case in order to convey to others that they
are coping well (Wortman, 2004).
Yet, illusions are not necessarily negative, nor untrue. Taylor and Brown (1988)
argued that positive illusions lead to positive mental health because they add to feelings
of well-being, increase optimism in one’s choices and future path, promote confidence in
one’s abilities and enhance self-regard, all of which have been associated with positive
psychological outcomes. Moreover, Taylor and Brown (1988) reported that illusions are
adaptive when an individual is challenged by adversity, such as a diagnosis with cancer.
Evidence from converging sources suggests that positive illusions about the self, one's
control, and the future may be especially apparent and adaptive under circumstances of
adversity, that is, circumstances that might be expected to produce depression or lack of
motivation. Under these circumstances, the belief in one's self as a competent, efficacious
actor behaving in a world with a generally positive future may be especially helpful in
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overcoming setbacks, potential blows to self-esteem, and potential erosions in one's view
of the future (Taylor & Brown, 1988, p. 201).
Related to the question of whether reports of PTG are real or illusory, is the
question of whether to conceptualize the report of growth as a means of coping (either as
an adaptive mechanism or a defensive, self-protective strategy), or as an outcome in and
of itself representing true change (Butler, 2007). Helgeson, Reynolds and Tomich (2006)
described,
Growth outcomes may reflect a variety of processes, some of which have to do with
actual changes in one’s life, some of which have to do with coping, and others of
which have to do with cognitive manipulations on the order of self-enhancement
biases meant to alleviate distress. (p. 812)
As mentioned above, this study will conceptualize PTG as an outcome. One
reason it is useful to conceptualize PTG in this manner is because research suggests
growth and psychological distress are two independent dimensions of well-being (Park &
Helgeson, 2006).
Cognitive engagement and rebuilding typically takes into account the changed
reality of one’s life and produces schemas that incorporate the trauma, which may be
experienced as growth. Yet, the trauma itself may remain distressing (Tedeschi &
Calhoun, 2004). Often in the literature, distress and growth are conceptualized as having
an ipsative relationship, such that if one experiences growth, distress will decrease.
However, Tedeschi and Calhoun (2004) argued that distress and PTG are two distinct
constructs, and a person can experience them simultaneously.
Baker, Kelly, Calhoun, Cann, and Tedeschi (2008) conducted a study where both
PTG and posttraumatic depreciation were measured. The researchers designed a scale
that mirrored the Posttraumatic Growth Inventory, but assessed depreciation in life
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domains, and administered both scales to a group of undergraduate students. Results
revealed that changes in growth and depreciation were independent. Moreover, the
researchers concluded that individuals who experience significant stressors might
simultaneously report depreciation in the same areas they report growth (Baker et al.,
2008). Cordova and Andrykowski (2003) explained that it is possible to experience
cancer-related stress and growth concurrently because individuals often view the
experience as both a trauma and a transition into a new chapter in their lives. Thus,
growth may best be conceptualized as an outcome of importance in its own right (Park &
Helgeson, 2006).
Another critique of PTG relates to measurement. PTG is most often assessed by
self-report, through interviews and/or questionnaires, and some believe these reports are
not valid (Frazier & Kaler, 2006). Ransom, Sheldon and Jacobsen (2008) explained that
the validation of survivors’ PTG reports has been challenging, largely due to the
difficulty in obtaining pre-stressor data from individuals who subsequently survive a
traumatic event. Thus, it is largely unknown whether individuals’ reports of PTG reflect
actual, measurable change from their pre-stressor state.
Two routine measures of growth, the Posttraumatic Growth Inventory and the
Stress-Related Growth Scale have sound psychometric properties (Helgeson, Reynolds &
Tomich, 2006); however, these measures may not be sophisticated enough to capture the
complexity of growth. Moreover, Helgeson, et al. (2006) explained that it is unclear how
these instruments could be altered so that they may be able to distinguish actual growth
from perceived growth from coping. The shortcomings of current growth assessment
instruments are a limitation of the literature that needs to be taken into consideration.
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Future research also needs to examine growth using multiple methods at various time
points, and to examine the process of growth, which is likely multi-faceted. This study
seeks to examine variables, such as cognitive processing, which will aid in understanding
how PTG emerges after trauma.
Cognitive Processing and Posttraumatic Growth
Affleck and Tennen (1996) suggested that cognitive models of trauma all share
the premise that trauma can lose some of its subjective severity through cognitive
adaptations. One of these adaptations, for example, might be finding the “good in bad
events,” which can restore encouraging views of ourselves, other people, and the world.
Research on the correlates of PTG is consistent with the notion that cognitive processing
of the traumatic event has an important role in facilitating growth. It has been proposed
that individuals who cope effectively with traumatic events actively contemplate and
process their experience using cognitive, affective, and interpersonal processing
strategies (Manne, Ostroff, Winkel, Goldstein, Fox & Grana, 2004). A number of
indicators of cognitive processing (e.g., rumination, intrusions, positive appraisal,
acceptance) have been found to relate to PTG (Helgeson, Reynolds & Tomich, 2006;
Linley & Joseph, 2004).
In line with the assumptive world literature above, Carboon, Anderson, Pollard,
Szer and Seymour (2005) asserted that the potential for growth is somewhat dependent
on the degree of positive bias in an individual’s pre-trauma assumptions and therefore the
degree to which assumptions are challenged by the event. Likewise, the theoretical
framework used in this study (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004) proposed that the degree to
which a traumatic event is perceived as threatening by an individual (i.e., challenges
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his/her fundamental beliefs and is perceived as a threat of death or physical integrity),
and is actively and deliberately thought about, will influence the amount of PTG
experienced. Therefore, deliberate rumination plays a significant role in the process of
growth.
For instance, Bower, Kemeny, Taylor, and Fahey (1998) conducted a study with
40 HIV-positive men who had recently experienced an AIDS-related bereavement. The
results indicated that those men who engaged in active or deliberate thinking about the
death were more likely to report positive shifts in their values or priorities in response to
the loss. The authors explained that actively thinking about trauma can be a painful
process, provoking short-term increases in negative mood and certain measures of
autonomic activity. However, this process may be needed to reach a positive cognitive
outcome following the event, creating changes in attitudes and values that would not
otherwise be conceived.
When considering the role of cognition, and more specifically rumination, in the
facilitation of growth, it is necessary to keep in mind that there is a lack of consistency in
the use of the term “rumination” in the psychology literature, and it can be either adaptive
or maladaptive depending on the particular definition used. For instance, when
rumination is defined as “persistent thoughts about one’s symptoms of distress, and the
possible causes and consequences of these symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 2004,
p. 62), it is associated with more distress, more negative thinking, poorer problem
solving, and other negative outcomes. In contrast, “reflection,” defined as analyzing
recent events in order to increase understanding, has been found to be associated with
benefit finding and forms of coping that seem likely to be associated with PTG (Nolen-
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Hoeksema & Davis, 2004). This study utilized Martin and Tesser’s (1996) general
definition of rumination as “a class of conscious thoughts that revolve around a common
instrumental theme and that recur in the absence of immediate environmental demands
requiring the thoughts” (Martin & Tesser, 1996, p. 1).
Intrusive thoughts, which are common and automatic initially following a
traumatic event, are typically categorized in the literature as maladaptive and associated
with avoidance and escape. Furthermore, attempts at avoidance, particularly of traumarelated thoughts and feelings, have been conceptualized as key to the development and
maintenance of PTSD. Yet, some researchers have argued that intrusive thoughts are
adaptive. Individuals who have experienced a traumatic event tend to think about it
frequently in an attempt to understand, resolve, and make sense out of what happened.
Horowitz (1986, p. 99) explained that intrusive thoughts may lead to “revising the
automatic processing of such information, to revising the relevant schemas…and to
completing the processing of the stressful information.” Creamer, et al. (1992) argued
that escape and avoidance may reduce immediate distress, but long-term reliance on these
methods might be maladaptive. The authors explained that for recovery to occur,
memories must be activated for periods long enough to allow for effective processing,
which tends not to occur when escape and avoidance are high. Examples of effective
processing identified in the literature include: talking about the trauma with family and
friends, therapeutic exposure to trauma-related stimuli, and deliberate attempts to access
new information. Creamer et al. (1992) explained that in these instances the thoughts and
memories may not be intrusive, but rather individuals are making a conscious effort to
recall the event.
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Research has suggested that cognitive processing is related to the amount of PTG
individuals’ report (Gangstad, Norman & Barton, 2009; Phelps, Williams, Raichle,
Turner & Ehde, 2008; Salsman, Segerstrom, Brechting, Carlson & Andrykowski, 2009).
Research has also indicated that the timing of cognitive processing is significant. For
example, when intrusive thoughts are actively processed early in the cancer experience
rather than ignored, they are likely to result in a better psychological outcome (Manne et
al., 2004). Calhoun, Cann, Tedeschi, and McMillan (2000) conducted a study with 54
individuals who had experienced a traumatic event, and results indicated a relationship
between event-related rumination and the amount of PTG reported. The more rumination
participants experienced soon after the event, the greater the amount of PTG. The authors
concluded that early event-related rumination is associated with growth. Moreover, it is
expected that people who purposefully think about the event, and its potential meaning
and importance, are more likely to report PTG. However, the authors also speculated that
when ruminations are primarily intrusive, negative, and continue consistently for long
periods of time, both low levels of growth and high levels of distress would be expected.
Salsman, Segerstrom, Brechting, Carlson, and Andrykowski (2009) conducted a
study with 55 post-treatment, colorectal cancer survivors, which demonstrated the role
cognitive processing might have not only on growth, but on distress. As part of the study,
participants completed measures assessing cognitive processing (cognitive intrusions,
cognitive rehearsal) and psychological adjustment variables, including PTSD and PTG. It
was found that baseline intrusive thoughts were not significantly associated with baseline
or 3-month PTGI scores. Also, baseline cognitive rehearsal (defined as a form of
deliberate cognitive processing) was neither predictive of baseline PTGI scores nor
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predictive of 3-month PTGI scores. After controlling for baseline PTGI scores, and
excluding both age at diagnosis and education, baseline cognitive rehearsal was found to
predict 3-month PTGI scores (Salsman et al., 2009).
The researchers concluded that in contrast to the lack of associations between
automatic, intrusive cognitions and PTG, more intentional effortful processing was
weakly associated with higher levels of growth. Though baseline cognitive rehearsal was
not associated with baseline growth, the relationship between baseline cognitive rehearsal
and 3-month PTG suggested a trend. Moreover, the researchers hypothesized that
individuals who were experiencing higher levels of intrusive thoughts, along with PTSD
symptoms, were also engaging in more deliberate reflection as a means to begin
processing their cancer experience. Three months later, those who had engaged in higher
levels of cognitive rehearsal were less likely to report higher levels of PTSD symptoms
and more likely to report higher levels of PTG (Salsman et al., 2009). Thus, based on
these results, it appears that cognitive rehearsal is positively associated with PTG.
Finally, the important role of cognitive processing in PTG is not meant to imply
that a survivor’s emotions are not important. Yet, research has suggested that more
growth may occur when both emotions and thoughts are processed. Ullrich and
Lutgendorf (2002) reported that emotional expression, focused specifically on cognitive
processing following exposure to trauma (i.e., writing in a journal about emotions and
making sense of the traumatic event) was related to increased positive growth over a one
month time period. The authors suggested that engagement of both cognitions and
emotions while journaling about a traumatic event can raise awareness of the benefits of
the event. In contrast, focusing solely on the emotions related to the event might not
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produce a greater understanding of the trauma. Furthermore, they explained that creating
a coherent explanation for the event may help restore self-efficacy and add meaning to
the event (Ullrich & Lutgendorf, 2002). In general, the above findings support the notion
that the greater the opportunity to contemplate stressor-related thoughts and feelings, the
greater the opportunity for PTG.
Unique Aspects of the Cancer Experience
Sumulla et al. (2009) suggested five ways that cancer is different than an acute
trauma, such as a car accident, and therefore is somewhat unique. First, whereas some
traumatic events can be characterized by a specific and single stressor, during cancer the
stressors may be associated with “the diagnosis of cancer, its severity and prognosis, the
aggressiveness of treatments, alterations in body image, a decrease in the level of
functional autonomy or role alterations” (p. 25). Thus, with cancer it is usually difficult to
identify an exact, or single, stressor that precipitates PTG. Second, while acute traumatic
events are often caused by an external source; cancer has an internal nature and origin.
The authors proposed that it is this internal reference point that makes it more difficult for
survivors to avoid or ignore signs of the trauma (such as not feeling well physically), and
that may also play a key role in changing assumptions about the individual’s self.
Third, unlike acute traumas, in which the recurrence of intrusive cognitions is
associated with the past traumatic event, with cancer many of the intrusive cognitions are
fears related to future health. Cancer survivors, unlike other trauma survivors, must live
with the threat of disease recurrence (Carboon, et al., 2005). For instance, in a study with
breast cancer survivors conducted by Bower, Meyerowitz, Desmond, Bernaards,
Rowland and Ganz (2005), approximately 40% of the participants reported a persistent
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worry about the possible recurrence of the illness five years after diagnosis. Sumulla, et
al. (2009) asserted, “in a cancer-associated trauma what is present is an ill-fated future,
resulting in the inability of the patients to picture themselves over time because of the
distress this causes” (p. 26).
Fourth, it is not easy to establish the onset and termination of cancer. Typically,
with a cancer diagnosis comes the progressive presence of adverse events related to
treatment, side effects, and changes in prognosis such that it feels like a “long obstacle
race” (Sumulla et al., 2009). Finally, survivors of cancer often experience a certain level
of control over treatment and its outcome. In contrast with the uncontrollable nature of an
acute trauma, medical knowledge related to the mechanisms involved with cancer may
allow survivors some means of changing the way in which the illness develops (e.g.; diet,
exercise, etc.). Komura and Hegarty (2006) asserted that many of the positive changes
described by cancer survivors are associated with a greater sense of perceived control
over their lives and selves, and this perception is a typical characteristic of illness-related
trauma.
Experience Of Being A Survivor: Prominent Role of Uncertainty & Fear
To better understand what it means to be a cancer survivor, Allen, Savadatti and
Levy (2009) conducted six focus groups with 47 breast cancer survivors, who had
completed treatment in the past 12 months. Participants were asked about the transition
from being a “patient” who is actively in treatment, to a “survivor” who has completed
treatment. The most prominent theme in these groups centered around positive aspects of
the cancer experience. These changes included: enhanced appreciation for life, greater
willingness to do things that were once put off, feeling empowered by surviving, and an
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increased ability to “not sweat the small stuff” (p. 74). Yet, the majority of women also
expressed constant and distressing fears about disease recurrence. Often these fears were
triggered by physical symptoms of unclear origin. Related to fear of recurrence where
reports of emotional distress. For some women, it felt as though anguish could arise at
any time without a specific trigger.
While the completion of successful cancer treatment may be a cause of
celebration for many survivors, the end of treatment was associated with a sense of loss
for many women in the focus groups. The loss experienced was related to the cessation of
monitoring by, and support from, medical professionals, and a clear “action plan” against
cancer. The women also reported decreased contact with other cancer survivors. Finally,
the women talked about difficulty returning to their pre-cancer life including: the sense
that life would never feel “normal,” the struggle to resume responsibilities, the burden of
needing to “be strong” for family and friends, and uncertainty regarding the future. The
authors also noted that for younger women, the unknown impact of treatment on fertility
was typically a prime concern (Allen et al., 2009).
Distress and physical symptoms related to cancer can continue for many years
after diagnosis and treatment. While there is a general understanding of, and sympathy
for illness in our society, it has been argued that the challenges of survival are less well
recognized (Little, Paul, Jordens & Sayers, 2002). One proposed reason why cancer
leaves consequences that persist well beyond diagnosis and treatment is because it is an
“extreme experience…that leaves no aspect of identity untouched” (Little, et al., 2002, p.
176). The authors explained,
The physical, embodied component of identity has been challenged, and its
vulnerability made clear. There may also be physical changes in the body as a result of
44

the extreme experiences, such as a colostomy or a surgical scar. The content of
cognition, the perceptions and remembered experiences that make up the background
to our thinking, has been changed. There is now available to it the knowledge that
comes from the extreme experience. (Little, et al., 2002, p. 176-177)
A paradoxical rise in anxiety has been found at the end of treatment as the
survivor now must contend with an uncertain future without frequent contact with
medical services (Brennan, 2001; Kaiser, 2008). Kaiser (20008) performed a qualitative
study with 39 women who had completed treatment (surgery, chemotherapy, or radiation)
for breast cancer 3-18 months prior to the interviews. One survivor talked about the
contrast between the precise, medical periods of diagnosis and treatment, and the vague,
uncertain period following treatment.
There was so much definition to the cancer, you know the cancer is this grade, and it’s
estrogen receptor positive, and you’re this age and all these factors and this is what we
can do. Everything was so precise and now it’s like you’re back to the unknown again
like I was before, and I don’t like that. (Kaiser, 2008, p. 84)
A paper published in the Journal of Aging Studies in 2005 presented the
experiences of breast cancer survivors living years beyond diagnosis. The dialogue
presented in the paper was taken from focus group transcripts that were conducted to help
create a theatrical production in Ontario, Canada about life after breast cancer. The focus
groups were comprised of 10 cancer survivors (nine breast, one cervical) who were at
least four years disease free (Sinding & Gray, 2005). The women spoke of ongoing pain,
scars, or perhaps having only one breast from surgery, lingering anxiety and depression,
fatigue and low energy as well as the loss of predictability of energy. The awareness that
cancer might recur was central to the experience of survivorship. The potential for
metastatic disease carried with it a change in the meaning of bodily symptoms. The
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authors explained, “Certain signs, once neutral, became charged; aches or pains that
would have been treated casually are now laced with danger” (p. 153).
The women discussed how they know they may live for many years, even perhaps
the rest of their lives, without ever receiving another cancer diagnosis; yet, they described
“living under threat,” of anticipating, at some level, cancer returning. This experience of
living under threat was perceived to separate the survivors from their peers who had
never experienced cancer. One survivor pointed out that others, based on the universality
of death, often minimize the sense of ongoing threat: ‘any of us could be hit by a bus!’
Yet, as another survivor noted, “Most people don’t go around worrying they are going to
be hit by a bus and most people do not try to organize their lives to avoid buses” (Sinding
& Gray, 2005, p. 154).
Cancer and Posttraumatic Growth
Traumatic events, including cancer and other life-threatening illnesses, can
undermine a person’s ability to cope, create symptoms of depression and anxiety, and
decrease psychological well-being. The psychological toll of illness is related to the
challenge and threat the illness presents to one’s core beliefs and assumptions about
themselves and the world (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Lepore and Helgeson (1998) explained,
“The life-threatening and unpredictable nature of cancer, as well as the changes it can
impose on daily life, can cause its victims to question core beliefs they hold about
themselves, their relationships with others, and their future” (p. 90). For example, the
authors described that prostate cancer can challenge a man’s assumptions about being
invulnerable to illness, having an active and fulfilling retirement, providing for his
family, and satisfying his and his partner’s sexual desires. Moreover, prostate cancer is
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likely to especially challenge a man’s masculine identity, because it can cause fatigue and
lessen control over important bodily functions, including sexual function and continence
(Lepore & Helgeson, 1998).
For many people the threat of cancer is believed to have been the prompting force
for restructuring their lives in more meaningful ways, thereby creating the perception that
cancer was beneficial. When individuals find some positive meaning in their illness, their
ability to cope is enhanced, they might feel better about themselves, and they suffer less
(Affleck & Tennen, 1996; Taylor, 1983). According to Taylor (1983), finding meaning in
adversity is self-empowering. It is a cognitive adaptation that lessens the negative impact
of traumatic events and helps the individual master future challenges.
Taylor (1983) reviewed data from interviews with 78 women with breast cancer,
and found that when the women were asked if the changes they reported in their lives
since cancer were positive or negative, only 17% reported any negative changes in their
lives. Fifty-three percent reported only positive changes, and the remainder reported no
changes. Moreover, participants tended to see themselves as presently better adjusted
than before diagnosis. Taylor (1983, p. 1165) concluded that the women possessed a
“remarkable ability to construe personal benefit from potential tragedy.”
A study performed over a three-year period with 56 adult bone marrow transplant
(BMT) cancer survivors found that most survivors found benefit from cancer (Tallman,
Altmaier & Garcia, 2007). More specifically, at one-year post BMT, 91% of participants
indicated at least one benefit from their experience; most frequently in the “life
perspective domain.” At three years post BMT, again, 91% of participants found benefits
from their experience. The majority of participants reported benefits in life perspective,

47

followed by perception of self, interpersonal relationships, and spiritual or religious
benefits. Moreover, it was found that individuals who found more benefit at year one
were less depressed and had better physical functioning at year three than were
participants who found less benefit at year one (Tallman et al., 2007).
Key Variables Associated with Posttraumatic Growth Following Cancer
Demographic Variables
Numerous studies have demonstrated that demographic variables, such as
ethnicity, marital status, gender, religious affiliation, and age are unrelated, or
inconsistently related, to individual differences in PTG among individuals with cancer
(Bellizzi & Blank, 2006; Lechner et al., 2003; Stanton et al., 2006; Tomich, & Helgeson,
2004; Widows, Jacobsen, Booth-Jones, & Fields, 2005). However, given the inconsistent
relationship between some of these variables and PTG, along with the fact that the
majority of studies that have examined PTG in cancer have been conducted with breast
cancer survivors, certain demographic variables, such as age and gender, require further
investigation.
Age
Prior research examining the impact of age on PTG has revealed non-significant
results, although several studies have demonstrated significant negative associations,
such that younger adults with cancer report greater PTG than do older adults (Stanton et
al., 2006). For example, Manne, Ostroff, Winkel, Goldstein, Fox, and Grana (2004)
found that younger breast cancer survivors had higher PTGI scores shortly after surgery,
as well as nine and 18 months later compared to older breast cancer survivors. The
researchers suggested that the younger survivors in the study might be more aware of and
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motivated to conform to expectations to adopt a positive attitude when dealing with
cancer than older adults. It has also been hypothesized that one reason differences emerge
in PTG between young and older survivors is because onset of disease is a more
normative experience for older adults, whereas a cancer diagnosis requires more
developmental readjustment for younger adults and is therefore more distressing for them
(Stanton et al., 2006). Bellizzi (2004) reported, “Those diagnosed in their thirties and
forties likely face a different set of life challenges, expectations, and demands when
compared to individuals diagnosed in their eighties” (p. 269). Furthermore, the researcher
hypothesized that younger cancer survivors may experience greater PTG than older
survivors because they realize they have more time left in their lives to accomplish
chosen goals.
Using a sample of 74 cancer survivors ranging in age from 23 to 93 years, Bellizzi
(2004) examined three age groups: 26-41 years, 42-54 years, and 55 years and over in
relation to perceptions of PTG as measured by the PTGI. It was found that both younger
adults as well as midlife adults reported significantly higher scores of PTG than older
adults. When examining the subscales of the PTGI, it was revealed that younger and
midlife cancer survivors reported significantly more growth in ‘new possibilities’ than
older survivors. There were no significant differences between younger and midlife
survivors. This same pattern was found for ‘personal strength’ and ‘appreciation of life’.
With regard to ‘spiritual change’ midlife survivors reported more growth than older
survivors, and again there were no differences between younger and midlife survivors.
Bellizzi (2004) speculated that lower scores of PTG may be found among older
individuals because of where they are in the life cycle. Perhaps with age comes a

49

“peaceful acceptance” about life, and growth may simply not be as important to older
survivors.
Gender
Gender may influence how one copes with and processes his/her cancer
experience, which in turn, influences the emergence of growth. However, research on the
relationship between gender and PTG is mixed. Some studies propose that females report
both more distress and more growth compared to men, while other studies report no
differences (Salsman, Brechting, Segerstrom, Carlson & Andrykowski, 2009). In a study
conducted with 55 colorectal cancer survivors, of which 58.9% were female, it was found
that gender was unrelated to psychological variables including: cancer-related intrusive
thoughts, PTSD, and PTG (Salsman, et al., 2009). Lepore and Helgeson (1998) argued
that talking with empathic and supportive others facilitates cognitive processing and
growth. Yet, the researchers asserted that prostate cancer, in particular, may be difficult
to talk about with close others because it is related to a man’s intimate anatomy and
creates problems in bodily functions that ordinarily might not be discussed.
In a qualitative study with 34 prostate cancer survivors and their partners (Gray,
Fitch, Phillips, Labrecque & Fergus, 2000), which examined issues related to coping and
support, it was found that many of the men minimized the impact of their cancer and
either seemed to experience less distress overall when compared to their partners or went
to greater lengths to avoid acknowledging their distress. The researchers explained that,
in general,
Ill men are in a psychological bind. They may feel vulnerable, and may experience
more intense emotions than they are accustomed to feeling. Consequently, they may
also feel a greater need for emotional support. But these experiences run counter to
their identities as men. To express their distress or to actively seek support has the
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potential for undermining their sense of self. Minimization of impact thus becomes
understandable. (Gray et al., 2000, p. 545)
The researchers also found that the survivors flipped back and forth from talking with
their partners and withdrawing. The researchers explained that sometimes the men “go
with the needs the illness evokes” and at times “fight those needs in favor of meeting
their expectations for themselves” (p. 545). Overall, the impact of the disease on the
survivors was often hidden as they struggled to stay in control of their emotions and lives
(Gray, et al., 2000). If men are more likely to downplay their cancer experience and not
acknowledge their distress due to gender expectations, it seems reasonable that they
would experience less growth compared to females as the emergence of growth requires
an acknowledgment of distress and cognitive processing, which for many is facilitated by
talking with others.
To examine the amount of growth reported by prostate cancer survivors, Thornton
and Perez (2006) conducted a study with 82 prostate cancer survivors, which assessed
PTG one year after the men underwent a radical prostatectomy. The researchers found
that none of the demographic and medical information collected, including employment
status, type of surgery (standard versus nerve-sparing), and disease stage, were related to
PTG. In general, the survivors reported a modest degree of PTG one year after treatment.
Coping by using positive reframing (p < 0.001) and emotional support (p = 0.01) was
significantly related to PTG. Levels of PTG were slightly lower in the sample of prostate
cancer survivors compared to samples of breast cancer survivors. The researchers
hypothesized that lower scores for prostate survivors may have been related to the fact
that stress symptoms were lower in the sample of men one year after treatment compared
to stress symptoms of breast cancer survivors that were assessed as much as two years
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post-diagnosis or treatment. In addition, echoing the conclusion above, the researchers
postulated that gender socialization differences between men and women could have
impacted reports of PTG (Thornton & Perez, 2006).
It has also been proposed that both men and women seek emotional support and
information following cancer, but that they express themselves differently. A 2007 study
conducted by Gooden and Winefield investigated two online discussion boards for breast
and prostate cancer survivors in order to examine the expressive content of the survivors’
postings. Using a qualitative research approach it was found that the two primary reasons
survivors used both discussion boards were information sharing and emotional support,
and both men and women used the boards for these reasons equally. However, there were
differences in how the survivors communicated (Gooden & Winefield, 2007). Men
provided more accounts from research and medical reports than women and spent more
time discussing disease-site specific concerns, such as sexual dysfunction. Moreover,
men used humor as a way to cope whereas women used humor less. Regarding sharing
distress, women clearly expressed emotions, whereas men tended to imply their
emotions. When offering encouragement to other survivors, women tended to provide
nurturance and affection, whereas men emphasized strength and used “battle like
terminology, as though they were at war with cancer” (Gooden & Winefield, 2007, p.
111). Results of this study highlight the differences in how men and women tend to
express themselves. It is important to note that growth measures may be more in
accordance with how women are socialized to express their thoughts and feelings, which
may be part of the reason why many studies find women reporting more growth than
men.
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Zwahlen, Hagenbuch, Carley, Jenewein and Buchi (2010) reiterated the above
conclusion after conducting a study examining the effects of gender and role on benefit
finding in couples. The sample of 224 cancer survivors (123 men and 94 women) and
their partners completed questionnaires, including the PTGI. The participants had several
types of cancer including, among others: skin, intestinal, breast, lung, and leukemia. The
results revealed gender did contribute to variation in PTGI scores such that PTGI total
scores for all women in the sample were greater than those reported by the men. The
researchers suggested that females may be more willing or able to express personal
growth experiences or the PTGI itself may not capture the “engagement in emotional
work in men” (p. 17).
It is worth noting that an alternative hypothesis for why prostate cancer survivors,
in particular, are less likely to report PTG than breast cancer survivors is that, based upon
trends in five-year survival rates, more individuals survive five years with prostate cancer
(99%) compared to breast cancer (89%, National Cancer Institute, 2007). Because fewer
people die from prostate cancer than breast cancer, it may be perceived as less
threatening, and thus, less growth is reported. However, survival rates based off of group
data do not speak to the individual differences among survivors, and perceived threat may
be related to many variables, such as type of treatment received, treatment side effects
and degree that beliefs are challenged. Furthermore, as will be discussed below, a
survivor may subjectively feel a great degree of threat regardless of objective data, such
as medical information and relevant statistics. Upon hearing a diagnosis of prostate
cancer, a man may be very worried that he will die, regardless of the fact that, in general,
fewer individuals die of prostate cancer compared to other types of cancer.
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Time
Intuitively, it seems that a positive correlation would be expected between PTG
and time, as more time to process the meaning and impact of cancer might be associated
with the discovery of more benefit and positive life changes. For example, measures of
PTG taken soon after a traumatic event might reflect a cognitive strategy that individuals
use to reduce distress, rather than reflecting actual change or growth (Helgeson,
Reynolds, & Tomich, 2006). As Helgeson, et al. (2006) stated, “It is difficult to imagine
that true growth can occur within days of a traumatic event” (p. 811). Butler (2007)
explained that growth is more likely to be reported in hindsight when an individual
reflects upon his/her experience because he/she has used coping methods and other
efforts over time to process what has occurred. A longitudinal study conducted by Manne
et al. (2004) found a consistent and significant increase in PTGI scores over 18 months
among women with breast cancer. In general, a meta-analysis revealed that benefit
finding is more likely to be related to a good outcome when a longer time has elapsed
since the trauma (Helgeson, et al., 2006).
It is likely that when an individual is initially diagnosed with cancer, he/she
experiences a high level of distress and feelings of being overwhelmed, as the individual
is confronted with a large amount of new information that needs to be processed. For
instance, results from a longitudinal study conducted with women with various types of
cancer indicated that the cancer diagnostic period is one of acute stress (Andersen,
Anderson, & deProsse, 1989). Carboon, et al. (2005) asserted that during treatment
survivors report being “intently focused on the goal of ‘getting better.’” Thus, all their
resources are directed to managing the practical aspects of treatment. It is only when
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treatment is complete that many survivors find time and energy to process and reflect on
their experience. Therefore, it typically takes time for PTG to emerge. Sears, Stanton and
Danoff-Burg (2003) found that among a sample of women with early-stage breast cancer
who had completed medical treatment, greater perceived cancer stress and longer
duration since diagnosis at study entry were related to PTG one year later. Findings were
consistent with the notion that more intensive initial engagement with a stressor (as
indicated by high thought intrusion, avoidance, and stress appraisals), coupled with more
time to process the stressor, facilitates PTG.
Some research, conducted with time periods ranging from two weeks to eight
years after a traumatic event, has suggested that PTG is unrelated to time since the trauma
occurred, and that there may even be a negative relationship between time and growth
(Linley & Joseph, 2004; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996). Stanton et al. (2006) reported that
in two studies that found a negative relationship between the variables, the participants
were on average more than three years post-diagnosis of their cancer, as compared with a
diagnosis duration of less than two years in three of the four studies that found a positive
relationship. Therefore, it has been suggested that the “relationship between PTG and
time since diagnosis may be stronger in the one to two years following diagnosis and
treatment than after several years of survivorship” (Stanton et al., 2006, p. 159).
Overall, the literature on the relationship between time and PTG is inconsistent,
which is likely related to methodological issues in the research. For instance, many
studies use participants who are newly diagnosed and likely still undergoing primary
treatment (e.g., surgery, radiation, chemotherapy) or those who are no more than a few
years post-diagnosis (Stanton et al., 2006). There is less information available regarding
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longer-term survivors. Further, studies generally utilize a cross-sectional design. Because
there is a lack of longitudinal data (Helgeson et al., 2006; Stanton, et al., 2006),
researchers are uncertain of the emergence and role of growth over time.
Nonetheless, it has been suggested that it is not time per se that facilitates PTG,
but rather intervening events and processes (Linley & Joseph, 2004). Considering the
cognitive processing model of trauma, it is probable that the longer the time since being
diagnosed with cancer, the more opportunity for deliberate cognitive processing (versus
the automatic and intrusive rumination that typically occurs in the immediate aftermath of
trauma), which would increase the facilitation of PTG (Cordova et al., 2001; Helgeson et
al., 2006; Sears et al., 2003).
Types of Cognitive Processing
By and large, little research has been conducted that examines the relationship
between specific types of cognitive processing and growth. Manne et al. (2004)
conducted a study with 162 women with breast cancer and their partners, and found that
women who engaged in more contemplation about the potential reasons why they might
have developed breast cancer experienced more growth over time. It was also found that
engaging in more attempts to search for meaning in breast cancer was marginally
associated with gains in growth. However, other cognitive processes, including intrusive
thoughts, searching for a cause for developing cancer, and positive reappraisal were not
associated with growth. The researchers concluded that not all cognitive processes
facilitate growth. For instance, they proposed that searching for a cause of one’s cancer
may lead to self-blame, which has been found to be associated with poorer adaptation to
breast cancer (Manne et al., 2004).

56

Another study examined whether cognitive processing was associated with PTG
after stroke in a sample of 60 stroke survivors (Gangstad, Norman & Barton, 2009). The
researchers found statistically significant (p < .01) positive correlations between scores
on the Posttraumatic Growth Inventory and four of the five Cognitive Processing of
Trauma Scale subscales: Positive Cognitive Restructuring, Downward Comparison,
Resolution, and Denial (r = .52, .29, .44 and .38, respectively). Thus, higher levels of
growth were associated with these four subscales. It was concluded that cognitive
processing of the traumatic event is an important process for stimulating PTG.
Interestingly, Denial is one of two subscales (Regret is the other) that are thought to
represent minimal and/or negative cognitive processing and thus, theoretically, one would
assume that denial would be negatively, not positively, related to growth. Yet, Bonanno
(2004) has written on the potentially adaptive role of various kinds of cognitive
processing, such as denial, self-enhancement and dissociation from stressful events.
Therefore, it is possible that in some instances denial is helpful and in others it is not.
There is a gap in the current literature related to understanding how different types of
cognitive processing influence growth.
Finally, 83 people with newly acquired limb loss participated in a study which
investigated symptoms of depression, PTSD and PTG (measured with the PTGI) six and
12 months following amputation (Phelps et al., 2008). The researchers examined
cognitive processing as a potential predictor of the psychological outcomes. Positive
Cognitive Processing consisted of benefit-finding, accommodation of belief structures,
and resolution. Negative Cognitive Processing was defined as ruminative thoughts, anger,
sense of victimization, and blaming. It was found that Positive Cognitive Processing was
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significantly related to depressive symptom severity at six and 12 months (r = -.27 and .33, respectively) and to the level of PTG at 12 months (r = .33), such that greater levels
of positive processing were associated with lower symptom severity and more growth.
Negative Cognitive Processing was significantly related to depressive and PTSDsymptom severity at six months (r = .29 and .36, respectively), such that greater levels of
negative processing were associated with greater levels of distress. Moreover, cognitive
processing was found to account for 15 percent of the unique variance in PTG at 12
months, with higher levels of positive processing associated with higher levels of growth
(Phelps et al., 2008).
The above researchers also found that demographic factors were unrelated to
PTG, which is consistent with prior research (Linley & Joseph, 2004). Impressively, in
their study, positive cognitive processing within nine weeks of amputation predicted
growth at 12 months. Interestingly, negative cognitive processing was found to be
basically unrelated to PTG at any time. It was concluded that the findings support a
cognitive-processing model of PTG in which deliberate thought characterized by
meaning-making, as opposed to nonproductive rumination, facilitates PTG (Phelps et al.,
2008).
Perceived Threat: Overview
Threat of mortality as well as threat to a person’s overall belief system are thought
to be a stimulus for PTG in cancer survivors, as a diagnosis of cancer involves an
inherent threat to mortality and often challenges how one sees him/herself, others and the
world at large. Thus, a general theme in the literature on growth following cancer is that
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the greater the impact of the cancer experience (i.e., larger threat to physical well-being
and beliefs/assumptions), the greater the potential for PTG (Stanton et al., 2006).
Curvilinear Relationship Between Threat and Growth
Based upon Tedeschi and Calhoun’s (2004) model of PTG, if an event is not
serious enough to provoke a re-examination of one’s fundamental beliefs, schemas are
unlikely to be shattered. Therefore, searching for meaning in the cancer experience might
not take place, and the individual would not believe that much had changed in his/her life
as a result of cancer. Conversely, the experience of very advanced disease might prompt
such a high life threat that an individual cognitively shuts down any search for meaning
and benefit (Lechner et al., 2003). Carboon, et al. (2005) explained that cognitive
processing, and subsequent perception of PTG, might be contingent on the ending of
immediate threat upon successful treatment, thereby arguably allowing a survivor to have
enough emotional and physical energy to devote to processing his/her cancer experience.
Evidence exists that a curvilinear, rather than a linear, relationship exists between
degree of trauma exposure, PTG and trauma-related distress (Butler, Blasey, Garlan,
McCaslin, Azarow, Chen, et al., 2005; Kleim & Ehlers, 2009; Lechner et al., 2003;
McCaslin, Zoysa, Butler, Hart, Marmar, Metzler, et al., 2009). For example, using a large
convenience based Internet sample participating in a longitudinal study following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Butler, et al. (2005) found a curvilinear
relationship between PTG and PTSD symptoms, with the highest level of growth
reported by those who endorsed a moderate level of PTSD symptoms. Further, results
indicated that initial PTG (nine weeks post 9/11) was related to higher levels of trauma
symptoms (measured by the PTSD Checklist-Specific), positive changes in worldview
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(measured with the Changes in Outlook Questionnaire), more denial, and less behavioral
disengagement (measured with the Brief COPE). Levels of PTG also declined somewhat
over time with the exception of ‘spiritual change.’ PTG levels at follow-up assessment
(mean 6.5 months post-attacks) were primarily predicted by initial PTG levels; however,
decreases from initial trauma symptoms and increases in positive worldview, acceptance,
and positive reframing were also associated with higher reported PTG at follow-up. The
authors concluded that the results “suggest that there may be a range of traumatic
experience most conducive to growth and they also highlight the important contributions
of cognitive and coping variables to psychological thriving in short-and longer-term
periods following traumatic experience” (Butler, et al., 2005, p. 247).
Given the evidence of a curvilinear relationship between distress and growth,
McCaslin, et al. (2009) argued that a sample with a small range of PTSD symptoms could
conceivably yield a positive, negative or no relationship to growth depending upon the
level and range of symptoms, and segment of the curve sampled. The researchers also
explained that the curvilinear relationships found between PTG and PTSD suggest that an
optimal level of immediate and subsequent distress may facilitate PTG, whereas low
levels of distress may be insufficient to foster growth, and an overwhelming amount of
distress, at the time of an event and following it, may impede the development of PTG.
Threat to Physical Well-Being
The threat of mortality that comes with a cancer diagnosis is consistent with
existential theory (Frankl, 1959), and more specifically, the concerns that arise when one
is confronted with the finite nature of his/her life. Weisman and Worden (1976) described
the “existential plight in cancer” as a period of time that begins with initial and definite

60

diagnosis and continues for two to three months. The researchers interviewed and
assessed 120 newly diagnosed cancer survivors using semi-structured interviews and
assessments, specifically the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), the
Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), and scales that were designed for the study (a
modification of the General Coping Strategies [COPE], Resolution [RES], Inventory of
Predominant Concerns [IPC] and the Index of Vulnerability [VUL]). The survivors were
assessed at about 10 days after diagnosis, then at four and six-week intervals until three to
four months had elapsed. Overall, the authors found that the primary signs of this period
were predominance of life/death concerns as the individual’s very existence seemed
endangered. Weisman and Worden (1976) suggested that cancer survivors, regardless of
the prognosis or site, are primarily concerned about dying. Other concerns about health,
family, finances, work, and so forth are largely secondary during the first few months
after initial diagnosis.
Being confronted with one’s mortality may elicit a re-evaluation of life goals and
priorities, such that individuals have a greater appreciation of life, interpersonal
relationships, spirituality, and personal strengths and skills (Cordova, et al. 2001; Fromm,
Andrykowski & Hunt, 1996; McMillen, Smith & Fisher, 1997; Wortman, 2004). For
instance, a study conducted with 90 male cancer survivors revealed that a majority of the
participants reported an increased ability to appreciate life, and an enhancement in their
interest and concern for significant others. The authors concluded that the cancer
experience had a “humanizing impact” on the survivors (Cella & Tross, 1987).
It has been suggested that the greater the life threat posed by the stressor, the
greater the opportunity for growth (Cordova, Cunningham, Carlson, & Andrykowski,
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2001); however, there have been few studies that have assessed perceived threat of
cancer. Most studies in the psycho-oncology literature have utilized objective stage of
disease as a measurement of threat. For instance, a study that examined benefit-finding
and quality of life in 364 women with Stage I, II, and III breast cancer found that stage of
disease was associated with benefit-finding (Tomich & Helgeson, 2004). Women
diagnosed at Stage II perceived more benefits as a result of their experience than did
those diagnosed at Stage I. Furthermore, the mean on the benefit-finding measure for
women diagnosed at Stage III was higher than those diagnosed at Stage I and II, but this
difference was not statistically significant, likely because there were only 22 women with
Stage III cancer. The authors concluded that women diagnosed with more severe disease
perceived more benefits following diagnosis than did women diagnosed with less severe
disease and that a potential reason for this difference is because women with more
advanced disease may have more critically examined their experience (Tomich &
Helgeson, 2004).
These results, and the conclusion drawn from them, need to be examined critically
as research has shown that threat measured using stage of disease is often not a valid
indicator of the subjective level of threat a survivor may be experiencing (Cordova,
Giese-Davis, Golant, Kronenwetter, Chang, & Spiegel, 2007; Lechner, Zakowski,
Antoni, Greenhawt, Block, & Block, 2003). For example, if degree of cognitive
engagement and reflection is based upon amount of subjective threat, which is not
dependent on disease stage, then someone with Stage I cancer may feel just as much, or
possibly more, threat than someone with Stage III cancer. In that case, the person at Stage
I might deliberately think about and process his/her experience.
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Utilizing a more subjective measure of threat, Cordova et al. (2001) conducted a
study, which investigated predictors of PTG among 70 women with breast cancer. The
researchers examined perceived threat based upon Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders-IV criteria for PTSD. They asked participants two questions: “Did you
perceive being diagnosed with and treated for breast cancer as a threat of death or serious
injury or a threat to your physical integrity?” and “Given your experience with breast
cancer, has your response ever involved intense fear or helplessness?” The coefficient
alpha for this two-item alternative measure of the stressor criteria was .68 (Cordova et al.,
2001).
It was found that 61% of breast cancer participants endorsed both of the questions
above; 80% perceived breast cancer as a threat to life or physical integrity; and 64%
responded with fear or helplessness. Moreover, the total score on the Posttraumatic
Growth Inventory was significantly correlated with scores on the two-item stress criteria
measure (r = .38, p < .001), such that greater PTG was associated with breast cancer
being perceived as a traumatic stressor. The researchers concluded that for stressors to
elicit positive change, they must have been threatening enough to challenge one’s
assumptions and to elicit coping responses (Cordova et al., 2001).
A further study conducted by Cordova et al. (2007), with 65 breast cancer
survivors, utilized the same criteria as the above study to measure “Stressfulness of the
Cancer Experience,” and found that approximately 66% of the sample reported that they
perceived their cancer experience as a threat to their life or physical well-being, and 59%
indicated that their response involved fear or helplessness. It was found that perception of
cancer as a traumatic stressor was a unique predictor of PTG (p < .05), such that those
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who perceived cancer as traumatic reported greater PTG. Results also revealed that
objective indices of cancer severity, such as stage of disease or treatment received, were
not related to PTG. The researchers suggested that in line with stress and coping theories,
perceived, rather than objective threat posed by a stressor appears to be a better predictor
of adjustment (Cordova et al., 2007).
Salsman, et al. (2009) conducted a study with 55 colorectal cancer survivors
which examined emotional coping as a predictor of PTG. Participants were all posttreatment and within six to 18 months post-diagnosis. Perceived threat was measured
using DSM-IV stressor criteria. Results indicated that few participants (16.4%) perceived
their cancer experience as a traumatic stressor; however, perceiving the cancer experience
as traumatic was associated with reports of appreciation of life and greater personal
strength over time. The researchers concluded PTG might continue to increase posttreatment as patients begin to live life as a cancer survivor (Salsman et al., 2009).
Bellizzi and Blank (2006) asked 224 breast cancer survivors to use their
recollection to rate the emotional impact they experienced in relating to others, purpose in
life, and appreciation of life at the time of diagnosis. Results indicated that the perceived
emotional impact of the disease on specific domains of life was significantly related to
perceptions of PTG. More specifically, women who rated a high emotional impact at the
time of diagnosis reported higher levels of PTG in their relationships with others, purpose
in life and appreciation for life compared to women who did not (Bellizzi & Blank,
2006).
Lechner et al. (2003) investigated the relationships between benefit-finding,
sociodemographic and disease-related variables in a sample of 83 men and women with
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various types and stages of cancer. The researchers measured perceived threat by asking
the participants to provide a percentage rating of how likely they felt it was that they
would die of cancer; the rating was made on a scale of zero to 100 percent. Lending
support to the notion that perceived threat is an important determinant of PTG, the
researchers found that after statistically controlling for stage of disease, perceived threat
was significantly correlated with benefit-finding (r = 0.24, p < 0.05).
This finding, along with the results of the above studies, indicates that irrespective
of objective life threat (i.e., stage of disease), perceptions of threat appear to influence the
facilitation of PTG. Lechner et al. (2003) concluded that different levels of threat or
prognostic uncertainty should produce different responses to cancer. Bower, Meyerowitz,
Desmond, Bernaards, Rowland and Ganz (2005) reported that there is evidence that
greater impact of cancer is associated with perceptions of both vulnerability and positive
meaning. For instance, studies have shown that younger survivors, as well as those who
perceive a greater physical threat associated with cancer and who undergo more risky
medical treatment, report more positive changes (Cordova, et al., 2001; Lechner, et al.,
2003).
The majority of studies on PTG and cancer have examined individuals diagnosed
with breast cancer. A study by Widows et al. (2005) was conducted with 72 bone marrow
transplant patients with the aim of extending previous research to a population of cancer
survivors undergoing more aggressive treatment and who are at a greater risk for
mortality than are women with non-metastatic breast cancer. Contrary to hypotheses,
PTG was found to be unrelated to risk of disease recurrence or progression (p < .19), a
variable that might serve as an objective measure of degree of life threat.
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Overall, the above study found that reports of PTG were common among
participants, yet not more so than reports of PTG in other populations of cancer survivors.
More specifically related to threat, PTG was not significantly related to the total stress
appraisal score (p = .09); however, it was significantly positively associated with postBMT recollections of greater emotional distress (p = .01) and greater concern for life (p =
.02) during BMT. Thus, in general, similar to other research findings, the researchers
explained that survivors’ subjective concerns about mortality were associated with PTG,
whereas an objective measure of mortality risk was not (Widows et al., 2005).
Summarizing the research, Brennan (2001) explained that since cancer diagnosis poses a
future threat that is likely to be influenced by the individual’s unique belief system,
typically the individual’s perception of their prognosis may be a more accurate measure
of the traumatic impact of disease threat, rather than the more objective prognosis made
by medical professionals based on clinical staging.
Threat to Assumptive World
As mentioned above, a traumatic event has the potential to greatly challenge an
individual’s beliefs about him/herself, others, and the world. It has been proposed that in
order to “make meaning” of the event, individuals must either change their view of the
trauma to make it fit into their existing worldviews, or change their worldviews to
accommodate the trauma. Park and Folkman (1997) asserted that individuals alter either
their global beliefs and goals, or their appraised situational meaning of the traumatic
event in order to reduce their distress. While this study conceptualizes PTG as an
outcome rather than a coping strategy, Tennen and Affleck (1998) suggested that
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perceiving positive changes or personal growth following trauma is an adaptive strategy
for reducing the upsetting nature of the event.
Cognitive processing is considered crucial to resolve discrepancies between an
individual’s previously held beliefs and current situation that they appraise as violating
those beliefs (Park & Blumberg, 2002). Thus, a traumatic event must sufficiently
challenge an individual’s beliefs in order to set in motion cognitive processing that
potentially may lead to PTG. Conversely, if the event does not disrupt an individual’s
beliefs, his/her distress is likely to be less severe, and subsequently there is less of a
psychological need to alter his/her worldview to accommodate trauma.
Few, if any, studies have examined the extent to which having cancer challenges
an individual’s worldview. In a qualitative study conducted by Collins, Taylor and
Skokan (1990) 55 female and male cancer survivors were asked about changes
experienced in self-views, views of the world, future plans, relationships, and
activities/priorities following diagnosis. On average, participants had received a diagnosis
of cancer, or had a recurrence, three years prior to the interview. Results revealed that the
majority of participants reported changes in their perceptions following diagnosis.
Eighty-four percent reported changes in their views of themselves, 83% in their relations
with others, 79% in priorities/daily activities, 67% in their plans for the future, and 66%
in their views of the world. Changes in activities/priorities and relationships were
primarily positive, whereas changes in views of the self, world, and the future were
mixed. More specifically, there was a belief by some participants that the future was now
uncertain or threatening. Although respondents reported increased perceptions of threat,
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some of them considered this a positive change as they now had an increased awareness
of the uncontrollability of many events (Collins et al., 1990).
As stated previously, Bellizzi (2004) examined PTG in a mixed age and gender
sample of cancer survivors. Participants were asked to rate on a 4-point Likert scale “the
extent to which cancer impacted their perspective on life” (p. 276) and to explain their
answers. The narrative explanation was coded and examined for themes that were
associated with the four response choices. The researcher found that younger survivors’
perspectives on life were impacted significantly more than older adults, but there were no
significant differences between midlife survivors and the other two groups. Graphing the
results, it was also found that there was a linear decline in impact for middle and older
survivors compared to the younger group. Furthermore, 12% of the oldest group reported,
“having cancer had no impact on their perspective on life” (p. 278).
Of those who reported cancer had impacted their perspective on life “a lot,” 64%
described an “increased awareness of the fragility of life and the value of loved ones, and
had learned not to worry about the little annoyances in life” (p. 278). The researcher
concluded that for this group of survivors, facing mortality and realizing the fragility of
life might promote a positive shift in one’s beliefs regarding life. For those who reported
the impact on life perspective as “somewhat,” 68% reported themes related to mortality.
For participants who reported “a little” impact, no consistent themes emerged. However,
one 53 year-old prostate cancer survivor reported, “I spend little time reflecting on a
situation that I can’t control and their outcomes” (p. 281). Finally, for those who stated
“no impact” on their life perspective, 58% reported having other problems that took
precedence over cancer (Bellizzi, 2004).
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While the above studies offered useful information regarding changes in beliefs, a
missing component in the literature is the degree to which an individual’s beliefs are
challenged. As noted previously, according to the model of PTG utilized in this study
(Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004), the more the event challenges an individual’s beliefs, and
causes them to reflect on various life issues, such as mortality, the greater the potential
for PTG. Thus, it is critical that the degree of threat to an individual’s belief system, not
necessarily changes in the belief system, is measured. Bellizzi (2004) echoed this idea by
stating, “It may be important for posttraumatic growth models to examine potential levels
of “seismic” events. If different intensity levels exist, do they correspond to different
levels of reported posttraumatic growth?”(p. 282).
Anxiety & Depression in Cancer Survivors
As noted previously, diagnosis of cancer often generates fear and unrest in the
lives of survivors. Cancer has the potential to disrupt all aspects of daily life, and often
creates anxiety, anger, sadness, and depression as patients struggle to process and work
through the many decisions that confront them. It has been proposed that “somatic
distress,” defined as preoccupation with physical symptoms and fear of recurrence, is
almost universal and part of a “normal” response to cancer (Somerfield, Stefanek, Smith,
& Padberg, 1999). A longitudinal study conducted with women who had a variety of
cancer diagnoses revealed that the emotional distress experienced by survivors appeared
to be primarily defined by depressed and confused moods, with anxiety being the second
most frequent source of distress (Andersen et al., 1989).
Prevalence rates for anxiety and depression disorders amongst cancer survivors
are generally in the range of 10 to 30%, with rates of various anxiety disorders equivalent
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to, or greater than, those of depression in many cases (Roy-Byrne, Davidson, Kessler,
Asmundson, Goodwin, Kubzansky et al., 2008). A particular factor that has been shown
to increase the risk of co-morbid depression and anxiety is severity of cancer, as
manifested by significant pain, declining performance status, or the need for ongoing
treatment (Massie, 2004).
Results from a 2002 to 2006 National Health Interview Survey, using a sample of
4,636 survivors of adult-onset cancer of five years or more, and 122,220 respondents who
were never diagnosed with cancer, revealed that survivors were more likely to experience
“serious psychological distress” (SPD) than non-survivors. Moreover, survivors remained
significantly more likely to experience SPD after adjustment for sociodemographic and
clinical characteristics (Hoffman, McCarthy, Recklitis, & Ng, 2009). SPD was measured
by the K6 scale, which is a validated reliable screening scale that is designed to assess
nonspecific psychological distress that is severe enough to cause moderate to severe
impairment in social, occupational or school functioning and to require treatment. An
important methodological strength of this study is that it was designed to produce a
nationally representative sample that reflects ethnic and socioeconomic diversity.
The researchers proposed several reasons why a cancer history can affect current
psychological health including: a) cancer diagnosis and treatment can cause delayed
negative effects on physical health and functioning, negative affects on social adaptation,
employment opportunities or insurance coverage; b) an underlying sense of loss for what
might have been in life; c) or an underlying fear of recurrence and death. Overall, it was
found that “approximately 1 in 18 non-institutionalized long-term survivors of adult-
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onset cancer who reside in the United States report SPD based on a general screening
instrument” (Hoffman, et al., 2009, p. 1279).
A study conducted by Zabora, Brintzenhofeszoc, Curbow, Hooker, and Piantadosi
(2001) found that in a sample of over 4000 cancer survivors, the overall prevalence rate
of distress was 35.1%. Breast cancer is arguably the most studied cancer in terms of the
psychological and psychosocial aspects of the disease. It has been suggested that up to
30% of breast cancer survivors develop an anxiety or depressive disorder within a year of
diagnosis. On the other hand, some research has demonstrated that women with breast
cancer show no difference in psychological distress compared to women with benign
breast problems (Montazeri, Harirchi, Vahdami, Khaleghi, Jarvandi, Ebrahimi et al.,
2000).
Montazeri et al., (2000) conducted a study with a baseline sample of 168 breast
cancer survivors, and a follow-up sample of 151 survivors. The researchers assessed
levels of anxiety and depression before diagnosis and three months post-diagnosis using
the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS). Results revealed that 48% had
severe symptoms of anxiety at both baseline and follow-up. In contrast to prior research
findings, approximately 63% of survivors had normal scores on the HADS depression
subscale both at baseline and follow-up. Both symptoms of anxiety and depression were
found to be more prevalent in those who had metastatic disease. At baseline, survivors
with breast cancer showed no statistically significant differences in anxiety and
depression scores compared to women with benign disease. However, at follow-up,
breast cancer survivors had significantly higher mean scores on the HADS for both
anxiety (p <. 001) and depression (p < .001), compared to those with benign disease.
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Thus, the researchers concluded that, in general, symptoms of anxiety and depression
persist three months after disease diagnosis (Montazeri et al., 2000).
Although the above study found that the majority of participants did not
experience depressive symptoms, research has suggested that cancer survivors are at
increased risk of having co-existent depression. Depression is believed to be particularly
common in survivors who experience pain and physical disability. Since pain and
physical disability become more common in the terminal phases of cancer, coupled with
the threat of impending loss, depression is typical among palliative care patients. In a
sample of 63 survivors with advanced cancer, who were currently receiving palliative
care services, it was found that 22% of participants scored above the cutoff for probable
depression on the HADS and 25% scored above the cutoff for probable anxiety.
Moreover, anxiety and depression were associated with impairment in cognitive
functioning and global health status. This finding continued to be significant after
controlling for the effects of pain and illness severity (Smith, Gomm, & Dickens, 2003).
Pain and physical limitations are also more common during treatment compared to posttreatment (although pain can persist as discussed above), with many survivors showing
slight and steady improvement in physical and psychological functioning over time
(Helgeson, Snyder & Seltman, 2004), which is why it is important to distinguish between
active-treatment and post-treatment survivors.
Variables that are likely related to level of distress in cancer survivors are type of
cancer treatment completed and the severity of treatment side effects. Jim, Andrykowski,
Munster and Jacobsen (2007) performed a longitudinal, observational study with 151
women who had completed chemotherapy and/or radiotherapy for Stage I or II breast
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cancer. The researchers examined whether the number of physical symptoms/side effects
experienced during treatment was a correlate of cancer-related distress and/or general
distress, four months after treatment completion, as measured by the Impact of Events
Scale and the Mental Health subscale of the Short Form-36. Hierarchical multiple
regression analysis (with relevant sociodemographic, clinical, and psychiatric variables
entered as controls) revealed that greater physical symptoms/side effects predicted greater
total cancer-related distress, intrusive thoughts, and general distress. More specifically,
results suggested that physical symptoms/side effects during treatment trigger later
cancer-related distress, specifically intrusive thoughts. Intrusive thoughts, in turn, appear
to have a negative effect on overall mental health and well-being. The researchers
asserted that this finding is important because it suggests that to improve mental health in
breast cancer survivors, one must first address intrusive thoughts relating to cancer.
Interestingly, in the above study, physical symptoms/side effects did not
significantly predict avoidance. Jim, et al. (2007) made sense of this finding by
postulating;
Perhaps patients who are troubled by more physical symptoms/side effects have more
intrusive thoughts but also more difficulty avoiding reminders of cancer, whereas
patients who have fewer physical symptoms/side effects experience fewer intrusive
thoughts and thus do not need to reduce distress by avoiding reminders of cancer. (p.
206)
The researchers suggested that physical symptoms/side effects might lead to
increased distress by negatively impacting survivors’ self-image and by interfering with
important activities, though future research is needed to explore this hypothesis. Overall,
it appeared that survivors who experience greater physical symptoms/side effects during
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treatment are at greater risk for later cancer-related distress and, in turn, general distress
(Jim, et al., 2007).
Differences Between Cognitions Associated with Anxiety & Depression
In 1988, Mitchell and Campbell published a study that sought to examine whether
cognitions associated with depression were different than those associated with anxiety.
Sixty-four students and administrative staff completed the Beck Depression Inventory,
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory and the Cognitions Questionnaire. While the results of
the study are limited due to the fact that the sample was primarily students, it was
revealed that individuals with depression scores above the median were significantly
more likely to generalize their thoughts from one situation to another and showed greater
overall cognitive distortion than individuals with scores below the median. Those who
had anxiety scores above the median did not show a greater amount of cognitive
distortion, and there was no difference between high and low anxiety scores in terms of
generalization from one situation to the next. The researchers concluded that although
there are some cognitions that might arise with both anxiety and depression, they
represent distinct constructs (Mitchell & Campbell, 1988).
In general, research suggests that anxiety and depression symptoms are
components of a broader construct of negative affectivity, but there are unique
components to each type of distress. More specifically, symptoms of anhedonia and low
positive affect are relatively unique to depression, and manifestations of somatic tension
and arousal are relatively specific to anxiety (Primo, et al., 2000; Watson, Clark, Weber,
Assenheimer, Strauss, & McCormick, 1995). Research has also indicated that those who
engage in negative rumination, which is commonly associated with a depressed mood,
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have a more perseverative cognitive style and therefore might not be able to change their
cognitive focus despite negative consequences. Worry, consisting of a focus on future
potential threat, imagined catastrophes, uncertainties, and risks has also been found to be
difficult to dismiss or ignore, and is often perceived as uncontrollable (Segerstrom,
Stanton, Alden, & Shortridge, 2003). When an individual is depressed, for example,
his/her thoughts tend to be more negative and self-critical and he/she may experience
impaired concentration. When anxious, an individual might attempt to engage in
unsuccessful problem solving that is focused on events which have an uncertain outcome
(Watkins, 2008). Thus, thoughts can impact the emergence of symptoms of anxiety and
depression, and symptoms of anxiety and depression can impact the type of cognitive
processing in which an individual engages in. As discussed above, cognitive processing
facilitates the emergence of PTG, and therefore it is necessary to assess a survivor’s
anxiety and depression symptoms as well as cognitive processing when investigating
PTG.
The Role of Cognition in Anxiety & Depression
Intrusive, unwanted negative thoughts about cancer, accompanied by efforts to
avoid these thoughts, are among the more prominent stress-related cognitions
experienced by cancer survivors (Primo, Compas, Oppedisano, Howell, Epping-Jordan &
Krag, 2000). These types of cognitions are often associated with symptoms of anxiety
and depression. In a study with 85 women with newly diagnosed breast cancer, the
majority of whom (61%) had Stage I cancer, Primo, et al. (2000) found that survivors
who reported high levels of both intrusive thoughts and avoidance symptoms (as
measured by the Impact of Events Scale), and those high in only intrusive thoughts, had
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the highest levels of anxiety and depression symptoms (as measured by the Symptom
Checklist-90-Revised) at the time of diagnosis and at three and six month follow-ups.
Moreover, survivors who were high only in avoidance also displayed more anxiety and
depression symptoms when compared with survivors who were low in both intrusion and
avoidance. When examining demographic variables it was found that younger survivors
had higher levels of intrusion, and survivors with fewer years of education had higher
levels of avoidance.
The authors speculated that younger survivors might perceive their diagnosis as
more threatening as it occurs at a point in their life when a potentially life-threatening
illness is more unexpected compared to older survivors. Authors also suggested that
survivors with less education may perceive themselves as having fewer resources to cope
and thus may rely on avoidance. Interestingly, disease severity did not influence patterns
of intrusive thoughts and avoidance; however, it is worth noting that the majority of the
sample was comprised of only one disease stage (Primo, et al., 2000). These findings
suggest that it is imperative to assess potential anxiety and depression symptoms, as these
might be important indicators of current and future distress.
Incorporating the role of meaning in the relationship between cognitions and
distress, Vickberg, Bovbjerg, DuHamel, Currie and Redd (2000) conducted a study with
breast cancer survivors (two to 15 years past diagnosis), with a variety of disease stages
and treatment procedures. The researchers sought to determine if a survivor’s sense of
global meaning (defined as the belief that one’s life has purpose and order, and measured
by the Personal Meaning Index of the Life Attitude Profile-Revised) might moderate the
relationship between intrusive thoughts and distress. The authors hypothesized,
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More frequent intrusive thoughts would be associated with higher psychological
distress among women with lower global meaning. However…among those with
higher global meaning, more frequent intrusive thoughts would not be associated with
increased distress…we expected that higher global meaning would protect (buffer)
those women from the distress such thoughts might otherwise cause. (Vickberg, et al.,
2000, p. 153)
Consistent with these hypotheses, hierarchical regression analyses showed a
strong association between intrusive thoughts and psychological distress only among
those with lower global meaning. For these survivors, more intrusive thoughts were
associated with higher psychological distress; yet, this relationship was not found among
survivors with higher global meaning. The authors concluded that although global
meaning did not prevent intrusive thoughts from occurring, a survivor who feels that life
has more purpose and meaning is possibly less distressed by such thoughts. It was also
postulated that intrusive thoughts experienced by individuals with high global meaning
might be qualitatively different (i.e., less threatening) than those experienced by
individuals with low meaning. The authors suggested that future research examine the
content of intrusive thoughts to determine whether specific types of thoughts are more
distressing than others and whether a sense of meaning influences what types of thoughts
a survivor has (Vickberg, et al., 2000).
It is important to note that a sense of meaning and PTG are not the same. Yet,
research has suggested that PTG is an outcome of meaning-making (Tedeschi &
Calhoun, 2006). In other words, an individual has to assign some meaning to a traumatic
event before they experience growth. This process occurs as an individual is repeatedly
exposed to, or reflects on a trauma and begins to have a clearer understanding of the
event, typically reappraising the experience by identifying positive aspects of it (Tedeschi
& Calhoun, 2004). Some studies have found that meaning-making processes are related
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to more growth (Bower et al., 1998; Calhoun, Cann, Tedeschi, & McMillan, 2000; Park
& Ai, 2006).
Putting the key variables of Perceived Threat, Anxiety, Depression, Cognitive
Processing and PTG together, the above research demonstrates that at least a moderate
level of threat is needed to facilitate growth. If threat is too low or too high, it is probable
that growth will not emerge as an individual will likely not have the impetus to engage in
the cognitive processing necessary for growth or will be too overwhelmed to engage in
deliberate and effortful processing. Given that there is typically some level of on-going
distress in those that experience growth, it stands to reason that some survivors will also
experience a certain amount of symptoms of anxiety and depression as these often
indicate the amount of threat and/or distress an individual feels. Individuals with
symptoms of anxiety and depression, would, in turn, likely engage in minimal or negative
cognitive processing (defined by the Cognitive Processing of Trauma Scale as Denial and
Regret). Subsequently, less growth would likely emerge.
In contrast, if symptoms of anxiety and depression are fairly low, it would then be
expected that a survivor would engage in positive cognitive processing (defined by the
Cognitive Processing of Trauma Scale as Positive Cognitive Restructuring, Resolution,
and Downward Comparison), and, in turn, would experience more PTG. This theorydriven rationale provides the foundation for several hypotheses in this study which will
be presented more thoroughly in Chapter Three.
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Types of Cancer
This study examined PTG in breast, prostate, and colorectal cancer because of
their high prevalence rates, occurrence in both females and males, and similar course of
treatment.
Breast, prostate, and colorectal cancer represent three of the four (lung cancer is
the fourth) leading anatomical sites of both new cancer cases and cancer deaths in
Colorado, and the United States as a whole (American Cancer Society, 2008). The
American Cancer Society (2008), using a sample of 294,120 men and 271,530 women
reported that lung cancer is, by far, the most common fatal cancer in men (31%),
followed by prostate (10%), and colon & rectum (8%). In women, lung (26%), breast
(15%), and colon & rectum (9%) are the leading sites of cancer death. Trends in five-year
survival rates based on follow-ups with survivors through 2004, have improved
significantly since the 1970s due, in part, to earlier detection and advances in treatment
(American Cancer Society, 2008). Between 1996-2003, prostate cancer had a five-year
survival rate of 99%, followed by breast (89%), rectum (66%) and colon cancer (65%;
National Cancer Institute, 2007). Also, age of the survivor and stage of the cancer at the
time of diagnosis have an impact on survival rates.
From a methodological viewpoint, these cancer types are similar to one another in
several ways. First, they all are solid tumor cancers (as opposed to blood cancers) and
therefore have similar treatment courses, which typically consist of chemotherapy,
radiation, surgery, or a combination, depending upon the specific stage of the cancer
(American Cancer Society, 2008).
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Second, according to the National Cancer Institute (2008) breast, prostate, and
colorectal cancer all have similar mean ages for initial diagnosis (61, 68, and 71 years
old, respectively), although more young people are diagnosed with breast cancer
compared to prostate or colorectal cancer. Table 1 presents the percentage of individuals
diagnosed with each type of cancer, based on age, using data collected between 2002 and
2006.
Table 1
Percentage of Individuals Diagnosed with Breast, Prostate and Colorectal Cancer Based
on Age
Colorectal
Breast
Prostate
Under Age 55

34.9%

9.3%

17%

Age 55-84

59.5%

86%

71%

Age 85+

5.5%

4.7%

12.1%

Source: National Cancer Institute, 2008.

Third, a fairly low percentage of individuals diagnosed with these three cancer
types will be in Stage IV, although it is anticipated that more colorectal cancer survivors
will be compared to breast and prostate. Table 2 presents the percentage of individuals
diagnosed with Stage I-IV.
Table 2
Percentage of Individuals Diagnosed with Stage I-IV Cancer
Breast
Prostate

Colorectal

Stage I

60%

80%

39%

Stage II & III

33%

12%

37%

Stage IV

5%

4%

19%

Source: National Cancer Institute, 2008.
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While not many survivors diagnosed with breast, prostate or colorectal cancer will
be in an advanced stage of disease, there was potential for a fairly wide range of disease
severity to be represented in this study’s sample. Therefore, a decision was made to
examine the influence of stage of disease on other variables. However, it is important to
note that this study examined perceived threat of cancer, and the literature has
demonstrated that perceived threat of cancer is associated with PTG beyond objective
threat (i.e., stage of disease). Moreover, perceived threat is likely to be related to
variables other than disease stage, such as the degree to which beliefs are challenged, etc.
Fourth, both females and males are represented among the diagnoses, which
allows for a potentially gender-balanced sample. Although gender differences have not
been found in most of the PTG literature to date (Stanton et al., 2006), it is important to
consider that the majority of studies are conducted with breast cancer survivors and,
therefore, are gender biased.
Finally, given the high prevalence of breast, prostate, and colorectal cancer there
was opportunity to recruit a high number of participants, potentially yielding a larger
sample size, and subsequently more statistical power. Also, since three types of cancer
will be assessed, the results will be more generalizable than if sampling were restricted to
a single cancer diagnosis.
Overall, breast, prostate and colorectal cancer have the potential to impact a large
number of people, and therefore, it is important that research examine these survivor
populations. More specifically, it is imperative that we further our understanding of the
mechanisms of PTG among those who experience the most common types of cancer. By
doing so, clinical interventions can be created that are not only sensitive to the potential
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for PTG, but which can also help survivors utilize beliefs of growth to promote their
adjustment to living with cancer during diagnosis and treatment and beyond.
Summary
A growing body of literature has examined PTG in the aftermath of trauma. While
numerous studies have been conducted investigating PTG among cancer survivors, few
have examined the role of cognitive processing in facilitating PTG. The studies that were
selected for review provide findings that suggest that cognitive processing, along with
perceived threat and an individual’s level of anxiety and depression, have the potential to
influence the emergence of PTG. However, many of the proposed relationships amongst
these variables have been conceptual in nature, and therefore, more research is needed to
investigate these issues.
The concept of positive change in the aftermath of trauma has been recognized for
centuries, and an emerging body of literature exists on PTG. Yet, there are many
unanswered questions regarding the specific mechanisms that facilitate growth. The
empirical evidence reported in the literature suggests that not everyone who experiences
cancer is going to perceive that they have grown from it, thereby suggesting there are a
number of factors that influence PTG. The aim of this study was to develop a regression
model to examine factors related to, and predictive of, PTG among cancer survivors.
More specifically, Anxiety, Depression, Perceived Threat and Cognitive Processing were
explored as predictors of PTG. This regression model was investigated in a group of
breast, prostate, and colorectal cancer survivors who had completed primary medical
treatment (i.e., chemotherapy, radiation and/or surgery).
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODS

Introduction
The current study examined the role of Anxiety, Depression, Perceived Threat
and Cognitive Processing in predicting Posttraumatic Growth (PTG) among breast,
prostate, and colorectal cancer survivors. These cancer diagnoses were selected because
they represent three of the top four anatomical sites of new cancer cases and cancer
deaths in the United States. After reviewing the literature, these particular variables were
chosen based upon their common association with cancer and/or their key theoretical
function in the facilitation of PTG. Chapter Three will present information regarding
participants, power and sample size, measures, procedures, data analysis and the
hypotheses of the study.

Participants

Participants were breast, prostate or colorectal cancer survivors who had
completed primary medical treatment (i.e., chemotherapy, radiation, and/or surgery) at
least two months prior to the study. This convenience sample was recruited from Rocky
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Mountain Cancer Centers (RMCC) in the Denver metro area. The time period of at least
two months post-treatment was chosen because of the assumption that during treatment,
survivors are likely overwhelmed with information and the treatment process, including
attending various medical appointments and dealing with initial treatment side effects.
Therefore, if a survivor is at least two months post-treatment, he/she has presumably
started to make the transition from “active patient” to “survivor” and likely has more
emotional energy and time to devote to reflecting on his/her cancer experience.

Eligibility criteria for participation in the study were: (1) at least 18 years of age;
(2) at least two months post-completion of surgery, chemotherapy, and radiotherapy (can
be taking maintenance medication); (3) no history of multiple types of cancer; (4) English
speaking. Only individuals who have completed primary treatment, and those with no
history of multiple types of cancer, were eligible because people in the midst of cancer
treatment, or those with multiple types of cancer, may experience specific psychological
symptoms, such as intense feelings of being overwhelmed, that may disrupt cognitive
processing and blur the results of the study. Also, those individuals with a history of
multiple cancers were excluded in order to create a more homogenous sample. Only data
from participants who met eligibility criteria were included in the analyses.

Power and Sample Size

In order to determine the appropriate sample size needed to achieve statistical
power in the current study, a power analysis was conducted using the computer software
G*Power 3.1. The analysis was run for the statistical test “Linear Multiple Regression”
and was computed with three possible effect sizes (small = 0.02, medium = 0.15, large =
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0.35, Cohen, 1988) and 11 predictor variables as each regression model included a total
of 11 predictors. The power analysis revealed that to achieve statistical power with a
small effect size, 1,267 participants would be needed, with a medium effect size, 178
participants would be needed, and with a large effect size, 83 participants would be
needed. A medium effect size was targeted for the study as the researcher deemed that a
large effect was unlikely and a small effect would be potentially inconsequential in terms
of the study’s implications. Research has shown that the average response rate for mail
surveys is approximately 30% (Cobanoglu, Warde & Moreo, 2001); therefore,
anticipating an average response rate, and a medium effect size, 600 questionnaires were
mailed to potential participants.

Measures

Demographics

The survey contained a demographic information section (see Appendix D),
which included variables provided by self-report. This information was used for
descriptive and analytic purposes and participants were encouraged to complete this
section of the survey, which also included seven ethnic categories defined by the federal
government as follows: African American, American Indian/Alaskan Native,
Asian/Pacific Islander, Caucasian, Hispanic/Latino/a, Multi-racial, and Other.

Perceived Threat

Perceived Threat was measured with a survey designed for the current study. The
measure designed for the study was comprised of items that have been utilized in prior
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research, as well as items created by the researcher (see Appendix E). These items were
piloted with five cancer survivors at RMCC before administration to the study
participants to ensure the items were clear and understandable and were measuring what
they were intended to measure. Two of the Perceived Threat items that have been utilized
in previous research (Cordova et al., 2001; Cordova et al., 2007; Salsman et al., 2009)
assessed whether cancer constituted a traumatic stressor for the participant. These items
were created based upon the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-IVText Revision criteria for PTSD (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000).
Lechner et al. (2003) measured perceived threat in a mixed sample of cancer
survivors by asking them to provide a percentage rating of how likely they felt it was that
they would die of cancer; a scale ranging from zero to 100 percent was used. The current
study utilized three items from the Perceived Threat Questionnaire created by Lechner et
al. (2003). While the questionnaire has never been validated for its psychometric
properties, the developer of the measure confirmed its use in research (S.C. Lechner,
personal communication, April 6, 2009).
Finally, because research has not examined the extent to which being diagnosed
with cancer challenges an individual’s beliefs about him/herself, others, and the world in
general; the researcher created three new items. The items are based on the notion that the
more cancer challenges an individual’s beliefs, the greater the potential for PTG. Each of
the three items asked participants to rate on a 1 (“not at all”) to 6 (“extremely”) Likerttype scale the extent to which being diagnosed with cancer challenged how the
individuals see (1) themselves, (2) others, and (3) the world. For all the items in the
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Perceived Threat questionnaire, higher scores indicate greater threat. The items used in
this measure can be found in Appendix E.
Anxiety and Depression
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) was used to measure
symptoms of anxiety and depression. The HADS was developed by Zigmond and Snaith
in 1983 to identify both possible and probable cases of anxiety disorders and depression
among patients in non-psychiatric hospital clinics. The measure is a 14-item
questionnaire with two subscales measuring anxiety and depression. Each subscale
contains seven items scored on a 4-point Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (“not at all”) to
3 (“very much”), indicating degree of psychological distress. The total score for each
subscale ranges from zero to 21 and examples of the items include “I feel tense or
‘wound up’” and “I still enjoy the things I used to enjoy.” In order to prevent “noise”
from somatic disorders on the scores, all symptoms of anxiety and depression relating
also to physical disorder, such as dizziness, headaches, insomnia, and fatigue were
excluded. Symptoms related to serious mental disorders were also excluded since such
symptoms were less common in patients attending a non-psychiatric hospital clinic
(Bjelland et al., 2002).
Zigmond and Snaith (1983) assessed the internal consistency of the two subscales
based on data from 50 medical patients in outpatient clinics, who were dealing with a
variety of complaints and illnesses, by calculating correlations between each item and the
total score of the remaining items in the subscale. For the anxiety items, the correlations
ranged from 0.41 to 0.76 and were all statistically significant (p < .01). The items in the
depression scale had correlations ranging from 0.30 to 0.60 and were all statistically
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significant (p < .02). The researchers then conducted analyses to determine what rating
for each subscale total score would represent “non-cases,” “doubtful” cases and
“definite” cases. For both the depression and anxiety scales, it was found that a score of
seven or less for “non-cases,” scores of eight to 10 for “doubtful” cases, and scores of 11
or more for “definite” cases produced the best results (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). These
criteria were then applied to another 50 patients and similar results were found. Next,
correlations between subscale scores and psychiatric ratings were calculated in order to
determine whether scores on the two subscales could also be used as indicators of
severity of depression and anxiety, respectively. For both depression and anxiety,
statistically significant (p < .001) positive correlations were found (r = .70 and .74,
respectively). The researchers concluded that the subscale scores could justifiably be used
as measures of severity of depression and anxiety.
Bjelland et al. (2002) reviewed 747 papers to examine the validity of the HADS.
It was found that in most studies an optimal balance between sensitivity and specificity
was achieved when “caseness” was defined by a score of eight or above on both
subscales. Moreover, correlations between the HADS and other commonly used
instruments, such as the Beck Depression Inventory and State Trait Anxiety Inventory,
were in the range of .49 to .83. Overall, the researchers concluded that the HADS
performed well in assessing symptom severity and caseness of anxiety disorders and
depression in both somatic, psychiatric, and primary care patients and in the general
population (Bjelland et al., 2002). The items used in this measure can be found in
Appendix F.
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It is worth noting that the HADS has been used with cancer survivors to assess
anxiety and depression in various studies (Ho, Chan & Ho, 2004; Kornblith, Powell,
Regan, Bennett, Krasner, Moy, et al., 2007; Lipscomb, et al., 2005; Mager &
Andrykowski, 2002; Thomas, Glynne-Jones, Chait & Marks, 1997). For instance, a study
by Kornblith, et al. (2007) used the HADS as the primary measure of “psychosocial
adjustment” in a group of breast and endometrial cancer survivors who were on average
3.7 years post-treatment. A study with a Chinese sample of 32 male and 156 female
cancer survivors, who were at least five years “disease free,” used the Chinese version of
the HADS to assess symptoms of anxiety and depression and found adequate internal
reliability values for the anxiety and depression subscales (0.88 and 0.78, respectively;
Ho, et al., 2004). Finally, Thomas, et al. (1997) utilized the HADS to assess anxiety in a
group of 65 cancer survivors, two-thirds of whom had completed treatment
approximately ten years prior. Thus, the HADS has been shown to be an appropriate
anxiety and depression measure for use with cancer survivors who are actively in
treatment as well as post-treatment survivors.
Cognitive Processing
The Cognitive Processing of Trauma Scale (CPOTS; Williams et al., 2002) is a
17-item scale measuring cognitive processing of traumatic experiences. Each item was
scored on a Likert-type response scale ranging from -3 (“strongly disagree”) to +3
(“strongly agree”). The CPOTS measures five aspects of cognitive processing: (a)
Positive Cognitive Restructuring, (b) Downward Comparison, (c) Resolution, (d) Denial,
and (e) Regret. Examples of items are: “There is ultimately more good than bad in this
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experience” and “I have figured out how to cope.” The instrument is scored by adding +3
to each item score, and then computing a mean score for each of the five subscales.
The CPOTS was developed using two different college student samples.
Based on initial testing with 35 participants, the researchers conducted a second study
with 229 undergraduate students in order to refine the measure. The researchers
investigated the factor structure of the scale utilizing multiple confirmatory factor
analysis, and the results indicated that a five factor model was the best fit. The five
factors in the final model were: (a) Positive Cognitive Restructuring (three items, α =
.83), (b) Resolution/Acceptance (four items, α = .81), (c) Downward Comparison (three
items, α = .72), (d) Denial (four items, α = .85), and (e) Regret (three items, α = .74;
Williams et al., 2002). A sub-sample of 67 participants completed the measure four
weeks after the first administration to assess test-retest reliability. Correlations between
each of the subscales administered at baseline and four weeks later ranged from r = .70 to
.85; all were significant at p < .001. These results suggest that the subscales of the
CPOTS have adequate test-retest reliability (Williams et al., 2002). Correlations among
each of the five subscales revealed that the subscales indicative of positive cognitive
processing (i.e., Positive Cognitive Restructuring, Resolution, and Downward
Comparison) are negatively associated with those subscales that indicate
minimal/negative cognitive processing (i.e., Denial, Regret). Further, the subscales
indicating positive cognitive processing are positively associated with each other, as are
the two subscales indicating minimal cognitive processing (Williams et al., 2002). These
findings suggest that it may be appropriate to create two composite variables from the
five subscales, Positive and Negative Cognitive Processing, when analyzing data.
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The CPOTS has also been correlated with the Impact of Event Scale (IES) and the
Stress-Related Growth Scale (SRGS) to establish construct validity. It was found that the
IES items that are indicative of relatively little cognitive processing were positively
associated with Denial and Regret (r values ranged from .24 to .51, all p values < .001)
and negatively associated with Resolution, Positive Cognitive Restructuring and
Downward Comparison (r values ranged from -.16 to -.54, all p values < .01). Further,
Positive Cognitive Restructuring was associated with the SGRS (r = .31, p < .001), while
Denial and Regret were minimally associated with SRGS. Thus, when compared to other
validated measures, the subscales of the CPOTS appear valid. Overall, the researchers
reported that the CPOTS is a “17-item psychometrically solid measure” (Williams et al.,
2002, p. 356). The items used in this measure can be found in Appendix G.
Posttraumatic Growth
The Posttraumatic Growth Inventory (PTGI; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996) was
used to measure the extent to which cancer survivors perceived personal benefits,
including changes in perceptions of self, relationships with others, and philosophy of life,
accumulated from their attempts to cope with cancer and its aftermath. The PTGI is a 21item self-report measure scored on a 6-point Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (“I did not
experience this change as a result of my crisis”) to 5 (“I experienced this change to a very
great degree as a result of my crisis”). Scores can range from zero to 105, with high
scores indicating positive growth. Examples of items are: “I changed my priorities about
what is important in life” and “I have a greater appreciation for the value of my own life.”
The scale can be used with various types of trauma as it was developed to measure
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positive outcomes after traumatic experiences. In the current study, “my crisis” was
changed to, “my cancer.”
The PTGI has five factors: Relating to Others, New Possibilities, Personal
Strength, Spiritual Change, and Appreciation of Life, which are based on principle
component analyses performed with data from 604 undergraduate students. Relating to
Others includes positive changes such as developing stronger bonds with loved ones, reestablishing relationships with family members/friends, or gaining more compassion for
others. New Possibilities refers to changes such as making choices in a more conscious
manner according to a plan, or changing factors in one’s life that one believes need
changing. Personal Strength may be expressing greater self-reliance and feeling more
able to accept circumstances and developing personal strength that may help one through
future challenges. Spiritual Change includes re-evaluating spiritual beliefs, associating
with a community of similar believers, or connecting with spiritual roots. Lastly,
Appreciation of Life refers to changes such as trying to live each day more fully,
rethinking one’s values and priorities about what is most important in life, and acting
differently regarding changed priorities (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996).
Tedeschi and Calhoun (1996) reported that the internal consistency of the PTGI is
α = .90. Research has demonstrated that all items contribute relatively equally to the
consistency of the scale. The internal consistency of each factor is as follows: New
Possibilities (α = .84); Relating to Others (α = .85); Personal Strength (α = .72); Spiritual
Change (α = .85); and Appreciation of Life (α = .67). The correlations among the factors
ranged from .27 to .52, and the correlations of the factors with the PTGI total score
ranged from .62 to .83, which indicates some separate contributions by these factors
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(Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996). Overall, test-retest reliability over the period of two
months, with 28 participants, was acceptable at r = .71 (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996).
It is interesting to note that Tedeschi and Calhoun (1996) found that in a
subsample of 117 undergraduate participants, women reported more benefits than men (F
(1,113) = 10.69, p < .001) and people experiencing severe trauma reported more benefits
than those who did not (F (1, 113) = 12.33, p < .001). In general, the researchers
concluded that the PTGI has sound internal consistency, acceptable test-retest reliability,
and that among people reporting a variety of life difficulties, scores on the scale are
approximately normally distributed (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996). The items used in this
measure can be found in Appendix H.
Procedure
Permission to conduct this study was granted by the Institutional Review Board
for the use of Human Subjects at the University of Denver. Additionally, permission was
obtained from the Institutional Review Board utilized by the Rocky Mountain Cancer
Centers (RMCC) of the Denver metro area (HealthONE). Two RMCC employees, Teri
Simoneau, PhD and Susan Ash-Lee, MSW, LCSW, were identified on the IRB protocol
as “co-investigators” of the study. This was done because these professionals meet the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) requirements that allow
them access to survivor identifying information through the RMCC database. Therefore,
Dr. Simoneau was the primary professional, with the help of Susan Ash-Lee, who
identified potential participants in the database and mailed them a questionnaire packet.
The researcher did not have access to or knowledge of, a participant’s identifying
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information until he/she consented to participating in the study and mailed the researcher
a signed informed consent form and HIPAA form along with a completed questionnaire.
The RMCC database holds the names of thousands of cancer survivors. In order
to identify potential participants, Dr. Simoneau and Susan Ash-Lee requested the names
and addresses of all survivors with a diagnosis of breast, prostate or colorectal cancer
who were seen in the Denver Division clinics, and whose first appointment at RMCC was
between the dates of 1/1/06 and 9/1/09 from the database coordinator. The specific time
frame of between 1/1/06 to 9/1/09 was chosen in order to limit the potential list of
participants and to identify survivors who had completed primary treatment within the
last few years. A list of 4,474 survivors was yielded, which was broken down as follows:
Breast = 3,956, Prostate = 147, Colorectal = 367. All prostate survivors were sent a
questionnaire packet as the number was so low, and the remaining packets (433) were
split generally evenly between breast (221) and colorectal (232) cancer survivors.
To narrow down the 3,956 identified breast cancer survivors, all survivors who
had Carcinoma in Situ were removed (a total of 461 survivors), because that is a low risk
breast cancer, and then the first 221 were chosen alphabetically. Similarly, with
colorectal cancer survivors the first 232 were chosen alphabetically. Dr. Simoneau
postulated that the reason there were so few prostate cancer survivors on the database list
is because they are often treated by urologists, not oncologists, and typically only come to
the attention of oncologists when the disease is metastatic (T. Simoneau, personal
communication, April 19, 2010).
The questionnaire packets contained two copies of an informed consent form, two
copies of a HIPAA form (participants were advised to retain one copy of each form for
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their reference), a refusal postcard, and the self-report measures mentioned previously.
The informed consent form provided potential participants with information regarding the
purpose of the study, including the risks and benefits, and highlighted that participation
was voluntary. The confidentiality of participant responses was emphasized and assured
on the form and all participants were discouraged from providing any information on the
questionnaires that might have led to potential identification. Consent to participate in the
study was provided when participants returned a signed copy of the informed consent and
HIPAA form, along with the completed questionnaire, to the researcher. If a participant
decided not to participate, he/she was asked to return the postage-paid pre-addressed
refusal postcard to the researcher. The completion time of the questionnaire was
estimated at 20–30 minutes based upon piloting the entire questionnaire with five cancer
survivors at RMCC.
The researcher compiled and placed postage on each of the 600 questionnaire
packets and dropped off the packets and follow-up mailings (see below) to Dr. Simoneau.
Each questionnaire was numbered in the upper right hand corner of the cover page and on
the corner of each outside envelope. These numbers corresponded to a number next to the
participant’s name on a mailing list in order to track receipt of completed questionnaires.
The mailing list was kept and tracked by Dr. Simoneau so that the researcher did not have
access to participants’ identifying information. Dr. Simoneau assigned each potential
participant a number, addressed the packets and mailed them to the participants. As the
researcher received refusal postcards and/or returned questionnaire packets, she emailed
Dr. Simoneau with the identification numbers so that the individuals could be marked off
the mailing list and would not receive follow-up mailings.
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As reported previously, mail surveys have an expected response rate of
approximately 30%. This study used the follow-up mailing procedure outlined by
Dillman (2000) in order to increase the response rate. There were three follow-up
mailings, which were all mailed by Dr. Simoneau. The first letter was mailed one week
after the original mailing and was sent to all potential participants. It served as both a
thank you for those who had responded and as a courteous reminder for those who had
not. Three weeks after the original mailing, a second letter was sent only to nonrespondents (those who had not returned the refusal postcard or a completed
questionnaire). This letter informed non-respondents that their questionnaire, or refusal
postcard, had not been received, and appealed for a return. If participants were in need of
another questionnaire, they were instructed to contact Dr. Simoneau or Susan Ash-Lee at
RMCC. Five weeks after the original mailing a final reminder letter was sent to all nonrespondents that contained the same information as the second letter (Dillman, 2000).

Data Analyses
The alpha level was set at p < .05 for all statistical analyses. A cross-sectional
design was used. Four hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to explore the
potential effect of both Positive and Negative Cognitive Processing on the relationship
between Anxiety, Depression, Perceived Threat and PTG. The regression assumptions of
normality, linearity, independence, multicollinearity, and homoscedasticity were
determined.
Preliminary Analyses
Preliminary analyses were conducted for several purposes. First, data were collected
from several RMCC sites throughout the Denver metro area and it was important to
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ensure, using descriptive statistics and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), that the samples
were similar enough to justify combining them for future analyses. Second, data were
collected from persons with cancer of one of three specific anatomical sites and as in the
example above, it was important to determine whether or not the samples could be
combined. Third, a small portion of the data set (13%) had experienced a recurrence of
cancer and it was necessary to determine whether data from those with and without a
cancer recurrence could be combined. Fourth, because several items were created and
added to the Perceived Threat questionnaire, analyses were performed to refine and yield
a reliable instrument. Finally, analyses were conducted on the five subscales of the
Cognitive Processing of Trauma Scale in order to determine if the subscales could be
grouped together to form the two composite variables of Positive (i.e., Positive Cognitive
Restructuring, Downward Comparison, Resolution) and Negative (i.e., Denial, Regret)
Cognitive Processing.
Primary Analyses
Several demographic variables were used as control variables in each regression
equation. Research has shown that gender differences may exist in the level of PTG
reported, with women being more likely to report PTG than men (Tedeschi & Calhoun,
1996). Therefore, Gender was controlled for in the regression models. Stage of disease
may also influence the amount of PTG reported, with more severe stages, and the
accompanying greater threat to mortality, facilitating more growth (Tomich & Helgeson,
2004). Thus, Stage of Disease was included as a demographic variable. Time since
treatment completion has been found to be related to PTG, such that greater PTG
emerges over time (Helgeson, Reynolds, & Tomich, 2006). Therefore, Time Since
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Treatment Completion was included. Finally, younger age has sometimes been associated
with greater reports of PTG (Stanton et al., 2006). Therefore, Age was included in the
regression model. It was also suggested (C. Parry, personal communication, June 15,
2009) that the specific cancer treatment a survivor received, possible permanent aftereffects of treatment, and the amount that after-effects interfere with a survivor’s daily life
may influence the amount of PTG that emerges and, therefore, need to be included in the
regression model. Thus, analyses were performed to examine if these specific variables
had statistically significant relationships with the main outcome variables (see Chapter 4
for more information).
The study hypotheses were as follows:
1. Anxiety, Depression, and Perceived Threat will predict Positive Cognitive
Processing over and beyond the contribution of the demographic control variables. It is
hypothesized that Anxiety and Depression will negatively predict Positive Cognitive
Processing, while Perceived Threat will positively predict Positive Cognitive Processing.
The research reviewed in Chapter Two demonstrated that a sufficient level of threat is
needed to facilitate any type of cognitive processing. Thus, in general, it is predicted that
Perceived Threat would be positively associated with Positive Cognitive Processing. In
contrast, an individual experiencing symptoms of anxiety and depression would likely
engage in minimal, or no positive cognitive processing due to potentially experiencing a
high degree of worry and non-deliberate ruminative, rather than reflective thinking.
Therefore, negative relationships between Anxiety and Depression and Positive
Cognitive Processing are predicted.
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Hierarchical regression analyses were utilized to investigate the relative contributions
of Anxiety, Depression, and Perceived Threat in the prediction of Positive Cognitive
Processing. The following participant characteristics were included in the first block of
variables: Age, Gender, Stage of Diagnosis, and Time Since Treatment Completion.
Anxiety and Depression were entered in the second block, while Perceived Threat was
entered in the third block. Positive Cognitive Processing was entered as the dependent
variable.
2. Positive Cognitive Processing will significantly predict PTG over and beyond the
demographic control variables, Anxiety, Depression, and Perceived Threat. In other
words, Positive Cognitive Processing will account for a significant amount of the
variance of PTG beyond the demographic control variables (i.e., Age, Gender, Stage of
Diagnosis, Time Since Treatment Completion), Anxiety, Depression, and Perceived
Threat. It is hypothesized that Positive Cognitive Processing and Perceived Threat will
positively predict PTG, while Anxiety and Depression will negatively predict PTG.
It has been argued that threat, along with deliberate and effortful cognitive
processing (what the CPOTS defines as Positive Cognitive Processing), facilitates the
emergence of PTG. Therefore, positive relationships between these variables and growth
are anticipated. On the other hand, it is expected that Anxiety and Depression will be
negatively associated with growth due to the assumption that individuals experiencing
these symptoms would likely not engage in deliberate and effortful thinking.
A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was utilized to investigate the relative
contributions of Anxiety, Depression, Perceived Threat, and Positive Cognitive
Processing in the prediction of PTG. The following participant characteristics were
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included in the first block of variables: Age, Gender, Stage of Diagnosis, and Time Since
Treatment Completion. Anxiety and Depression were entered in the second block.
Perceived Threat was entered in the third block, and then Positive Cognitive Processing
was entered in the fourth block. PTG scores were entered as the dependent variable.
3. Anxiety, Depression, and Perceived Threat will predict Negative Cognitive
Processing over and beyond the contribution of the demographic control variables. It is
hypothesized that Anxiety, Depression, and Perceived Threat will all positively predict
Negative Cognitive Processing.
It is anticipated that Perceived Threat will positively predict Negative Cognitive
Processing based on the theoretical assumption stated above that a certain level of threat
and/or subjective impact is needed to prompt cognitive processing of any type. Stated
another way, an individual who engages in negative cognitive processing (what the
CPOTS defines as Denial and/or Regret) would have likely experienced his or her cancer
as threatening. Furthermore, an individual who is experiencing symptoms of anxiety and
depression is more likely to engage in negative types of thinking compared to positive
types. Thus, positive relationships are also anticipated between Anxiety and Depression
and Negative Cognitive Processing.
Hierarchical regression was utilized to investigate the relative contributions of
Anxiety, Depression, and Perceived Threat in the prediction of Negative Cognitive
Processing. The following participant characteristics were included in the first block of
variables: Age, Gender, Stage of Diagnosis, and Time Since Treatment Completion.
Anxiety and Depression were entered in the second block, and then Perceived Threat was
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entered in the third block. Negative Cognitive Processing was entered as the dependent
variable.
4. Negative Cognitive Processing will significantly predict PTG over and beyond the
demographic control variables, Anxiety, Depression, and Perceived Threat. In other
words, Negative Cognitive Processing will account for a significant amount of the
variance of PTG beyond the demographic control variables (i.e., Age, Gender, Stage of
Diagnosis, Time Since Treatment Completion), Anxiety, Depression, and Perceived
Threat. It is hypothesized that Negative Cognitive Processing, Anxiety, and Depression
will negatively predict PTG, while Perceived Threat will positively predict PTG.
This hypothesis is based on the same theoretical basis as above. Anxiety and
Depression are anticipated to have a negative association with PTG, because an
individual with these symptoms expectedly engages in negative cognitive processing.
Negative Cognitive Processing, in turn, is expected to have a negative relationship with
PTG because this type of processing is likely intrusive, non-deliberate, non-effortful and
non-reflective in nature, and thus, would not facilitate growth. Finally, Perceived Threat
is, again, expected to be positively related to PTG.
A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was utilized to investigate the relative
contributions of Anxiety, Depression, Perceived Threat, and Negative Cognitive
Processing on the prediction of PTG. The following participant characteristics were
included in the first block of variables: Age, Gender, Stage of Diagnosis, and Time Since
Treatment Completion. Anxiety and Depression were entered in the second block.
Perceived Threat was entered in the third block, and then Negative Cognitive Processing
was entered in the fourth block. PTG scores were entered as the dependent variable.
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Summary
The role of Anxiety, Depression, Perceived Threat, and Cognitive Processing in
facilitating PTG was examined amongst breast, prostate and colorectal cancer survivors
who had completed primary medical treatment. All data were collected through selfreport measures (i.e., demographic questionnaire, Perceived Threat questionnaire,
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale, Cognitive Processing of Trauma Scale, and
Posttraumatic Growth Inventory) which were mailed to the homes of potential
participants. In order to better understand the potential mechanisms of PTG, four primary
hierarchical regression analyses were conducted. Two of the analyses explored the
predictive role of Anxiety, Depression, and Perceived Threat related to either Positive or
Negative Cognitive Processing, while the other two analyses explored the association of
these variables, including Cognitive Processing, to PTG.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS
Overview
In this chapter, the findings of the statistical analyses associated with the study are
presented. Offered are the results of the preliminary analyses followed by the results of
the primary analyses related to the four main hypotheses. All preliminary, primary and
follow-up statistical analyses were performed using the Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences version 18.0 (SPSS 18.0). All statistical procedures used two-tailed tests of
significance with the alpha level set at p < .05.
Preliminary Analyses
This portion of the chapter includes: 1) details of the survey response rate, 2) an
analysis of missing data and how it was treated in analyzing the research hypotheses, 3)
the participants’ demographic and cancer information, 4) results of reliability analyses for
the main study variables: Anxiety, Depression, Life Outlook Threat, Physical Threat,
Positive Cognitive Processing, Negative Cognitive Processing, and PTG 5) descriptive
statistics and correlations related to the main variables analyzed in the research
hypotheses, 6) results of analyses (ANOVAs) to examine possible differences between
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three sets of groups (no recurrence of cancer/recurrence of cancer, single cancer
treatment received/multiple cancer treatments received, and no permanent after-effects of
treatment/permanent after-effects of treatment), an ANOVA to examine differences
between three groups (breast, prostate and colorectal cancer survivors), as well as an
ANOVA to examine differences between groups based upon location of treatment, and 7)
results of one additional ANOVA to examine differences between four groups based
upon the degree after-effects interfere with a survivor’s daily life (none, some, a little, a
lot).
Survey Details and Response Rate
This study used a confidential mail survey method. Breast, prostate and colorectal
cancer survivors treated at one of several Rocky Mountain Cancer Centers (RMCC)
Denver metro area locations were invited to participate in the survey (n= 600). Out of the
600 potential participants 211 returned questionnaires, a response rate of 35%. One
hundred sixty nine (n=169) of the returned questionnaires included signed consent and
HIPAA forms and met eligibility criteria. It is important to note that 22 of the 169
participants had experienced a recurrence of cancer. In order to determine if survivors
who had a recurrence of cancer were statistically similar to those who had not, a
preliminary analysis was conducted (please see below for more information). There were
42 returned questionnaires that were not eligible for use in data analysis. Of the 42, nine
survivors did not return a signed consent and/or HIPAA form, 11 had a history of
multiple types of cancer, 10 survivors were still in primary cancer treatment, and two
provided unclear answers, which raised the possibility that their responses were not valid.
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Furthermore, 10 individuals were survivors of cancers other than breast, prostate or
colorectal. Therefore, the total sample size used in data analyses was 169.
One hundred thirty-three potential participants declined to participate in the study.
One hundred sixteen of these individuals returned the refusal postcard, 10 returned the
entire blank questionnaire packet, and seven survivors left phone messages for the
researcher. Finally, 15 individuals contacted the researcher via note on the refusal
postcard, hand-written note, or phone message explaining that the potential participant
had passed away.
Analysis of Missing Data
There were 169 completed surveys in the final data set. As part of the preliminary
analyses, the data set was examined using Frequencies analyses to assess the missing data
in order to understand possible patterns or reasons that might help to explain why data
were missing. Forty-eight completed surveys were missing some type of data. Out of
these 48, 18 questionnaires were missing demographic information only, three
participants appeared to have accidentally skipped an entire page of the questionnaire
packet, and the remainder (n = 27) missed certain items on one of several measures
within the questionnaire packet. An inspection of the missing data on these cases was
completed by visually exploring the database and making note of the demographic and
cancer history characteristics of each participant. No discernable pattern emerged.
Missing values did not appear to be related to age, gender, race/ethnicity, marital status,
living arrangement, education level, income, type of cancer, stage of cancer, type of
treatment received, time since completed treatment, or recurrence of cancer. Thus, data
were considered to be missing at random (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). It is also
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important to note, that although 48 questionnaires were missing some type of data, for the
variables utilized in primary analyses, the maximum number of cases missing data was
nine. This was the case for the variables of Stage of Diagnosis and Location of
Treatment. All other variables used in analyses had four or fewer cases of missing data,
with five variables missing no data. Given the sample size, and due to the random nature
of the missing values, it was determined that it was acceptable to not control for or
correct missing data in the statistical analyses.
Demographic Information
A demographic questionnaire (Appendix C) designed for this study was used to
collect information on the participants’ demographic characteristics as well as cancer
diagnosis and treatment. Results are presented in Table 3 and Table 4. The demographic
variables initially used in the analyses were Age, Gender, Stage of Diagnosis, and Time
Since Treatment Completion. The results indicated that the sample was relatively
homogeneous related to these variables.
Table 3
Overview of Demographic Characteristics
Variable

Frequency

Percentage

Total Participants

169

100

Age Range
18 to 29
30 to 39
40 to 49
50 to 59
60 to 69
70 to 79
80 to 89
90 +

0
2
25
47
56
27
10
1

0
1.2
14.9
27.9
33.4
16.1
5.3
0.6

M (SD)
61.24 (11.38)
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Variable

Frequency

Percentage

Gender
Female
Male

117
52

69.2
30.8

Race/Ethnicity
Caucasian
Hispanic, Latino/a
African-American
Asian or Pacific Islander
American Indian or Alaskan Native
Other

159
4
3
2
0
1

94.1
2.4
1.8
1.2
0
0.6

Marital Status
Single (never married)
Committed relationship
Married/Remarried
Divorced/Separated/Widowed
Other

8
5
118
37
1

4.7
3.0
69.8
21.9
0.6

Living Arrangement
Live alone
Live with spouse/partner, w/children
Live with spouse/partner, w/out children
Live with children
Live with someone else
Other

29
40
81
11
4
3

17.2
23.7
47.9
6.5
2.4
1.8

Education (# of years) M (SD)
8
16.08 (2.28)
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19 +

1
0
1
1
16
8
11
9
47
24
23
27

0.6
0
0.6
0.6
9.5
4.7
6.5
5.3
27.8
14.2
13.6
16.0
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Variable

Frequency

Household Income
Under $25,000
$25,001 - $50,000
$50,001 - $75,000
$75,001 - $100,000
$100,000 +

10
26
30
36
60

Percentage

5.9
15.4
17.8
21.3
35.5

Table 4
Overview of Cancer Diagnosis and Treatment Information
Variable

Frequency

Percentage

Total Participants

169

100

Type of Cancer
Breast
Prostate
Colorectal
Female
Male

84
24
61
33
28

49.7
14.2
36.1
54.1
45.9

Stage of Cancer (at Initial Diagnosis)
Pre-Cancer/Stage 0
Stage I
Stage II
Stage III
Stage IV
Stage V
Other

3
49
57
30
14
2
5

1.8
29.0
33.7
17.8
8.3
1.2
3.0

Location of Treatment (>5% of sample)
RMCC Midtown
RMCC Rose
RMCC Skyridge
All other locations

25
35
15
85

14.8
20.7
8.9
50.3

Treatment Received
Single Cancer Treatment Received
Multiple Cancer Treatments Received

49
120

29.0
71.0
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Variable

Frequency

Time Since Completed Treatment
2 – 4 months
5 – 6 months
7 – 12 months
13 – 36 months
37 – 60 months
61 – 84 months
85 – 108 months
109 – 132 months
133 – 156 months
157 – 180 months
180 + months
Unknown

Percentage

8
10
17
55
26
18
10
8
6
5
5
1

4.7
5.9
10.1
32.5
15.4
10.7
5.9
4.7
3.6
3.0
3.0
0.6

22
147

13.0
87.0

Number of Recurrences
1–2
More than 2
Other

17
3
1

10.1
1.8
0.6

Permanent After-Effects from Treatment
Yes
No

90
76

53.3
45.0

Degree After-Effects Interfere w/Daily Life
None
A little
Some
A lot

20
28
30
9

11.8
16.6
17.8
5.3

Recurrence of Cancer
Yes
No
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Reliability Analyses Related to Main Variables
The Perceived Threat questionnaire used in this study contained three items
created by the researcher that have never been used in prior research. The three items
assessed various aspects of how being diagnosed with cancer challenged a survivor’s
life outlook and are found under the heading of Life Outlook in Appendix E. The
remaining five items in the scale have been used in prior research (Lechner, 2003a,
2009b; Salsman, 2009), and measured physical threat related to cancer diagnosis. These
items can be found under the two headings of Physical Threat and Reaction to Cancer.
It is worth noting that although there are two separate headings all five items are related
to physical threat. Based on theory (Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004)
the researcher believed that the Life Outlook items were theoretically different than the
Physical Threat items as the former were developed to measure cognitive threat rather
than physical threat. Therefore, the researcher thought it appropriate to create two
separate Perceived Threat variables: Life Outlook Threat and Physical Threat. In order
to determine if the scale was reliable, reliability analyses using SPSS 18.0 were
performed. More specifically, the internal consistency of the scale was assessed using
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha, which provides an indication of the average correlation
among the items of the scale. Values range from zero to one, with higher values
indicating greater reliability (Pallant, 2007). Nunnally (1978) recommended that a
minimum level of .7 is needed to establish adequate reliability. Results of the reliability
analysis indicated that the overall scale, consisting of eight items, had an estimated
reliability of .87. The three items comprising Life Outlook Threat had a Cronbach’s
alpha of .90, which indicated that all of the items are essentially measuring the same
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construct. Finally, the five items that comprise Physical Threat had a Cronbach’s alpha
of .83, again indicating that all of the items are essentially measuring the same construct.
Based on these results, the researcher determined it was appropriate to run subsequent
analyses with two Perceived Threat variables: Life Outlook Threat and Physical Threat.
Next, reliability analyses were conducted for the Anxiety and Depression
subscales of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS). Results indicated that
the seven items comprising the Anxiety subscale of the HADS had an estimated
reliability of .85, while the seven items comprising the Depression subscale had an
estimated reliability of .82. Therefore, based on these results, the measure was reliable.
Reliability analyses were also performed to determine if it was appropriate to
examine two subscales of the Cognitive Processing of Trauma Scale (CPOTS): Positive
Cognitive Processing and Negative Cognitive Processing rather than examining each of
the five subscales separately. The researcher speculated that positive and negative
cognitive processing would differentially influence the amount of PTG that is reported
by survivors, and therefore having two subscales assessing opposite ends of the
spectrum was key to the study hypotheses. Ten items comprise the subscales that are
theorized to represent Positive Cognitive Processing (i.e., Positive Cognitive
Restructuring, Resolution, and Downward Comparison). Results revealed that these 10
items have a Cronbach’s alpha of .83. One item, “Other people have had worse
experiences than mine,” which is part of the Downward Comparison subscale, had a low
corrected item-total correlation of .236 (values below .3 are questionable). This result
suggested that this item might be measuring something different from the other items as
a whole. However, given the high overall alpha level, the item was retained. Seven items
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comprise the subscales that form Negative Cognitive Processing (i.e., Denial and
Regret). The items had an alpha of .70, with all items having corrected item-total
correlations of .33 or greater; thus, all items were retained. Overall, the results suggested
that it was appropriate to divide the CPOTS into two subscales assessing Positive and
Negative Cognitive Processing. Finally, a reliability analysis was performed on the
Posttraumatic Growth Inventory (PTGI). The 21 items had an alpha of .96, indicating
that all items are essentially measuring the same construct.
Descriptive Statistics for Independent and Dependent Variables
Descriptive analyses of the independent and dependent variables included in the
study were conducted to determine if the responses were normally distributed and if the
data showed adequate variability within this sample of breast, prostate and colorectal
cancer survivors (see Table 5). An examination of the data indicated that the responses
were normally distributed and that there was adequate variability within the sample for
the variables of Life Outlook Threat, Physical Threat, and Posttraumatic Growth.
However, the distributions of Anxiety, Depression, and Negative Cognitive Processing
were positively skewed with the majority of scores clustering around lower values. In
contrast, the distribution of Positive Cognitive Processing was negatively skewed with
the majority of scores clustering around higher values. Thus, there was a lack of
variability within the sample for these variables.
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Table 5
Descriptive Statistics for Independent and Dependent Variables
Variable

N

Mean

SD

Min

167
167
167
166

4.72
2.88
10.23
16.62

3.83
3.18
4.68
6.26

0
0
3
5

Dependent Variables
Positive Cognitive Processing (CPOTS) 166
Negative Cognitive Processing (CPOTS)167
Posttraumatic Growth (PTGI, Total)
165

14.71
2.74
48.84

2.92
2.27
27.08

Independent Variables
Anxiety (HADS)
Depression (HADS)
Life Outlook Threat
Physical Threat

Max Possible
Range
18
16
18
30

0-21
0-21
3-18
5-30

1.83 18
0-18
0
11.75 0-12
0
105
0-105

Table 6 provides the correlation coefficients for the demographic, independent, and
dependent variables utilized in the study.
Table 6
Correlation Coefficients
Variable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1. Age

1.00

2. Gender

.322** 1.00

3. Stage of Dx

.099

.211** 1.00

4. Time

.167*

.005

-.136

1.00

5. L.O. Threat

-.423** -.182* -.065

-.095

6. Phys Threat

-.385** -.035

.075

-.026 .511** 1.00

7. Anxiety

-.284** -.127

.062

-.001 .335** .491* 1.00

8. Depression

-.039

.250** -.028 .153

9. Pos Cog Proc

.172* -.153* -.081

10. Neg Cog Proc .132

.087

.104

.072

11. PTG (Total) -.315** -.236** -.079

8

9

10

11

Stage of Dx = Stage of Diagnosis
Time = Time Since Treatment Completion
L.O. Threat = Life Outlook Threat
Phys Threat = Physical Threat
Pos Cog Processing = Positive Cognitive Processing
Neg Cog Processing = Negative Cognitive Processing
PTG = Posttraumatic Growth

1.00

.328* .574**

1.00

.131 -.174* -.479** -.460** -.516** 1.00
-.138 .022

.069

.160*

.024 .537** .249** .185*

*p < .05 level, two tailed. **p < .01, two tailed
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.221** -.252** 1.00
.030

.204** -.175* 1.00

Mean Comparisons for Variables Between Two Groups
A One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was performed using SPSS 18.0 to
compare means of Life Outlook Threat, Physical Threat, Anxiety, Depression, Positive
Cognitive Processing, Negative Cognitive Processing, and PTG between survivors who
had experienced a recurrence of cancer and those who had not. ANOVAs were conducted
instead of independent t-tests as Type I error rate (finding a significant result when it
does not exist) can increase with multiple t tests. Results indicated that there was a
difference in mean scores of the two groups for Physical Threat, F (1,164) = 7.48, p =
.007. More specifically, the non-recurrence group reported lower scores (M = 16.11, SD
= 6.14) compared to the recurrence group (M = 19.95, SD = 6.17). There was also a
difference in means scores of the two groups for Positive Cognitive Processing, with the
recurrence group reporting lower scores (M = 13.50, SD = 3.53) than the non-recurrence
group (M = 14.89, SD = 2.80), F (1, 164) = 4.20, p = .042.
Given that Positive Cognitive Processing was the dependent variable in
Hypothesis 1, and there was a significant difference between scores for those who had
experienced a recurrence of cancer and those who had not, a decision was made to take a
conservative approach and include Recurrence as a control variable in the regression
equation for this hypothesis. However, it is important to note that running an ANOVA
comparing samples of 22 and 144 participants may not provide meaningful information.
There were no other significant differences.
Specifically related to the variable of Cancer Treatment Received, the database
initially had 14 categories, including various combinations of treatments. Yet, many of
these categories included very few survivors. Thus, in order to collapse the groups for

114

future analyses, and create a variable that would be meaningful in terms of interpretation
and implication of the study’s results, two groups were created based on a survivor
receiving only one type of cancer treatment (i.e., chemotherapy only) or multiple types of
cancer treatments (i.e., chemotherapy and radiation). Twenty-nine percent of the sample
(n = 49) received a single cancer treatment and 71% (n = 120) received multiple cancer
treatments. All subsequent analyses utilized this categorized variable of treatment
received.
An ANOVA based upon Treatment Received indicated that there was a difference
in mean scores between the two groups for Life Outlook Threat, with those who received
a single cancer treatment reporting lower scores (M = 9.10, SD = 5.01) than those who
received multiple cancer treatments (M = 10.69, SD = 4.48), F (1, 165) = 4.08, p = .045.
There was also a difference between the groups for Anxiety, with survivors who received
a single cancer treatment reporting lower scores (M = 3.59, SD = 4.02) compared to those
who received multiple treatments (M = 5.19, SD = 3.67), F (1, 165) = 6.19, p = .014.
Furthermore, results indicated a significant difference between the two groups for PTG,
with survivors who received a single cancer treatment reporting lower scores (M = 36.81,
SD = 28.82) than those who received multiple treatments (M = 53.77, SD = 24.82), F (1,
163) = 14.44, p < .001. Thus, for the hypotheses where PTG was the dependent variable
(Hypotheses 2 and 4), Treatment Received was included as a control variable in the
regression equations. No other significant results were found.
Another ANOVA was performed to compare means of Life Outlook Threat,
Physical Threat, Anxiety, Depression, Positive Cognitive Processing, Negative Cognitive
Processing, and PTG between survivors who had experienced permanent after-effects of
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treatment and those who had not. Results indicated there was a difference in mean scores
between the two groups for Life Outlook Threat, with those without permanent aftereffects of treatment reporting lower scores (M = 8.69, SD = 4.86) than those with
permanent after-affects (M = 11.52, SD = 4.17), F (1, 162) = 16.07, p = .001. There was
also a significant difference between the groups for Physical Threat, with survivors who
have not experienced permanent after-effects of treatment reporting lower scores (M =
15.28, SD = 6.28) compared to survivors who had (M = 17.97, SD = 6.01), F (1, 161) =
7.79, p = .006). For Anxiety, results revealed that those without permanent after-effects
(M = 3.76, SD = 3.40) had significantly lower scores than those with them (M = 5.58, SD
= 4.03), F (1, 162) = 9.57, p = .002). A similar difference was found related to
Depression, F (1, 162) = 8.82, p = .003), with those without after-effects reporting lower
scores (M = 2.11, SD = 2.54) compared to survivors with after-effects (M = 3.56, SD =
3.55). Finally, results indicated there was a difference between the two groups for
Positive Cognitive Processing with those who had experienced permanent after-effects of
treatment reporting lower scores (M = 13.84, SD = 3.05) that those who had no aftereffects (M = 15.74, SD = 2.44), F (1, 161) = 18.65, p = .001). Given this result, a decision
was made to include permanent After-Effects of Treatment in the regression equation for
Hypothesis 1 since Positive Cognitive Processing was the dependent variable for that
hypothesis. No other significant differences were found.
Mean Comparisons for Variables Between Three or More Groups
An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted to compare means of Life
Outlook Threat, Physical Threat, Anxiety, Depression, Positive Cognitive Processing,
Negative Cognitive Processing, and PTG among breast, prostate and colorectal cancer
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survivors. Results revealed that for Life Outlook Threat, Cancer Type was significant, F
(2,164) = 3.23, p = .042 for the breast and prostate cancer groups. A Tukey posthoc
comparison indicated that prostate cancer survivors reported lower scores (M = 8.33, SD
= 4.98) compared to breast cancer survivors (M = 10.99, SD = 4.56). Cancer Type was
also significant for the variable of Negative Cognitive Processing, F (2,164) = 5.28, p =
.006. A Tukey posthoc comparison revealed that breast cancer survivors reported lower
scores (M = 2.18, SD = 2.31) than colorectal cancer survivors (M = 3.36, SD = 2.09).
Furthermore, the results indicated that for PTG, Cancer Type was significant, F
(2, 162) = 10.74, p < .001. The posthoc comparison revealed a statistically significant
difference between breast (M = 55.45, SD = 26.30) and prostate cancer (M =27.52, SD =
25.20) survivors as well as prostate and colorectal cancer (M = 47.97, SD = 24.78)
survivors. Prostate cancer survivors reported lower PTG scores compared to both breast
and colorectal cancer survivors. Thus, for the hypotheses where Negative Cognitive
Processing or PTG were the dependent variables (Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4) Cancer Type
will be included in the regression analysis in order to control for the influence of this
variable. There were no other statistically significant results.
An ANOVA was also performed to compare mean scores of survivors from
different locations for cancer treatment on the variables described above. It is important
to note that the database initially included 67 different treatment locations, counting
various combinations of locations. Yet, the majority of these locations (54) included only
one survivor. Thus, treatment location was categorized based upon percentage of
participants (greater than 5% of sample) going to a particular site. Four groups emerged:
Rocky Mountain Cancer Centers (RMCC) Rose Office (20.7%) RMCC Midtown Office
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(14.8%), RMCC Skyridge Office (8.9%) and All Other Locations (50.3%). All
subsequent analyses utilized the categorized variable of location of treatment. The
ANOVA revealed that location of treatment was significant for Negative Cognitive
Processing, F (3, 154) = 4.75, p = .003. The Tukey posthoc comparison indicated that
survivors treated at the RMCC Rose Office had lower scores (M = 1.65, SD = 1.54) than
survivors treated at All Other Locations (M = 3.19, SD = 2.41). Therefore, Location of
Treatment was included in the regression equation where Negative Cognitive Processing
was the dependent variable (Hypothesis 3). There were no other statistically significant
results.
One additional ANOVA was then conducted to compare means on Life Outlook
Threat, Physical Threat, Anxiety, Depression, Positive Cognitive Processing, Negative
Cognitive Processing, and PTG among four groups based on the degree that permanent
after-effects interfere with a survivor’s daily life. This analysis was performed in order to
determine if Interference of After-Effects of Treatment needed to be included in the
regression equations for the study’s main hypotheses. The ANOVA indicated that there
was a significant difference for Physical Threat, F (3, 28) = 2.67, p = .043. A Tukey
posthoc comparison showed that those with “a little” interference (M =16.71, SD = 5.94)
reported lower scores than those who had experienced “a lot” of interference (M = 22.67,
SD = 5.20). On the Depression score, there was a difference, F (3, 81) = 4.51, p = .003,
between the “none” group (M = 1.58, SD = 1.61) and “a lot” group (M = 6.44, SD =
5.57), with the “none” group reporting lower scores. There was also a significant
difference, F (3, 83) = 3.16, p = .023, between the “none” group (M = 14.83, SD = 2.03)
and “a lot” group (M = 11.34, SD = 4.48) for Positive Cognitive Processing, with the “a
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lot” group reporting lower scores. For Negative Cognitive Processing, there was a
significant difference, F (3, 83) = 3.33, p = .023, between the “none” group (M = 1.86,
SD = 1.67) and the “a little” group (M = 3.72, SD = 2.67), with the “none” group
reporting lower scores. Therefore, for the hypotheses where Positive and Negative
Cognitive Processing were the dependent variables (Hypotheses 1 and 3), Interference of
After-Effects of Treatment was included as a control variable in the regression equations.
Primary Analyses
This section first addresses the assumptions of multiple regression. Second,
identification and treatment of outliers is discussed. Third, the analyses and results for
each of the four research hypotheses are presented. The alpha level was set at p < .05 for
all statistical analyses.
The multiple regression assumptions of normality, linearity, homoscedasticity of
residuals, mean independence and absence of multicollinearity and outliers (Tabachnick
& Fidell, 2007) were examined and evaluated as follows. Normality was assessed by
plotting the residuals of each regression model using histograms that were overlaid with a
normal curve. A visual inspection of the histograms indicated that the residuals for the
models reasonably followed a normal distribution and it was determined that the
assumption of normality was met (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).
Linearity was assessed using the Normal Probability Plot (P–P) of the Regression
Standardized Residual. The Normal P-P Plot for all models revealed a reasonably straight
line from bottom left to top right indicating a straight-line relationship between variables
as well as no major deviations from normality. Homoscedasticity and independence of
residuals was visually examined using a scatterplot of the standardized residuals. The
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residuals were roughly rectangularly distributed, as opposed to curvilinear or cone
shaped, with scores relatively concentrated in the center, along the zero point line, and
evenly distributed on both sides of the centerline, indicating that these assumptions were
met (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).
Mean independence is an assumption that addresses error term. In assessing
independence, there are a few factors that need to be considered. The first factor is that
independent variables relevant to the analyses are included in the regression model. Mean
independence is violated when independent variables that influence the outcome
variables are omitted from the regression model (Freedman, 2005). Thus, the variables
used in the models were determined by existing literature and existing theories in order to
determine that the appropriate predictors and control variables were selected. A second
factor is that the variables are, ideally, measured without error. Therefore, the measures
used in this study were selected based on their reliability. Each of the independent and
dependent measures produced average to above average reliability within the current
sample. To further evaluate independence of errors, Durbin-Watson coefficient d values
were examined for each regression model. Values lower than two indicate autocorrelation
(Garson, 2010). The first regression equation had a coefficient d value of 2.08, which
demonstrated that there were no autocorrelations and there was an independence of
errors. While, the second, third, and fourth models had Durbin-Watson values of 1.83,
1.90, and 1.82 respectively, these values are only slightly less than two and therefore
there was no strong evidence for autocorrelation.
Multicollinearity was assessed using tolerance and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
values. Tolerance is an indicator of how much variability of the specified independent
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variable is not explained by the other independent variables in the model. The VIF is the
inverse of the tolerance value (Pallant, 2007). The cutoff values for tolerance and VIF
used in the analyses were based on Pallant’s (2007) cutoff levels of less than .10 for
tolerance and above 10 for VIF. Based on these values, the variables in all of the models
did not indicate the presence of multicollinearity.
As noted in the preliminary analyses, correlations coefficients were also examined
to detect strong correlations between variables. Moderate correlations were found
between Life Outlook Threat and Physical Threat (r = .511, p < .01) as well as Anxiety
and Depression (r = .574, p < .01). Therefore a decision was made to separate each of
these variable pairs, while keeping all other variables in the model the same, and run four
follow-up regressions for each hypothesis: one with Life Outlook Threat and without
Physical Threat, one with Physical Threat and without Life Outlook, one with Anxiety
without Depression, and one with Depression without Anxiety. This was done in order to
examine the individual impact of the four variables in each model.
Outliers were detected by inspecting the Mahalanobis distances that were found in
the results. To identify which cases were outliers, the critical chi-square values were
determined for each regression equation using the number of independent variables as the
degrees of freedom and subsequently looking up the value in Tabachnick and Fidell’s
Multivariate Statistics text (2007, Table C.4). The authors suggest using an alpha level of
.001 when determining critical chi-square values. Using these criteria, the maximum
Mahalanobis values for the first three models indicated that there were no values in the
dataset that exceeded the critical value, suggesting that no outliers were present. For the
fourth model, the maximum Mahalanobis Distance value exceeded the critical value,
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suggesting that one or more outliers were present. To determine which cases were
outliers, the database was sorted according to Mahalanobis Distance, which revealed that
there was one outlier in the database. While it is unlikely that one outlier would make a
substantial difference in the results, a conservative approach was taken and the equation
for Hypothesis 4 was re-run without the outlier. It is important to keep in mind that once
the single outlier was removed from the database the sample size decreased by one as
sample size influences the values obtained in the results.
Statistical Analyses Addressing Research Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: The first hypothesis stated, “Anxiety, Depression, and Perceived
Threat will predict Positive Cognitive Processing over and beyond the contribution of the
demographic control variables. It is hypothesized that Anxiety and Depression will
negatively predict Positive Cognitive Processing, while Perceived Threat will positively
predict Positive Cognitive Processing.”
To address this hypothesis, a hierarchical regression was utilized to investigate the
relative contributions of Anxiety, Depression, and Perceived Threat in the prediction of
Positive Cognitive Processing after controlling for the demographic variables of Age,
Gender, Stage of Diagnosis, Time Since Treatment Completion, Recurrence, AfterEffects of Treatment, and Interference of After-Effects. The last three variables were
added to the regression model after the preliminary analyses revealed that there were
differences for these variables related to the dependent variable of Positive Cognitive
Processing. The demographic variables were entered in the first block, Anxiety and
Depression were entered in the second block, and Life Outlook Threat and Physical
Threat were entered in the third block.
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The demographic control variables in the first equation (Block 1), significantly
contributed to the model, R2 = .226, F (7, 76) = 3.17, p < .01, accounting for 22.6% of the
variance. Anxiety and Depression (Block 2) also contributed to the model. After these
variables were entered the total variance explained by the model as a whole was 41.1%, F
(9, 74) = 5.74, p < .001. Anxiety and Depression explained an additional 18.5% of the
variance in Positive Cognitive Processing, after controlling for the demographic
variables, ∆R2 = .185, ∆F (2, 74) = 11.62, p < .001. Life Outlook Threat and Physical
Threat (Block 3) contributed to the model as well. When these variables were included,
the total variance explained by the model as a whole was 46.9%, F (11, 72) = 5.77, p <
.001. Life Outlook Threat and Physical Threat explained an additional 5.8% of the
variance in Positive Cognitive Processing, after controlling for the demographic variables
as well as Anxiety and Depression, ∆R2 = .058, ∆F (2, 72) = 3.91, p < .05. In the final
model, the variables of Physical Threat, Depression, and After-Effects of Treatment were
statistically significant, with Physical Threat recording the highest beta value (β = -.32, p
= .007) compared to Depression (β = -.27, p = .025) and After-Effects of Treatment (β = .19, p = .045). These findings suggest that a decrease in physical threat and depression as
well as not having experienced permanent after-effects of treatment appear to be related
to an increase in positive cognitive processing. Table 7 provides a summary of the
statistical findings.
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Table 7
Hierarchical Regression of Age, Gender, Stage of Diagnosis, Time Since Treatment
Completion, Recurrence, and Interference of After-Effects on Positive Cognitive
Processing (n = 166)
Variable

Positive Cognitive Processing
B

SE B

β

Block 1.
Age

.028

.029

.108

-.761

.749

-.121

Stage of Diagnosis

.036

.267

.014

Time Since Treatment Completion

.031

.133

.025

Recurrence

-.609

.973

-.070

After-Effects of Treatment

-1.73

.624

-.296**

Interference of After-Effects

-.822

.333

-.267*

Gender

R2

.226

F for change in R2

3.17**

Block 2.
Age

.016

.027

.061

Gender

-.935

.667

-.148

Stage of Diagnosis

.216

.240

.086

Time Since Treatment Completion

.090

.118

.072

Recurrence

-.542

.861

-.063

After-Effects of Treatment

-1.10

.568

-.188

Interference of After-Effects

-.460

.313

-.149

Anxiety

-.188

.089

-.247*

Depression

-.260

.112

-.284*

R2

.411

F for change in R2

11.62**
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Variable

Positive Cognitive Processing
B

SE B

β

Block 3.
Age

.003

.027

.013

Gender

-.868

.644

-.138

Stage of Diagnosis

.267

.232

.107

Time Since Treatment Completion

.106

.114

.085

Recurrence

-.033

.850

-.004

After-Effects of Treatment

-1.13

.556

-.194*

Interference of After-Effects

-.374

.303

-.121

Anxiety

-.122

.091

-.160

Depression

-.248

.108

-.270*

.091

.067

.147

-.151

.055

-.324**

Life Outlook Threat
Physical Threat
R2

.469

F for change in R2

3.91*

Note. Positive Cognitive Processing: R2 = .226; ∆R2 = .185 for Block 2 (p < .001); ∆R2 = .058 for Block 3
(p < .05); * p < .05 **p < .01

Follow-Up Analyses for Hypothesis 1
Given the high correlation between Anxiety and Depression (r = .574, p < .01), a
follow-up regression was conducted for Hypothesis 1 with Anxiety only in Block 2. In
contrast to what was found in the primary analysis for Hypothesis 1, results revealed that
Anxiety was a significant predictor in the model, R2 = .368, F (8, 75) = 5.46, p < .001.
Anxiety explained an additional 14.2% of the variance in Positive Cognitive Processing,
after controlling for the demographic variables, ∆R2 = .142, ∆F (1, 75) = 16.87, p < .001,
with a β of -.308 (p = .004) in the final model. This finding suggests that Anxiety alone is
a significant predictor of Positive Cognitive Processing such that a decrease in anxiety is
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related to an increase in positive cognitive processing. However, Anxiety shares enough
variance with Depression that when Depression is entered into the equation, the effect of
Anxiety “washes out” and is no longer significant. An additional regression was
performed with Depression only in the second block. Results revealed that, as expected
from previous analysis, Depression contributed to the model, R2 = .376, F (8, 75) = 5.64,
p < .001. Depression explained an additional 15% of the variance in Positive Cognitive
Processing, after controlling for the demographic variables, ∆R2 = .150, ∆F (1, 75) =
17.99, p = .001, with a β value of -.354 (p = .001). This finding indicates that a decrease
in depression is associated with an increase in positive cognitive processing. Thus, one
variable could be substituted for the other or Anxiety and Depression could be combined
to form a single variable.
Life Outlook Threat and Physical Threat are also highly correlated (r = .511, p <
.01). Therefore, a regression was performed with Life Outlook Threat only in Block 3.
Results revealed that Block 3 did not contribute significantly to the model, ∆R2 = .001,
∆F (1, 73) = .135, p = .716, accounting for only 0.1% of the variance. When the
regression was conducted again with Physical Threat only in Block 3, the results
indicated that Physical Threat significantly contributed to the model, explaining an
additional 4.4% of the variance in Positive Cognitive Processing, after controlling for the
demographic variables as well as Anxiety and Depression, ∆R2 = .044, ∆F (1, 73) = 5.89,
p < .05. In the final model, Physical Threat had a β value of -2.66 (p = .018). This
suggests that a decrease in physical threat is related to an increase in positive cognitive
processing. Therefore, it appears that Life Outlook Threat and Physical Threat have a
unique and separate relationship to Positive Cognitive Processing.
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Hypothesis 2. The second hypothesis stated, “Positive Cognitive Processing will
significantly predict PTG over and beyond the demographic control variables, Anxiety,
Depression, and Perceived Threat. In other words, Positive Cognitive Processing will
account for a significant amount of the variance of PTG beyond the demographic control
variables (i.e., Age, Gender, Stage of Diagnosis, Time Since Treatment Completion),
Anxiety, Depression, and Perceived Threat. It is hypothesized that Positive Cognitive
Processing and Perceived Threat will positively predict PTG, while Anxiety and
Depression will negatively predict PTG.”
To address this hypothesis, a hierarchical regression was utilized to investigate the
relative contributions of Anxiety, Depression, Perceived Threat, and Positive Cognitive
Processing in the prediction of PTG after controlling for the demographic variables of
Age, Gender, Stage of Diagnosis, Time Since Treatment Completion, Cancer Type and
Treatment Received. The last two variables were added to the regression model after the
preliminary analyses revealed that there were differences for these variables related to the
dependent variable of PTG. The demographic variables were entered in the first block,
Anxiety and Depression were entered in the second block, Life Outlook Threat and
Physical Threat were entered in the third block, and Positive Cognitive Processing was
entered in the fourth block.
The demographic control variables in the second equation (Block 1), did
significantly contribute to the model, R2 = .161, F (6, 150) = 4.81, p < .001, accounting
for 16.1% of the variance. Anxiety and Depression (Block 2) did not contribute to the
model. After these variables were entered, the total variance explained by the model as a
whole was 16.7%, F (8, 148) = 3.71, p = .001. Anxiety and Depression explained only an
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additional 0.6% of the variance in PTG, after controlling for the demographic variables,
∆R2 = .006, ∆F (2, 148) = .499, p = .608. Life Outlook Threat and Physical Threat (Block
3) significantly contributed to the model. After these variables were entered, the total
variance explained by the model as a whole was 34.9%, F (10,146) = 7.82, p < .001.
These variables explained an additional 18.2% of the variance in PTG, after controlling
for the demographic variables as well as Anxiety and Depression, ∆R2 = .182, ∆F (2,
146) = 20.39, p < .001. Positive Cognitive Processing (Block 4) also contributed to the
model. When this variable was included, the total variance explained by the model as a
whole was 44.5%, F (11, 145) = 10.59, p < .001. Positive Cognitive Processing explained
an additional 9.7% of the variance in PTG, after controlling for the demographic
variables, Anxiety, Depression, Life Outlook Threat and Physical Threat, ∆R2 = .097, ∆F
(1, 145) = 25.25, p < .001.
In the final model, the variables of Life Outlook Threat, Positive Cognitive
Processing, and Treatment Received were statistically significant, with Life Outlook
Threat recording the highest beta value (β = .452, p < .001) followed by Positive
Cognitive Processing (β = .416, p < .001), and Treatment Received (β = .142, p < .05).
These findings suggest that an increase in both life outlook threat and positive cognitive
processing appear to be related to an increase in posttraumatic growth. Furthermore,
having received more than one cancer treatment as compared to a single treatment,
appears to be related to an increase in PTG. Table 8 provides a summary of the results.
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Table 8
Hierarchical Regression of Age, Gender, Stage of Diagnosis, Time Since Treatment
Completion, Cancer Type Treatment Received, Life Outlook Threat, Physical Threat,
Anxiety, Depression, and Positive Cognitive Processing on Posttraumatic Growth (n =
165)
Variable

Posttraumatic Growth
B

SE B

β

Block 1.
Age

-.589

.195

-.247**

Gender

-6.97

5.23

-.119

Stage of Diagnosis

-1.11

1.94

-.048

Time Since Treatment Completion

.667

.906

.058

Cancer Type

1.88

2.84

.064

12.44

4.83

.209*

Treatment Received
R2

.161

F for change in R2

4.81**

Block 2.
Age

-.533

.204

-.224*

Gender

-6.49

5.29

-.111

Stage of Diagnosis

-1.09

2.00

-.047

Time Since Treatment Completion

.606

.911

.052

Cancer Type

1.71

2.83

.058

Treatment Received

11.95

4.89

.201*

Anxiety

.675

.694

.095

Depression

-.314

.824

-.037

R2

.167

F for change in R2

.499
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Variable

Posttraumatic Growth
B

SE B

β

Block 3.
Age

-.160

.196

-.067

Gender

-5.26

4.75

-.090

Stage of Diagnosis

-.375

1.79

-.016

Time Since Treatment Completion

.874

.813

.076

Cancer Type

1.38

2.55

.047

Treatment Received

10.94

4.38

.184*

Anxiety

-.040

.655

-.006

Depression

-.401

.736

-.047

2.86

.477

.495**

-.097

.382

-.022

Life Outlook Threat
Physical Threat
R2

.349

F for change in R2

20.39**

Block 4.
Age

-.230

.182

-.097

Gender

-1.11

4.48

-.019

Stage of Diagnosis

-1.06

1.67

-.046

Time Since Treatment Completion

.280

.762

.024

Cancer Type

.783

2.36

.027

Treatment Received

8.48

4.09

.142*

Anxiety

.429

.613

.061

Depression

.822

.724

.096

Life Outlook Threat

2.62

.444

.452**

Physical Threat

.489

.373

.113

Positive Cognitive Processing

3.86

.767

.416**

R2
F for change in R

.445
2

25.25**

Note. Posttraumatic Growth: R2 = .161; ∆R2 = .006 for Block 2 (p = .608); ∆R2 = .182 for Block 3 (p <
.001); ∆R2 = .097 for Block 4 (p < .001); * p < .05 ** p < .01
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Follow-Up Analyses for Hypothesis 2
Due to the high correlation between Life Outlook Threat and Physical Threat (r =
.511, p < .01), and given the significance of these variables in the main regression, a
follow-up regression was conducted for Hypothesis 2 with Life Outlook Threat only in
Block 3. Results revealed that Block 3 did contribute significantly to the model, R2 =
.349, F (9, 147) = 8.74, p < .001, explaining an additional 18.2% of the variance in PTG,
after controlling for the demographic variables as well as Anxiety and Depression, ∆R2 =
.182, ∆F (1, 147) = 40.98, p < .001. When the regression was conducted again with
Physical Threat only in Block 3, the results indicated that while the model as a whole was
significant at Block 3, R2 = .188, F (9, 147) = 3.78, p < .001, Block 3 did not individually
contribute to the model. Physical Threat explained only an additional 2.1% of the
variance in PTG, after controlling for the demographic variables as well as Anxiety and
Depression, ∆R2 = .021, ∆F (1, 147) = 3.77, p = .054. Yet, in the final model, Physical
Threat had a significant β value of .310 (p = .001). This suggests that although Physical
Threat did not significantly change the variance explained by the model as a whole, when
it is entered into the model alone it is a significant individual predictor of PTG such that
an increase in physical threat is related to an increase in PTG. However, when Life
Outlook Threat is entered along with Physical Threat, the influence of Physical Threat is
overshadowed by the variance it shares with Life Outlook Threat and is no longer
significant.
Hypothesis 3. The third hypothesis stated, “Anxiety, Depression, and Perceived
Threat will predict Negative Cognitive Processing over and beyond the contribution of
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the demographic control variables. It is hypothesized that Anxiety, Depression, and
Perceived Threat will all positively predict Negative Cognitive Processing.”
To investigate this hypothesis, hierarchical regression was utilized to investigate
the relative contributions of Anxiety, Depression, and Perceived Threat in the prediction
of Negative Cognitive Processing after controlling for the demographic variables of Age,
Gender, Stage of Diagnosis, Time Since Treatment Completion, Cancer Type, Location
of Treatment, and Interference of After-Effects of Treatment. The last three variables
were added to the regression model after the preliminary analyses revealed that there
were differences for these variables related to the dependent variable of Negative
Cognitive Processing. The demographic variables were entered in the first block, Anxiety
and Depression were entered in the second block, and Life Outlook Threat and Physical
Threat were entered in the third block.
The demographic control variables in the third equation (Block 1), did not
significantly contribute to the model, R2 = .121, F (7, 75) = 1.48, p = .187, accounting for
12% of the variance. Anxiety and Depression (Block 2) also did not contribute to the
model. After these variables were entered the total variance explained by the model as a
whole was 18.4%, F (9, 73) = 1.83, p = .078. Anxiety and Depression explained an
additional 6.2% of the variance in Negative Cognitive Processing, after controlling for
the demographic variables, ∆R2 = .062, ∆F (2, 73) = 2.79, p = .068. Life Outlook Threat
and Physical Threat (Block 3) did not contribute to the model as well. When these
variables were included, the total variance explained by the model as a whole was 18.6%,
F (11, 71) = 1.48, p = .159. Life Outlook Threat and Physical Threat explained only an
additional 0.3% of the variance in Negative Cognitive Processing, after controlling for
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the demographic variables as well as Anxiety and Depression, ∆R2 = .003, ∆F (2, 71) =
.111, p = .859. In the final model, none of the variables included in the model were
statistically significant. These findings suggest that none of the included variables are
related to negative cognitive processing. Table 9 provides a summary of the statistical
findings.
Table 9
Hierarchical Regression of Age, Gender, Stage of Diagnosis, Time Since Treatment
Completion, Cancer Type, Location of Treatment and Interference of After-Effects on
Negative Cognitive Processing (n = 167)
Variable

Negative Cognitive Processing
B

SE B

β

Block 1.
Age

.018

.024

.089

Gender

-.276

.636

-.056

Stage of Diagnosis

-.074

.237

-.038

Time Since Treatment Completion

-.129

.110

-.133

Cancer Type

.652

.341

.264

Location of Treatment

.399

.213

.207

-.023

.271

-.009

Interference of After-Effects
R2

.121

F for change in R2

1.48

Block 2.
Age

.026

.024

.130

Gender

-.244

.625

-.050

Stage of Diagnosis

-.159

.236

-.082

Time Since Treatment Completion

-.146

.108

-.150

Cancer Type

.636

.333

.258

Location of Treatment

.400

.208

.208

-.174

.279

-.073

Interference of After-Effects
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Variable

Negative Cognitive Processing

Anxiety

B
.074

SE B
.082

β
.125

Depression

.124

.102

.174

R2

.184

F for change in R

2

2.79

Block 3.
Age

.030

.026

.151

Gender

-.241

.637

-.049

Stage of Diagnosis

-.154

.240

-.079

Time Since Treatment Completion

-.144

.109

-.149

Cancer Type

.637

.337

.258

Location of Treatment

.406

.214

.211

Interference of After-Effects

-.184

.286

-.077

Anxiety

.064

.089

.108

Depression

.123

.103

.173

Life Outlook Threat

.025

.064

.151

Physical Threat

.005

.052

.015

R2

.186

F for change in R2

.111

Note. Negative Cognitive Processing: R2 = .121; ∆R2 = .062 for Block 2 (p = .068); ∆R2 = .003 for Block 3
(p = .895)

Follow-Up Analyses for Hypothesis 3
Given that no statistically significant results were found in the primary regression
equation for Hypothesis 3, no follow-up analyses were performed.
Hypothesis 4. The fourth hypothesis stated, “Negative Cognitive Processing will
significantly predict PTG over and beyond the demographic control variables, Anxiety,
Depression, and Perceived Threat. In other words, Negative Cognitive Processing will
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account for a significant amount of the variance of PTG beyond the demographic control
variables (i.e., Age, Gender, Stage of Diagnosis, Time Since Treatment Completion),
Anxiety, Depression, and Perceived Threat. It is hypothesized that Negative Cognitive
Processing, Anxiety, and Depression will negatively predict PTG, while Perceived Threat
will positively predict PTG.”
To address this hypothesis, hierarchical regression was utilized to investigate the
relative contributions of Anxiety, Depression, Perceived Threat, and Negative Cognitive
Processing in the prediction of PTG after controlling for the demographic variables of
Age, Gender, Stage of Diagnosis, Time Since Treatment Completion, Cancer Type and
Treatment Received. The last two variables were added to the regression model after the
preliminary analyses revealed that there were differences for these variables related to the
dependent variable of PTG. The demographic variables were entered in the first block,
Anxiety and Depression were entered in the second block, Life Outlook Threat and
Physical Threat were entered in the third block, and Negative Cognitive Processing was
entered in the fourth block.
The demographic control variables in the fourth equation (Block 1) significantly
contributed to the model, R2 = .165, F (6, 149) = 4.91, p < .001, accounting for 16.5% of
the variance. Anxiety and Depression (Block 2) did not contribute to the model. After
these variables were entered, the total variance explained by the model as a whole was
17.1%, F (8, 147) = 3.78, p < .001. Anxiety and Depression explained only an additional
0.6% of the variance in PTG, after controlling for the demographic variables, ∆R2 =
.006, ∆F (2, 147) = .497, p = .609. Life Outlook Threat and Physical Threat (Block 3)
contributed to the model. After these variables were entered the total variance explained
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by the model as a whole was 35.4%, F (10, 145) = 7.95, p < .001. Life Outlook Threat
and Physical Threat explained an additional 18.4% of the variance in PTG, after
controlling for the demographic variables as well as Anxiety and Depression, ∆R2 = .184,
∆F (2, 145) = 20.60, p < .001. Negative Cognitive Processing (Block 4) did not
contribute to the model. After this variable was entered, the total variance explained by
the model as a whole was 36.9%, F (11,144) = 7.64, p < .001. Negative Cognitive
Processing explained only an additional 1.4% of the variance in PTG after controlling for
the demographic variables, Anxiety, Depression and Perceived Threat, ∆R2 = .014, ∆F (1,
144) = 3.29, p = .072. In the final model, the variables of Life Outlook Threat and
Treatment Received were statistically significant, with Life Outlook Threat recording the
highest beta value (β = .499, p < .001) followed by Treatment Received (β = .176, p <
.05). These findings suggest that an increase in life outlook threat appears to be related to
an increase in posttraumatic growth. Furthermore, receiving multiple cancer treatments as
compared to a single form of treatment, appears to be related to an increase in PTG.
Table 10 provides a summary of the results.
Table 10
Hierarchical Regression of Age, Gender, Stage of Diagnosis, Time Since Treatment
Completion, Cancer Type, Treatment Received, Life Outlook Threat, Physical Threat,
Anxiety, Depression, and Negative Cognitive Processing on Posttraumatic Growth (n =
165)
Variable

Posttraumatic Growth
B

SE B

β

Block 1.
Age

-.591

.195

-.248**

Gender

-7.12

5.23

-.122
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Variable

Posttraumatic Growth

B

SE B

β

-1.22

1.95

-.052

Time Since Treatment Completion

.834

.922

.071

Cancer Type

1.91

2.84

.065

Treatment Received

12.57

4.84

.211*

Stage of Diagnosis

R2

.165

F for change in R2

4.91**

Block 2.
Age

-.536

.204

-.225**

Gender

-6.62

5.30

-.113

Stage of Diagnosis

-1.17

2.00

-.050

Time Since Treatment Completion

.772

.927

.065

Cancer Type

1.74

2.85

.059

Treatment Received

12.11

4.89

.203*

Anxiety

.681

.695

.096

Depression

-.355

.825

-.042

R2

.171

F for change in R2

.497

Block 3.
Age

-.158

.196

-.066

Gender

-5.43

4.75

-.093

Stage of Diagnosis

-.473

1.79

-.020

Time Since Treatment Completion

1.06

.826

.090

Cancer Type

1.43

2.54

.048

Treatment Received

11.14

4.38

.187*

Anxiety

-.048

.654

-.007
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Variable

Posttraumatic Growth

B

SE B

β

Depression

-.452

.736

-.053

Life Outlook Threat

2.86

.476

.496**

Physical Threat

-.072

.382

-.017

R

2

.354

F for change in R2

20.60**

Block 4.
Age

-.101

.197

-.042

Gender

-5.72

4.71

-.098

Stage of Diagnosis

-.698

1.78

-.030

Time Since Treatment Completion

.724

.840

.061

Cancer Type

2.28

2.57

.077

10.45

4.36

.176*

Anxiety

.074

.652

.010

Depression

-.234

.740

-.027

2.88

.472

.499**

Physical Threat

-.067

.379

-.015

Negative Cognitive Processing

-1.69

.931

-.134

Treatment Received

Life Outlook Threat

R2

.369

F for change in R2

3.29

Note. Posttraumatic Growth: R2 = .165; ∆R2 = .006 for Block 2 (p = .609); ∆R2 = .184 for Block 3 (p <
.001); ∆R2 = .014 for Block 4 (p = .072); * p < .05 ** p < .01

Follow-Up Analyses for Hypothesis 4
A follow-up regression was conducted for Hypothesis 4 with Life Outlook Threat
only in Block 3. Results were the same as reported above, with Life Outlook Threat
contributing significantly to the model, R2 = .354, F (9, 146) = 8.89, p < .001. Life
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Outlook Threat explained an additional 18.3% of the variance in PTG, after controlling
for the demographic variables as well as Anxiety and Depression, ∆R2 = .183, ∆F (1,
146) = 41.44, p < .001. When the regression was conducted again with Physical Threat
only in Block 3, the results indicated that Physical Threat significantly contributed to the
model, R2 = .193, F (9, 146) = 3.88, p < .001. Physical Threat explained an additional
2.2% of the variance in PTG, after controlling for the demographic variables as well as
Anxiety and Depression, ∆R2 = .022, ∆F (1, 146) = 4.01, p = .047. In the final model,
Physical Threat had a β value of .185 (p < .05). This result suggests that when Physical
Threat is entered into the model alone, it is a significant individual predictor of PTG such
that an increase in physical threat is related to an increase in PTG. However, when Life
Outlook Threat is entered with Physical Threat, the influence of Physical Threat is
eclipsed by the variance it shares with Life Outlook Threat and is no longer significant.
Summary
Chapter Four provided the results of the preliminary analyses of the study
followed by the primary analyses, which included the results of the four main regression
equations aimed at examining the four research hypotheses as well as follow-up analyses.
The results partially supported Hypothesis 1. In the first and second block of variables,
After-Effects of Treatment and Interference of After-Effects of Treatment emerged as
significant independent predictors of Positive Cognitive Processing, while Physical
Threat emerged as a predictor in the third block. After-Effects of Treatment, Physical
Threat and Depression were significant predictors of Positive Cognitive Processing in the
final model. Depression had a negative association with Positive Cognitive Processing,
which supported the hypothesis. After-Effects of Treatment also had a negative
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relationship with the dependent variable such that experiencing permanent after-effects
was related to a decrease in positive cognitive processing. This finding was expected
based on the preliminary analysis and makes logical sense as experiencing permanent
after-effects may hinder a survivor’s ability to engage in positive cognitive processing.
However, Physical Threat was negatively associated Positive Cognitive Processing,
which is the opposite of what was predicted. Hypothesis 1 was not supported in that Life
Outlook Threat and Anxiety were not significant predictors.
Hypothesis 2 was also partially supported. Age and Treatment Received emerged
as significant predictors of PTG in the first two blocks of variables. Life Outlook Threat
was a predictor in Block 3, along with Treatment Received. In the final model, Life
Outlook Threat and Positive Cognitive Processing were positive predictors of PTG, as
was Treatment Received. Interestingly, it was found that survivors who received more
than one type of cancer treatment reported more PTG than survivors who received a
single form of treatment. Hypothesis 2 was not supported in that Physical Threat, Anxiety
and Depression were not predictors of PTG. Yet, the follow-up analysis revealed that
when Physical Threat was entered into the equation without Life Outlook Threat, it was
significant.
Hypothesis 3 was not supported in the study. None of the variables entered in the
equation, including the demographic variables, emerged as predictors of Negative
Cognitive Processing. Possible reasons for the lack of findings are presented in Chapter
Five.
Finally, Hypothesis 4 was partially supported as Age and Treatment Received
emerged as significant predictors of PTG in the first two blocks of variables, while Life
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Outlook Threat was significant in the third block, along with Treatment Received. In the
final model, Life Outlook Threat and Treatment Received remained significant predictors
of PTG. The hypothesis was not supported in that Physical Threat, Anxiety, Depression,
and Negative Cognitive Processing did not predict PTG. Chapter Five will discuss these
results as well as the limitations of the study and recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION
This chapter includes 1) a brief summary of the study, 2) a discussion of the
overall findings associated with each of the four research hypotheses and their
implications, 3) limitations of the study, 4) recommendations for future research, and 5)
conclusions.
Summary of the Study
Tedeschi and Calhoun (2004) defined posttraumatic growth (PTG) as “positive
psychological change experienced as a result of the struggle with highly challenging life
circumstances” and research investigating PTG has expanded over the past decade. More
specifically, there is growing research in the field of psycho-oncology that examines PTG
in the aftermath of cancer. Past research has shown promising results and has broadened
the perspective on possible psychological responses following trauma. Many trauma
theories (Creamer, et al., 1992; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Park, 1998; Tedeschi & Calhoun,
1995) propose that the degree to which trauma challenges one’s beliefs and set of
assumptions about the world will determine how threatening a traumatic event is, and
subsequently facilitate the cognitive processing that leads to PTG. However, to the

142

researcher’s knowledge, few, if any, studies have directly assessed to what degree beliefs
were challenged by a trauma, a concept the researcher has termed Life Outlook Threat in
the present study. Rather, studies have focused on the degree of physical threat a trauma
evokes and how beliefs were altered. Furthermore, while the amount of deliberate and
purposeful cognitive engagement is theoretically key in the emergence of PTG, only a
few studies have examined cognitive processing in relation to PTG (Gangstad, et al.,
2009; Phelps, et al., 2008) Thus, there is a gap in the current literature regarding the role
of threat to one’s belief system and cognitive processing in the facilitation of PTG.
The overall purpose of this study was to increase understanding of how perceived
threat, both cognitive and physical, as well as symptoms of anxiety and depression are
associated with cognitive processing and PTG, and moreover, how cognitive processing
is related to PTG in breast, prostate, and colorectal cancer survivors. Findings suggest
that physical threat, along with depression, is associated with positive cognitive
processing, and positive cognitive processing and life outlook threat are associated with
PTG. However, Anxiety, Depression, and Negative Cognitive Processing did not emerge
as predictors of PTG in the current sample of cancer survivors.
A better understanding of these factors is helpful in illuminating the mechanisms
of PTG, allowing future research on the construct to be refined and furthered. In turn,
more empirical support for, and a clearer understanding of the process of PTG may allow
clinicians an increased ability to be aware of the potential for growth following trauma,
thus helping them to better assist trauma survivors in processing their experiences and
growth if and when it emerges. More broadly, research on PTG creates a more balanced
view in the psychology field regarding psychological outcomes of trauma. While
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negative consequences of trauma are very real and should never be minimized or ignored,
focusing exclusively on these outcomes creates a narrow view of human personality and
response. With the acknowledgement and recognition of growth comes the ability to be
more aware of the complexity of human personality, respectful of the multifaceted nature
of trauma, and allows for a more holistic approach in treating survivors.
Specific Findings and Implications for Hypotheses
The first hypothesis in this study examined factors associated with positive
cognitive processing. It stated that Anxiety and Depression would negatively predict
Positive Cognitive Processing, while Perceived Threat would positively predict Positive
Cognitive Processing. This hypothesis was partially supported by the data. The
demographic variables accounted for 22.6% of the variance in Positive Cognitive
Processing, with Interference of Treatment After-Effects emerging as a significant
individual predictor in the first and second block of variables, and After-Effects of
Treatment emerging as a significant predictor in all three blocks of the model. After
controlling for the demographic and cancer history variables, Anxiety and Depression
contributed to the model as well, accounting for an additional 18.5% of the variance in
Positive Cognitive Processing. However, only Depression emerged as a significant
individual predictor. Perceived Threat (composed of Life Outlook Threat and Physical
Threat) accounted for an additional 5.8% of the variance in the dependent variable, yet
only Physical Threat was a significant individual predictor. According to the final model,
for every one point increase in the Positive Cognitive Processing mean score, Physical
Threat decreased by 0.324 points, and Depression decreased by .270 points. Moreover,
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not having experienced permanent after-effects of treatment led to an increase in positive
cognitive processing.
These findings contribute to the current literature, as little is known about factors
associated with cognitive processing. Results suggest that lower levels of physical threat
and depression, as well as reporting no permanent after-effects of cancer treatment led to
an increase in positive cognitive processing. It was hypothesized that greater perceived
threat would lead to positive cognitive processing, as it has been theorized (Tedeschi &
Calhoun, 2004) that a certain amount of threat is needed to provide impetus for cognitive
processing. However, the results revealed the opposite. It may be that when physical
threat is high a survivor is psychologically and emotionally overwhelmed and is not able
to engage in the types of cognitive processing that are termed positive (i.e., Positive
Cognitive Restructuring, Downward Comparison and Resolution). Furthermore, with
depression often comes negative rumination and perseverative thinking (Primo, et al.,
2000) and the results indicate that when depression is low the ability to engage in
effortful and positive thinking increases. A similar argument can be made related to
survivors experiencing permanent after-effects of treatment. It seems logical to postulate
that with permanent after-effects comes greater distress and life disruption, which may
obstruct a survivor’s ability to think constructively. For example, significant correlations
were found in the current sample between After-Effects of Treatment and Depression (r =
.207, p = .008) as well as After-Effects of Treatment and Anxiety (r = .206, p = .008).
While Anxiety was not found to be a predictor of Positive Cognitive Processing in the
primary model, when it was entered in the equation without Depression in a follow-up
analysis, it was a significant predictor, such that for every one point increase in the
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Positive Cognitive Processing mean score, Anxiety decreased by 0.308 points. This
finding suggests that lower levels of anxiety may be important in the facilitation of
positive cognitive processing. Yet, the influence of Anxiety may be overtaken by the
variance it shares with Depression as was the case in this sample of breast, prostate and
colorectal cancer survivors.
Life Outlook Threat was not found to be a predictor of Positive Cognitive
Processing. This finding was surprising as theory has suggested that growth emerges after
trauma due to the event challenging one’s beliefs, which leads to intentional and effortful
cognitive engagement, which in turn, facilitates growth (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004).
Therefore, the researcher postulated that the threat to a survivor’s belief system would
provide the catalyst for positive cognitive processing. One possible explanation for the
non-significant result is that the amount beliefs are challenged and the specific type of
cognitive processing a survivor engages in are two distinct constructs. Furthermore, the
degree to which one’s worldview is challenged may lead to growth (see implications of
Hypothesis 2) through a mechanism other than positive cognitive processing. This is a
hypothesis that requires further research. In contrast, symptoms of depression and anxiety
directly influenced cognition and therefore these variables were found to be related to
positive cognitive processing. Moreover, a lack of physical threat may help to create the
emotional stability necessary for positive types of thinking, thus explaining the inverse
relationship between physical threat and positive cognitive processing. The overall results
suggest that helping cancer survivors decrease their sense of perceived physical threat, as
well as symptoms of depression and anxiety will increase positive cognitive processing.
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Moreover, reporting no permanent after-effects of treatment may be an indicator of an
increased ability to engage in positive cognitive processing.
The second hypothesis in the present study stated that Positive Cognitive
Processing and Perceived Threat would positively predict PTG, while Anxiety and
Depression would negatively predict PTG. This hypothesis was partially supported by the
data. The demographic control variables accounted for 16.1% of the variance in PTG,
with Age and Treatment Received being significant individual predictors in the first and
second block of variables. After controlling for the demographic variables as well as
Anxiety and Depression, Life Outlook Threat and Physical Threat explained an additional
18.2% of the variance in PTG, with Life Outlook Threat emerging as a significant
individual predictor. When added to the model, Positive Cognitive Processing explained
an additional 9.7% of the variance in PTG. In the final model, Treatment Received, Life
Outlook Threat and Positive Cognitive Processing were all significant predictors of PTG.
For every one point increase in the PTG score, Life Outlook Threat increased by .452
points and Positive Cognitive Processing increased by .416 points. Also, receiving more
than one form of cancer treatment was related to an increase in the PTG scores. Neither
Anxiety nor Depression was related to PTG.
These findings contribute to the current body of literature, which suggests that the
more beliefs are challenged by a traumatic event the more growth will emerge (Carboon,
Anderson, Pollard, Szer and Seymour, 2005; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). The result that
Life Outlook Threat was positively associated with PTG is important for several reasons.
First, while theoretical evidence is strong, there is a lack of empirical evidence related to
the degree beliefs are challenged and the emergence of growth. This finding lends
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support to theory and, in this sample, indicates that an increase in life outlook threat, or
cognitive threat, is associated with increased PTG. Moreover, follow-up analyses
revealed that when Life Outlook Threat and Physical Threat were entered into the
regression equation together, only Life Outlook Threat was significant. However when
entered separately, Physical Threat was a predictor of PTG, accounting for 2.1% of the
variance in PTG. This indicates that both life outlook threat and physical threat are
important in the emergence of growth, but that Life Outlook Threat may be more
significant due to the fact that when it was entered into the model alone it accounted for
18.2% of the variance.
The theory of PTG, along with past research, suggests that deliberate and effortful
cognitive processing is related to growth (Gangstad, Norman & Barton, 2009; Phelps,
Williams, Raichle, Turner & Ehde, 2008; Salsman, Segerstrom, Brechting, Carlson &
Andrykowski, 2009). The results of this study lend support to this notion such that an
increase in positive cognitive processing, which can be thought of as intentional and
reflective thinking, was related to an increase in PTG. Thus, the degree that cancer
challenged a survivor’s belief system, as well as whether a survivor is engaging in
positive cognitive processing may be important indicators of whether or not the
individual experiences growth. Moreover, assisting in the facilitation of positive
cognitive processing may facilitate growth.
It was hypothesized that a decrease in Anxiety and Depression would be related to
an increase in PTG; however, neither Anxiety nor Depression were significant predictors
of growth. Yet, the results from Hypothesis 1 demonstrated these variables are related to
Positive Cognitive Processing. It may be the case that symptoms of anxiety and
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depression are related to positive cognitive processing, and positive cognitive processing
is related to growth, but anxiety and depression are not directly related to the emergence
of growth. In other words, the relationship between anxiety and growth as well as
depression and growth may be explained by positive cognitive processing.
A somewhat surprising result found in Hypotheses 2 and 4 was that Treatment
Received was predictive of PTG. An ANOVA conducted during the preliminary analyses
revealed that receiving more than one form of cancer treatment compared to a single form
of treatment led to more growth in this sample. One possible explanation for this finding
is that a combination of cancer treatments creates more threat due to the potential of more
side effects than any one treatment in isolation and therefore more growth emerges. An
alternative explanation, and one that is supported by prior literature, is that this finding is
related to gender. While Gender did not emerge as a significant individual predictor of
PTG in the current sample, females reported significantly higher PTG scores compared to
males (p = .002), with mean scores of 53.03 and 39.18, respectively. This finding
corroborates prior research (Gooden & Winefield, 2007; Thornton & Perez, 2006;
Zwahlen, Hagenbuch, Carley, Jenewein and Buchi, 2010). To explore the potential
relationship between Gender and Treatment Received, the researcher conducted a Chisquare test for independence (with Yates Continuity Correction), which indicated a
significant association between the two variables, χ2 (1, n = 168) = 11.74, p = .001, phi =
-.279. The cross-tabulations of the Chi-square test indicated that the Multiple Treatment
group was composed of more females (79.3% female, 51.9% male) compared to the
Single Treatment group, which was composed of more males (20.7% female, 48.1%
male). This finding suggests that survivors who have received more than one form of
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cancer treatment may report higher PTG because this group is composed of more
females, rather than because of the specific treatment regimen.
An additional possibility may be that whether or not a survivor receives multiple
forms of cancer treatment is associated with stage of disease, and stage of disease is in
turn related to growth; e.g., prior research has suggested more advanced disease
facilitates growth (Cordova, et al., 2001; Tomich & Helgeson, 2004). Like Gender, Stage
of Disease was not found to be a significant predictor of growth in the current study. Yet,
a Chi-square test of independence indicated a significant association between Stage of
Disease and Treatment Received, χ2 (1, n = 159) = 13.07, p < .05, phi = .287. More
specifically, the cross-tabulations of the Chi-square test indicated that the Multiple
Treatment group was composed of more survivors diagnosed with Stage III and IV
cancer (93.3% Stage III, 71.4% Stage IV) compared to the Single Treatment group (6.7%
Stage III, 28.6% Stage IV). This suggests that the relationship between receiving multiple
forms of treatment and growth may be confounded by stage of disease. More research is
needed to explore these possibilities.
The third hypothesis of the study stated that Anxiety, Depression, and Perceived
Threat would all positively predict Negative Cognitive Processing, beyond the
contribution of the demographic variables. No significant results were obtained in the
regression equation; therefore this hypothesis was not supported. Based on the literature,
this finding was not expected (Manne, et al., 2004; Phelps, et al., 2008; Smith, et al.,
2003; Watkins, 2008). However, there are likely reasons for this outcome, as well as
implications that need to be considered in future research. Most importantly, the mean
score for Negative Cognitive Processing in the current sample was very low. Negative
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Cognitive Processing is calculated from the Cognitive Processing of Trauma Scale by
computing a mean score from the means of the two subscales that comprise the variable,
Denial and Regret. Possible scores range from zero to 12, with higher scores indicating
more negative cognitive processing. The mean score in the sample was 2.74; thus, the
survivors in the sample engaged in very little negative cognitive processing. It is worth
noting that there was a fair amount of variance among scores (M = 2.74, SD = 2.27), and
this remained the case even when the five scores that fell outside two standard deviations
of the mean were removed (M = 2.55, SD = 2.01), suggesting that participants provided a
fair range of responses on the variable. Nonetheless, overall the scores were low, with 42
participants (25% of the sample) reporting Negative Cognitive Processing scores below
one. In general, it is difficult to find relationships between variables when the dependent
variable is not endorsed, which may explain the lack of findings. Additionally, only a few
studies have used the Cognitive Processing of Trauma Scale to assess cognitive
processing (Gangstad, Norman & Barton, 2009; Phelps et al., 2008), and while the
measure has been shown to have adequate reliability and validity (Williams, et al., 2002),
it may not be refined to the extent necessary to detect a range of types of cognitive
processing. The role of cognitive processing, both positive and negative, and how it
relates to PTG, and other variables, in trauma survivors is an important field for further
investigation.
The fourth hypothesis in the present study stated that Negative Cognitive
Processing, Anxiety, and Depression will negatively predict PTG, while Perceived Threat
will positively predict PTG. This hypothesis was partially supported by the data. The
demographic variables contributed to the model and accounted for 16.5% of the variance
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in PTG, with Age and Treatment Received emerging as significant individual predictors.
After controlling for the demographic variables as well as Anxiety and Depression, Life
Outlook Threat and Physical Threat accounted for an additional 18.4% of the variance,
with Life Outlook Threat emerging as the significant individual predictor. In the final
model, Life Outlook Threat and Treatment Received were the only significant predictors
of PTG. For every one point increase in PTG score, Life Outlook Threat increased by
.499 points and receiving more than one form of cancer treatment was related to an
increase in the PTG score.
Anxiety, Depression and Negative Cognitive Processing did not contribute
significantly to the variance in PTG. Follow-up analyses revealed that when Life Outlook
Threat and Physical Threat were entered into the regression equation separately, Physical
Threat was a significant individual predictor of PTG, accounting for 2.2% of the variance
in PTG. As with Hypothesis 2, this result suggests that both life outlook threat and
physical threat have a role in the emergence of growth, but that Life Outlook Threat may
be more significant due to the fact that when it was entered into the model alone it
accounted for 18.3% of the variance.
The findings from Hypothesis 4 are similar to those found with Hypothesis 2 as
the same variables emerged as predictors of PTG and have the same implications (please
see above). The main difference between the results of the two hypotheses is that Positive
Cognitive Processing was a predictor of PTG in Hypothesis 2, while Negative Cognitive
Processing was not significant in Hypothesis 4. As stated above, this result may be due to
the low scoring of Negative Cognitive Processing in the sample. It is interesting to note
that originally, Negative Cognitive Processing did emerge was a predictor of PTG in
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Hypothesis 4, accounting for an additional 2.0% of the variance in PTG, ∆R2 = .020, ∆F
(1, 145) = 4.68, p = .032. Yet, upon examination of the Mahalanobis Distance statistic of
the model it was determined that this result was due to an outlier in the sample and once
the outlier was removed, Negative Cognitive Processing was no longer significant.
Nevertheless, the initial finding suggested that a decrease in negative cognitive
processing (β = -.154, p = .032) was related to an increase in PTG. It may be the case that
if the current sample of survivors engaged in higher levels of negative cognitive
processing, it would have emerged as a predictor of PTG. Further research is needed to
investigate this prospect.
Summary of Study Implications
The empirical literature has provided growing evidence for posttraumatic growth
(PTG) following cancer. It is clear that cancer can produce negative psychological
consequences; however, research has shown it can also lead to positive psychological
transformation. A critical question in the PTG literature is, “what processes are most
central to the emergence of growth?” The results of this study provide additional
information about the relationships between several factors and PTG. The implications of
the results from this study are significant to cancer survivors, psychologists and health
care providers in general.
By gaining understanding of the mechanisms of growth, effective interventions
can be developed and psychologists can be better equipped to help survivors not only
adjust and adapt to life after trauma, but also potentially grow in ways that they otherwise
may not have. Furthermore, evidence for the potential for growth following major
medical illness helps to broaden the perspective on potential responses to disease and
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increases health care providers’ awareness of the outcome of growth, which may lead to a
more complex and nuanced approach with survivors. Calhoun and Tedeschi (1999)
pointed out that experiencing growth is not the same as having an absence of negative
emotions. Distress and growth often occur simultaneously, and moreover, a certain
degree of distress may be needed for growth to be maintained. Thus, Calhoun and
Tedeschi (1999) advised that clinicians adopt a complex perspective when working with
survivors in order to enhance the possibility of growth.
When considering the implications of this study, it is important to bear in mind
how PTG benefits survivors. Prior research has demonstrated that the emergence of PTG
during active medical treatment for breast cancer predicted better quality of life and less
distress several years after treatment was completed (Carver & Antoni, 2004). While it
may take time for growth to emerge, it might also be the case that assisting survivors in
exploring benefits as they emerge early on in their cancer experience may lead to less
distress over time. Yet, as stated previously, growth and distress may often co-exist, and a
curvilinear relationship between the two variables has been indicated (Butler, Blasey,
Garlan, McCaslin, Azarow, Chen, et al., 2005; Kleim & Ehlers, 2009; Lechner et al.,
2003; McCaslin, Zoysa, Butler, Hart, Marmar, Metzler, et al., 2009). Exploring the
positive ways a survivor has changed due to his or her struggle to cope with cancer does
not negate or minimize the challenges and hardships that cancer creates. Survivors who
report PTG may continue to feel distress and their cancer may have a certain amount of
lasting negative influence in their lives. However, simultaneously, they may feel more
self-reliant, more capable, have developed deeper relationships, have a greater
appreciation for life and re-prioritized their lives in a way that brings them contentment.
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The findings of this study highlight the importance of the role of Physical Threat,
Depression, Anxiety and whether or not a survivor experiences permanent After-Effects
of Treatment in predicting Positive Cognitive Processing. In addition, Life Outlook
Threat, Positive Cognitive Processing and Type of Cancer Treatment Received were
found to be associated with PTG. The results suggest that an increase in physical threat
hinders positive cognitive processing, and positive cognitive processing is significant in
that it predicts growth. Furthermore, an increase in life outlook threat facilitates growth.
Thus, taken all together, it is important to assess a cancer survivor’s perception of threat,
both cognitive and physical, as well as symptoms of anxiety and depression and
engagement in positive cognitive processing. It is also necessary to determine what
specific types of treatment a survivor has received and whether or not he/she is
experiencing permanent after-effects from treatment.
The results of the study further indicate the importance of understanding and
working from a survivor’s subjective point of view because key variables related to PTG,
such as Life Outlook Threat, are subjective. The relationship between life outlook threat
and growth indicates that from a clinical perspective, allowing survivors to explore how a
cancer diagnosis challenged their general worldview may facilitate growth, as having
beliefs challenged often leads to the consideration of philosophical questions regarding
life. Subsequently, over time, survivors may come to question their assumptions, or
believe that their beliefs pre-trauma are no longer accurate, leading them to create a set of
beliefs and values that are more fitting to their new reality, which is regarded as growth.
While growth should not be expected, nor should psychologists imply to survivors that
those who do not report growth are somehow deficient, it may be helpful for some
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survivors to understand that while it may be initially distressing for beliefs to be
challenged, or even shattered by trauma, this challenge may eventually lead to positive
change and growth.
In general, the results point to the usefulness of psychosocial interventions for
cancer survivors that address cognitions. Psychologists should consider opportunities to
decrease symptoms of anxiety and depression as well as physical threat and the
permanent after-effects of treatment as a means to manage emotional distress and
increase positive cognitive processing, which in turn, would likely increase growth.
The relationship between positive cognitive processing and growth suggests that
constructive and deliberate cognitive engagement facilitates growth (Tedeschi &
Calhoun, 2004). Thus, it may be helpful for psychologists to assist cancer survivors in
identifying ways they can engage in constructive thinking as opposed to the negative or
brooding rumination that may often occur in the initial aftermath of trauma. Cognitive
and relaxation based techniques may also be useful as these tend to lessen anxiety and
depression, thereby increasing the ability to engage in effective cognitive processing.
Perhaps most importantly, creating a safe, empathic, nonjudgmental and supportive
therapeutic relationship is likely key to the facilitation of PTG. Providing survivors with
the space and opportunity to freely and openly process their experiences with cancer
would expectedly lead to more deliberate and constructive cognitive engagement, and
subsequently, growth.
Study Limitations
While this study produced results that addressed gaps in the current psychooncology growth literature, there are limitations to the contributions. First, the results
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found cannot be generalized to all cancer, or trauma, survivors as a whole. The sample
consisted of breast, prostate and colorectal cancer survivors, the majority of whom were
diagnosed with Stage I or Stage II cancer. Thus, results cannot be generalized to other
trauma survivors as different types of trauma may create distinct sets of circumstances.
Moreover, the current sample of cancer survivors was predominately Caucasian (94.1%),
came from households with high incomes, was well educated, married, and female.
(While both females and males were represented in the sample, over 69% of the sample
was female) Therefore, the sample is not representative of the diversity found within the
general cancer survivor population. Overall, the results of this study are limited by the
lack of diversity within the sample (e.g., racial/ethnic, economic, etc.) and it would be a
mistake to assume that the results can be generalized to survivors who fall outside the
specific demographics of the sample.
Second, the sample appeared to be positively biased. Very low levels of negative
cognitive processing, anxiety and depression were reported, while a high level of positive
cognitive processing was reported. These findings might be due to socially desirable
responding, or it may be the case that primarily psychologically healthy and motivated
survivors were the ones who completed the survey. This seems probable if one considers
that survivors who are currently experiencing high symptoms of anxiety or depression
may not feel well enough or have the energy to complete the questionnaire. Overall, the
sample appears to represent the most mentally healthy portion of survivors and not
survivors as a general group.
Third, mailed survey research is at risk of self-selection bias and typically has a
response rate of approximately 30% (Cobanoglu, Warde & Moreo, 2001), which was the

157

rate obtained in the current study. While the sample size of this study was adequate, a
larger sample size would have been preferable, which can be difficult to obtain using this
method. Future research should be mindful that survey research conducted through the
mail might lead to positively biased and/or smaller samples and strive to sample a wider
range of individuals through more efficient and/or multiple methods.
Fourth, this study used a cross-sectional research design. With this type of design,
researchers are unable to draw conclusions regarding causation, and future researchers
might consider a longitudinal design where survivors are assessed pre- and post-trauma,
if possible, so that cause and effect can be examined. In addition, questions have been
raised in the literature regarding the validity of self-reported growth (Frazier & Kaler,
2006; Ransom, Sheldon & Jacobsen, 2008). The measure of growth used in this study,
the Posttraumatic Growth Inventory (PTGI), has established validity and reliability
(Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996) and has been widely used in the growth literature.
Nonetheless, it would be useful for future research to investigate growth using multiple
methods, and multiple sources of data (e.g., data from survivors and significant others,
for example).
While much effort was made to select measures that had been tested for reliability
and validity within the PTG literature, there are limitations associated with two of the
measures included in this study. These measures have been less widely used in research
since the constructs have only recently received attention in the literature. Thus, there
were few measurement options for the researcher. The Perceived Threat questionnaire
was complied using several items that have been used in prior research (Cordova et al.,
2001; Cordova et al., 2007; Lechner, et al., 2003; Salsman et al., 2009), although on a
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limited basis, and three items created by the researcher to assess the degree of challenge
cancer poses on a survivor’s worldview. These three questions were based on theory and
were created based on the research’s knowledge that no prior study has assessed the
degree to which a trauma challenged worldview. While reliability analyses for the
measure as a whole, as well as groupings of items, were conducted before the primary
analyses were performed, and showed adequate reliability (please see preliminary
analyses section in Chapter 4) the validity of this instrument to measure perceived threat
in cancer survivors beyond the current sample has not been investigated and might be an
important area for future research.
The Cognitive Processing of Trauma Scale (CPOTS), while it directly met the
needs of this study, has received only a modest amount of attention in the literature. This
is likely because the construct has not been empirically investigated in the growth
literature to any great extent. The instrument did have adequate reliability in the current
sample, and based on the alpha values it was determined that it was appropriate for the
researcher to create two variables out of the scale items, Positive Cognitive Processing (α
= .83) and Negative Cognitive Processing (α = .70) rather than examining each of the
measure’s five subscales individually. Yet, based upon prior research, the creators of the
measure determined that a five factor model fit the data best (Williams et al., 2002).
Thus, it is possible that the two factor model utilized in this study is not the most
effective when assessing cognitive processing using the CPOTS. Furthermore, the lack of
significant results related to Negative Cognitive Processing may be the result of using a
measure that is potentially not adequate to identify this type of cognitive processing. At
the time of this study, there were few measures assessing types of cognitive processing,
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and it is important to note limitations associated with measures that have not been widely
used.
Recommendations for Future Research
This study was designed to explore the relationships between Anxiety,
Depression, Perceived Threat, Cognitive Processing and PTG. Breast, prostate and
colorectal cancer survivors who were at least 18 years of age, English speaking, and who
did not have a history of being diagnosed with multiple types of cancer, were recruited
through the Rocky Mountain Cancer Centers in the Denver metro area. It will be
important for future research to focus on cancer survivors of multiple types and stages of
cancer, located in a range of geographic areas, and with diverse demographic
backgrounds in order to generalize findings from research.
An important area for future research is to further investigate the role of challenge
to survivors’ assumptive worlds as well as cognitive processing in facilitating growth as
these two variables have not been widely studied in the literature. It is also imperative
that future research seeks to recruit participants with a broader range of psychological
health and functioning, as the current sample reported low levels of negative cognitive
processing as well as depression and anxiety, thereby hindering the emergence of
significant results related to these variables. It would be interesting to see if a relationship
between negative cognitive processing and PTG exists in a population that reports higher
levels of negative cognitive processing.
As mentioned previously, there is little information available regarding measures
of perceived threat and cognitive processing as these constructs have received little
empirical attention in the literature. This study contributes to this gap in research by
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creating and establishing the reliability of three items that assess how much being
diagnosed with cancer challenges a survivor’s assumptive world (i.e., Life Outlook
Threat) and reveals a relationship between an increase in life outlook threat and an
increase in PTG. Further research could consider creating additional measures of
perceived threat and cognitive processing as well as more widely establishing the validity
and reliability of those that exist.
Additionally, replicating findings regarding perceived threat, cognitive processing
and growth would help to advance research in this important area. This study supports the
finding that a decrease in physical threat and depression as well as not experiencing aftereffects of treatment predicts positive cognitive processing, and an increase in life outlook
threat and positive cognitive processing predicts PTG. Receiving more than one type of
cancer treatment was also found to be related to increased growth, which is interesting
and somewhat unexpected. The researcher proposes that this finding may be confounded
by gender and stage of disease. More research is necessary to explore these relationships
and it is unknown if the overall results would be duplicated among other groups of cancer
and/or trauma survivors.
Finally, using a cross-sectional research design utilizing regression analyses of the
data prevents the drawing of conclusions regarding a causal relationship between the
independent and dependent variables. Nonetheless, the use of multiple sources of data,
both qualitative and quantitative, as well as longitudinal designs would provide
researchers with a more complete understanding of the process and mechanisms of PTG
and would help to establish causation. While the findings of this study are an important
step in considering the predictive ability of the variables of Anxiety, Depression and
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Perceived Threat on Cognitive Processing and PTG, more complex research methods will
be a necessary progression so researchers can examine multifaceted theoretical models.
Conclusions
This study examined the effect of Anxiety, Depression and Perceived Threat on
Positive and Negative Cognitive Processing as well as the effect of these variables on
Posttraumatic Growth (PTG) in breast, prostate and colorectal cancer survivors. Three of
the four hypotheses were partially supported by the data. Results indicate that AfterEffects of Treatment, Physical Threat and Depression account for a significant amount of
the variance in levels of Positive Cognitive Processing within this population, and a
follow-up analysis revealed that when Anxiety was included in the regression equation
without Depression, it also emerged as a significant predictor of Positive Cognitive
Processing. Furthermore, Life Outlook Threat, Positive Cognitive Processing and Type of
Treatment Received (single versus multiple forms of treatment) accounted for a
significant amount of the variance in levels of PTG, and a follow-up analysis indicated
that when Physical Threat was entered into the regression equation without Life Outlook
Threat it, too, was a predictor of PTG. The hypothesis that Perceived Threat, Anxiety and
Depression would positively predict Negative Cognitive Processing was not supported,
which might be related to the low scoring of Negative Cognitive Processing in the current
sample.
The overall findings are consistent with both the theoretical and empirical growth
literature. Based upon the researcher’s knowledge, Life Outlook Threat (i.e., the degree
to which being diagnosed with cancer challenges a survivor’s assumptive world), in
particular, is a variable that has not been empirically assessed prior to this study and the
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finding that it is predictive of PTG addresses an important gap in the literature. While this
study had several limitations, the results provide further evidence that receiving multiple
types of cancer treatment, the emergence of permanent after-effects of treatment,
perceived cognitive and physical threat, positive cognitive processing, including the role
that symptoms of anxiety and depression have on positive cognitive processing, are
important considerations in PTG research.
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Appendix A

Glossary of Terms

Anxiety. In the study, anxiety is defined as only the cognitive symptoms of
anxiety, to prevent overlap with physical symptoms that are often related to illness, such
as dizziness, and fatigue (Bjelland, Dahl, Haug, & Neckelmann, 2002).
Assumptive world. Assumptive world is defined as the general set of beliefs, and
assumptions about the world, individuals develop and rely on to guide their actions, help
them to understand the causes and reasons for events, and that can provide them with a
general sense of meaning and purpose (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004).
Avoidance. Avoidance is defined as “cognitive or behavioral efforts aimed at
preventing thoughts and memories from entering conscious awareness when they become
too overwhelming. Avoidance can involve both intentional efforts (e.g., trying not to
think about an unwanted thought) as well as seemingly unintended responses (e.g., a
sense that one’s emotions are numb) (Primo, et al., 2000, p. 1142). Both avoidance and
intrusive thoughts (see below) are regarded as problematic when they are prolonged or
excessive, suggesting an inability to integrate a traumatic experience with pre-existing
cognitive schemas (as cited in Primo, et al., 2000).
Cognitive processing. Cognitive processing is defined as “the process of actively
thinking about a stressor, the thoughts and feelings it evokes, and its implications for
one’s life and future” (Bower, Kemeny, Taylor, & Fahey, 1998, p.979).
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Deliberate rumination. Deliberate rumination is defined as effortful and
purposeful thinking that might include reminiscing, problem solving, and trying to make
sense out of a situation. This process tends to repair or restructure the individual’s general
way of understanding the world (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2006).
Depression. Similar to anxiety, in the study depression is defined as only the
cognitive symptoms of depression, and is primarily related to the anhedonic state that
often accompanies depression in order to distinguish between symptoms related to
depression versus those related to cancer (Bjelland, Dahl, Haug, & Neckelmann, 2002;
Zigmond & Snaith, 1983).
Intrusive thoughts. Intrusive thoughts include involuntary thoughts, images and
dreams that can be associated with positive or, more frequently, negative emotions in
response to a stressor. They are triggered by internal or external stimuli related to the
original stressor and experienced as beyond personal control (Primo, et al., 2000).
Life Outlook Threat. In the study, Life Outlook Threat, in relation to the theory of
PTG, is defined as the degree to which the traumatic event is challenging to an
individual’s assumptive world (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004).
Mortality salience. In the study, mortality salience is defined as the perceived
degree being diagnosed with cancer threatens an individual’s life, and the degree to
which he/she reacted with feelings of intense fear, horror, or helplessness (DSM-IV-TR;
American Psychiatric Association, 2000).
Negative cognitive Processing. Negative cognitive processing is defined by two
of the subscales within the Cognitive Processing of Trauma Scale; Denial and Regret
(Williams et al., 2002).
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Perceived Threat. In the study, perceived threat is defined as the degree to which
being diagnosed with cancer threatens a survivor’s sense of physical well-being.
Perceived threat consists of two main components: mortality salience and reacting with
feelings of intense fear and helplessness.
Positive cognitive processing. Positive cognitive processing is defined by three of
the subscales within the Cognitive Processing of Trauma Scale; Positive cognitive
restructuring, Resolution, and Downward comparison (Williams et al., 2002).
Posttraumatic growth. Posttraumatic growth is defined as “the individual’s
experience of significant positive change resulting from the struggle with a major life
crisis” (Calhoun, Cann, Tedeschi, & McMillian (2000), p. 521). Tedeschi and Calhoun
(1996) divided posttraumatic growth into five domains: personal strength, new
possibilities, relating to others, appreciation of life, and spiritual change.
Rumination. Rumination is generally defined as “a class of conscious thoughts
that revolve around a common instrumental theme and that recur in the absence of
immediate environmental demands requiring the thoughts” (Martin & Tesser, 1996, p.1).
Survivor. In the study, survivor is defined as a person who remains alive to
function during and after overcoming a serious hardship or life-threatening disease. In
cancer, a person is considered to be a survivor from the time of diagnosis until the end of
life (National Cancer Institute, 2009).
Trauma/Traumatic Event. In the study, trauma is defined as a set of circumstances
that represent significant challenges to the adaptive resources of the individual, as well as
to the individual’s way of understanding the world and his/her place in it (Janoff-Bulman,
1992).
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Appendix B
Informed Consent
Posttraumatic Growth Following Cancer: The Role of Cognitive Processing,
Anxiety, Depression and Perceived Threat
Principal Investigator: Jennifer Caspari, MA
Co-Investigators:
Teri Simoneau, PhD
Susan Ash-Lee, MSW, LCSW

INTRODUCTION
You are invited to take part in a research study that is a doctoral dissertation conducted
by Jennifer M. Caspari, MA, a counseling psychology doctoral student at University of
Denver. This study is being conducted in partnership with the Rocky Mountain Cancer
Centers (RMCC). In addition, it is being supervised by Dr. Cynthia McRae, PhD,
Professor of Counseling Psychology, University of Denver, Denver, CO, 80208, 303871-2475, cmcrae@du.edu.
You are being asked to participate because you are a cancer survivor. Your participation
in this study is entirely VOLUNTARY. You should read the information below before
deciding whether or not to participate.
PURPOSE OF STUDY
The purpose of this study is to explore factors that contribute to positive changes
following cancer. It is important to learn more about factors that lead to positive change
and growth after cancer. Such information can be used to develop useful interventions
that recognize the complexity of the cancer experience, and better help people with
cancer.
PROCEDURES
If you volunteer to participate in this study, we will ask you to do the following things:
 Read and sign this form. Your consent to participate in the study is given when you
sign and return this form. A second identical form is enclosed for you to keep for your
reference.
• Read and sign the enclosed HIPAA Research Authorization Form. A second identical
HIPAA form is enclosed for you to keep for your reference.
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 Fill out the enclosed questionnaires about your demographic
information, mood, thoughts and experiences related to cancer, and
changes you may have experienced following cancer. The questionnaire
will take approximately 20 to 30 minutes to complete. You will fill out
this questionnaire just once.
 Return the signed consent form, signed HIPAA form and the completed
questionnaire in the pre-addressed, postage-paid envelope provided.
POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
The risks associated with this project are minimal. However, sometimes people
experience mild emotional distress or embarrassment when asked to think about their
thoughts and feelings related to their cancer experience. Filling out the questionnaires
may evoke unpleasant feelings related to your cancer experience, or you may feel
burdened by filling out the questionnaires. You are encouraged to participate only if you
feel that filling out these questionnaires will not be a burden. While we encourage you to
answer every question, we respect your right to choose not to answer any questions that
make you feel uncomfortable. If you become upset by participating in the study, you may
contact the co-investigators: Teri Simoneau, PhD (303) 285-5082 or Susan Ash-Lee,
MSW, LCSW (303) 285-5076 to be given a referral for psychological counseling. You
will be responsible for the cost of counseling.
ANTICIPATED BENEFITS TO SUBJECTS
Because individuals respond differently, no one can know in advance if participation will
be helpful in your particular case. The potential benefits may include gaining more
understanding regarding your cancer experience.
ANTICIPATED BENEFITS TO SOCIETY
The possible benefits from this study to society could include developing better
interventions that provide support to cancer patients and survivors.
ALTERNATIVES TO PARTICIPATION
You may discontinue the study at any time and still have the right to other treatments
available to you. The questionnaires given as part of this study are unrelated to any care
you may be receiving and are solely part of this research study.
PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION
You will receive no money for participation in this study.
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FINANCIAL OBLIGATION
Neither you nor your insurance company will be billed for you participation in this
research.

PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY
We will make every effort to keep your research records confidential. You will be
assigned an “identification number” and this will be used for all questionnaires and data
analysis. The list that identifies your name with your identification number will be kept in
a locked file separate from your questionnaire data. Please do NOT include your name
anywhere on the questionnaire.
Records that identify you may be looked at by the following people:
• Federal agencies that oversee human subject research
• University of Denver Institutional Review Board
• HCA-HealthONE Institutional Review Board
• The investigators and research team for this study
• Regulatory officials from the institution where the research is being conducted, to
ensure compliance with policies or monitor the safety of the study.
The results of this research may be presented at meetings or in published articles;
however, your name will be kept private. Information collected during the research study
will be kept in a secure computer system. After your participation in the study is
complete, you will be identified only by code number. Any protected health information
will be kept under lock and key.
PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
Your participation in this research is VOLUNTARY. Consent to participate in this
research, and the use of the answers you supply, is given when you return your signed
consent form and completed questionnaire by mail.
If you choose not to participate, you may simply throw away this questionnaire. Your
relationship with Rocky Mountain Cancer Centers, or your right to health care or
other services to which you are otherwise entitled, will not be affected. You can
discontinue participation at any time without affecting your future care.
•

If you choose not to participate, please take a moment and return the preaddressed, postage-paid refusal card.
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IDENTIFICATION OF INVESTIGATORS
If you have any questions or concerns about this research, or if you experience a negative
reaction to this study, please feel free to contact the principal investigator:
Principal Investigator: Jennifer Caspari, MA (720) 468-118, jennifer.caspari@gmail.com
If you are in need of another questionnaire you may contact the co-investigators:
Co-Investigators: Teri Simoneau, PhD (303) 285-5082 and Susan Ash-Lee, MSW,
LCSW (303) 285-5076
RIGHTS OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS
You may discontinue participation and simply throw away this questionnaire at any time
without penalty. You are not waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies because of your
participation in this research study. If you have questions regarding your rights as a
research subject, you may contact Susan Sadler, Chair, University of Denver Institutional
Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects, at 303-871-3454, or Sylk SottoSantiago, Office of Research and Sponsored Programs at 303-871-4052 or write to either
at the University of Denver, Office of Research and Sponsored Programs, 2199 S.
University Blvd., Denver, CO 80208-2121. Or you may contact the Vice Chairman of the
HCA-HealthONE Institutional Review Board, Carol Greenwald, M.D. at 303-584-2300.
Please sign below if you understand and agree to the above. If you do not understand any
part of the above form, please ask the prinicipal investigator (Jennifer Caspari, MA (720)
468-1118, jennifer.caspari@gmail.com) any questions you have.
Please return this signed form, signed HIPAA form and your completed questionnaire in
the return envelope provided. Keep the enclosed identicial copy of this form and the
HIPAA form for your reference.
I have read and understood the abovementioned descriptions of the study called
Posttraumatic Growth Following Cancer: The Role of Cognitive Processing, Anxiety,
Depression and Perceived Threat. I have asked for and received a satisfactory explanation
of any language that I did not fully understand. I agree to participate in this study, and I
understand that I may withdraw my consent at any time. I have received a copy of this
consent form.
___________________________________________
Printed Name of Participant
___________________________________________
Signature of Participant
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_______________________
Date

Investigator’s Statement:
I have made myself available to answer and explain the research to the patient or legally
authorized representative and answered all questions. I believe that he-she understand
the information described in this informed consent and freely consents to participation.

_____________________________
Printed Name of Investigator

____________________________
Signature of Investigator
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________
Date

Appendix C
HIPAA Research Authorization
Authorization to use and Disclose Health Information
This section explains who will use and share your study-related health information is you
agree to be in this study.
By signing this Authorization, you agree to allow the use and sharing of you health
information as described below.
1. During the study, the study doctor and study staff will use, collect, and share
health information about you. The health information that may be used and shared
includes:
•
•

All information collected during the research study and procedures described in
the Informed Consent Form; and
Personal health information in your medical records that is relevant to the study,
which includes your past medical history, medical information from your primary
care physician, and other medical information relating to your participation in the
study.

2. The study doctor and study staff may share your health information with:
•
•
•

Representatives of the government agencies in the United States and other
countries (including the FDA)
Review boards and other persons who watch over the safety, effectiveness, and
conduct of the study and
The sponsor of the study and its affiliates, agents, and contractors assisting in the
conduct of completion of the study.
These people will use your records to review the study, check the safety and
results of the study, and check how researchers are doing the study.

3. The study doctor, study staff, or sponsor may use some facts about your being in
this study in books, magazines, journals, and scientific meetings. If this happens,
no one will use your name or other information that could be used to identify you.
4. The study doctor and study staff may share your health information with your
health care payer to resolve your claim if you are hurt because of being in this
study. If this happens, the study doctor or the sponsor may share your health
information with their insurance carriers to resolve your insurance claim, and the
study doctor may also request medical records from your other health care
providers to learn more about your condition.
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5. The study doctor and study staff will share your health information with your
health care payer in order to collect payment for costs (even if your health care
payer does not cover these costs).
6. Once your health information has been disclosed to a third party, federal privacy
laws may no longer protect it from further disclosure. After the study doctor or
study staff shares your health information with the sponsor or others, the sponsor
or others may share your records with other people who do not have to protect the
privacy of your health information.
If you would like to know how the sponsor will protect the privacy of your health
information, ask the study doctor how to get this information.
Please note that the study doctor or study staff may share personal information
about you if required by law. (For example, if the study doctor or study staff
suspects that you are going to harm someone or yourself.) If you have questions
about this, please ask the study doctor.
You do not have to sign this Authorization, but if you do not, you may not
participate in the study. If you do not sign this Authorization, your right to
medical treatment will not be affected.
You may change your mind and revoke (take back) this Authorization at any time
for any reason. To revoke this Authorization, you must write a letter to the study
doctor.
However, if you revoke this Authorization, you will not be allowed to continue
taking part in the study. Also, even if you revoke this Authorization, the study
doctor and study staff may continue to use and share the health information they
have already collected to protect the integrity of the study.
While the study is in process, you may not be allowed to see your health
information that is created or collected by the study doctor and study staff during
the course of the study. After the study is finished, however, you may see and
copy this information.
This Authorization does not have an expiration (ending) date.
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You will be given a copy of this Authorization after you have signed it.
Indicate your agreement to the use and sharing of your study-related health
information by signing below:
________________________________
Printed Name of Participant

___________________
Date

________________________________
Signature of Participant

____________________
Time
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Appendix D
Demographics

Please answer the following questions about yourself. These will be used for statistical
analysis only.
For the following questions, please place a checkmark in the area to the left of the option
that best applies to you.
Part 1: Background Information
1. What is your date of birth? ____________________________________________
2. What is your gender?
____ Female
____ Male
____ Transgender

3. Which of the following categories below do you feel best describes your race
or ethnicity?
____ Caucasian
____ Hispanic, Latino/a
____ African-American
____ Asian or Pacific Islander
____ American Indian or Alaskan Native
____ Other (please indicate) _____________________________________________

4. What is your marital status? (Specify only one)
____ Single (never married)
____ Committed relationship
____ Married/Remarried
____ Divorced/Separated/Widowed
____ Other (please specify) ______________________________________________
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5. What is your current living arrangement? (Specify only one)
____ Live alone
____ Live with spouse or partner, with children
____ Live with spouse or partner, without children
____ Live with children
____ Live with someone else (please specify) ________________________________
____ Other (please specify)_______________________________________________
6. How many years of school have you completed? (please circle the number that best
explains your level of education)
8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19+

____ Other (please specify)______________________________________________

7. Approximately, what is your household income?
Check one income range that best describes your household income for last year from
all sources of income (salaries, wages, tips, social security, disability income or
insurance, retirement income, or any other income).
_____ Under $25,000
_____ $25,001-$50,000
_____ $50,001-$75,000
_____ $75,001-$100,000
_____ $100,000 +
Part 2: Questions about Cancer Diagnosis and Treatment
8. When were you first diagnosed with cancer?
______________MONTH _________YEAR
9. What type of cancer were you diagnosed with?
______ Breast
______ Prostate
______ Colorectal
______ Other
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10. What stage was your cancer at initial diagnosis?
_____ Stage I
_____ Stage II
_____ Stage III
_____ Stage IV
_____ Other (please explain)________________________________________________
11. Where did you receive your cancer treatment? (Or where are you receiving treatment
if on maintenance medication). Please specify specific location. (Example: Rocky
Mountain Cancer Centers Denver-Midtown)
_______________________________________________________________________
12. What treatment did you receive for your cancer? (check all that apply)
_____ Radiation
_____ Chemotherapy
_____ Surgery (please specify) ______________________________________________
_____ Other (please explain) ________________________________________________
13. How long has it been since you finished your primary treatment? (Primary treatment
refers to radiation, chemotherapy, or surgery, not maintenance medication)
_____ 2 - 4 months
_____ 5 - 6 months
_____ 7 - 12 months
_____ 13 – 36 months
_____ Other (please specify)________________________________________________
14. What medications are you CURRENTLY taking? (check all that apply)
_____ Arimidex
_____ Tamoxifen
_____ Aromasin
_____ Femara
_____ Zometa
_____ Faslodex
_____ Tykerb
_____ Lupron
15. a. Have you experienced a recurrence of cancer?
_____ yes
_____ no
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b. If you checked YES, when did you experience a recurrence?
_______________MONTH__________YEAR
c. If you checked YES, how many recurrences have you had?
_____ 1- 2
_____ more than 2
_____ Other
16. a. Right now do you have any permanent after effects from treatment?
_____ yes
_____ no
b. If you checked YES, what are they?_________________________________________
c. If you checked YES, how much do the after effects interfere with your daily activities?
_____ none
_____ a little
_____ some
_____ a lot
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Appendix E
Perceived Threat
Some people with cancer think that being diagnosed with cancer, as well as the general
cancer experience, represents a threat to their physical well-being, mortality, and the way
they see the world. The following set of questions asks you about the threat of your
cancer experience.
For each question, please circle the number from 1 to 6 that best describes your
experiences.
Life Outlook:
Some people think cancer challenges the way they see themselves, others, and the world.
The following questions address this issue.
1. To what extent did being diagnosed with cancer challenge the way you see your self
1

2

3

4

5

6

not at all

extremely

2. To what extent did being diagnosed with cancer challenge the way you see others?
1

2

3

4

5

not at all

6
extremely

3. To what extent did being diagnosed with cancer challenge the way you see the world
in general?
1

2

3

4

not at all

5

6
extremely

199

Physical Threat:
Some people with cancer think about cancer’s effect on their mortality. The following
questions address this issue.
4. Please try to recall how you felt when you were first diagnosed with cancer. At that
time, how likely did you think it was that you would die of cancer?
1

2

3

4

5

not at all

6
extremely

5. How likely do you think it is that you will develop cancer again, or that your cancer
will progress in your lifetime?
1

2

3

4

5

not at all

6
extremely

6. How likely do you think it is that you will die of cancer?
1

2

3

4

5

not at all

6
extremely

Reaction to Cancer:
Some people with cancer react to the experience with feelings of potential threat and fear.
The following questions address this issue.
7. In response to your cancer experience, have you felt that the event was a potential
threat to your life and safety?
1

2

3

4

5

not at all

6
extremely

8. In response to your cancer experience have you reacted with feelings of intense fear,
helplessness, or horror?
1

2

3

4

not at all

5

6
extremely
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Appendix F
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale
The following set of questions asks you about how you feel. Read each item below and
check the reply which comes closest to how you have been feeling in the past week.
Don’t take too long over your replies; your immediate reaction to each item will probably
be more accurate than a long, thought-out response.
1. I feel tense or ‘wound up’
_______ Most of the time
_______ A lot of the time
_______ From time to time, occasionally
_______ Not at all
2. I still enjoy things I used to enjoy
_______ Definitely as much
_______ Not quite so much
_______ Only a little
_______ Hardly at all
3. I get a sort of frightened feeling as if something awful is about to happen
_______ Very definitely and quite badly
_______ Yes, but not too badly
_______ A little, but it doesn’t worry me
_______ Not at all
4. I can laugh and see the funny side of things
_______ As much as I always could
_______ Not quite so much now
_______ Definitely not so much now
_______ Not at all
5. Worrying thoughts go through my mind
_______ A great deal of the time
_______ A lot of the time
_______ Not too often
_______ Very little
6. I feel cheerful
_______ Never
_______ Not often
_______ Sometimes
_______ Most of the time
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7. I can sit at ease and feel relaxed
________ Definitely
________ Usually
________ Not often
________ Not at all
8. I feel as if I am slowed down
________ Nearly all the time
________ Very often
________ Sometimes
________ Not at all
9. I get a sort of frightened feeling like ‘butterflies’ in the stomach
________ Not at all
________ Occasionally
________ Quite often
________ Very often
10. I have lost interest in my appearance
________ Definitely
________ I don’t take as much care as I should
________ I may not take quite as much care
________ I take just as much care as ever
11. I feel restless as if I have to be on the move
________ Very much indeed
________ Quite a lot
________ Not very much
________ Not at all
12. I look forward with enjoyment to things
________ As much as I ever did
________ Rather less than I used to
________ Definitely less than I used to
________ Hardly at all
13. I get sudden feelings of panic
________ Very often indeed
________ Quite often
________ Not very often
________ Not at all
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14. I can enjoy a good book or radio or television program
________ Often
________ Sometimes
________ Not often
________ Very seldom
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Appendix G
Cognitive Processing of Trauma Scale
The following set of questions asks you about your experience with cancer. Please rate
the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements, using the following
rating sale.
-3, strongly disagree
-2, moderately disagree
-1, slightly disagree
0, neither mainly agree nor disagree
1, slightly agree
2, moderately agree
3, strongly agree
______ 1. There is ultimately more good than bad in this experience
______ 2. I have figured out how to cope
______ 3. I say to myself ‘this isn’t real’
______ 4. I have moved on and left this event in the past
______ 5. Overall, this event feels resolved for me
______ 6. I have comes to terms with this experience
______ 7. I often think, ‘if only I had done something different’
______ 8. I blame myself for what happened
______ 9. I refuse to believe that this really happened to me
______ 10. I wish I could have handled this differently
______ 11. Other people have had worse experiences than mine
______ 12. I act as if this event never really happened
______ 13. Even though my experience was difficult, I can think of ways that it could
have been worse
______ 14. My situation is not so bad compared to other peoples’ situations
______ 15. I am able to find positive aspects of this experience
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______ 16. I have been able to find a ‘silver lining’ in this event
______ 17. I pretend this didn’t really happen
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Appendix H
The Posttraumatic Growth Inventory
People sometimes find that a crisis such as cancer may eventually lead to positive
changes in their lives. For each of the items below, indicate the degree to which the
changes described in the items has occurred in your life-as of today-as a result of cancer,
using the following scale:
0= I did not experience this change as a result of my cancer.
1= I experienced this change to a very small degree as a result of my cancer.
2= I experienced this change to a small degree as a result of my cancer.
3= I experienced this change to a moderate degree as a result of my cancer.
4= I experienced this change to a great degree as a result of my cancer.
5= I experienced this change to a very great degree as a result of my cancer.
______ 1. I changed my priorities about what is important in life.
______ 2. I have a greater appreciation for the value of my own life.
______ 3. I developed new interests.
______ 4. I have a greater feeling of self-reliance.
______ 5. I have a better understanding of spiritual matters.
______ 6. I more clearly see that I can count on people in times of trouble.
______ 7. I established a new path for my life.
______ 8. I have a greater sense of closeness with others.
______ 9. I am more willing to express my emotions.
______ 10. I know better that I can handle difficulties.
______ 11. I am able to do better things with my life.
______ 12. I am better able to accept the way things work out.
______ 13. I can better appreciate each day.
______ 14. New opportunities are available which wouldn’t have been otherwise.
______ 15. I have more compassion for others.
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______ 16. I put more effort into my relationships.
______ 17. I am more likely to try to change things which need changing.
______ 18. I have a stronger religious faith.
______ 19. I discovered that I’m stronger than I thought I was.
______ 20. I have learned a great deal about how wonderful people are.
______ 21. I better accept needing others.
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